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The thesis comprises three essays which reveal previously undetected costs and
benefits of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).
Chapter 2 empirically studies the effect of credit derivatives on employees –
one of firms’ key non-financial stakeholders. We find that CDSs increase employee
compensation for both non-executive and executive workers. The positive effect on
the base pay increases with employees’ bargaining power and their expected exposure
to unemployment risk. Unlike general workers, the growth of CEO compensation is
mainly driven by performance-sensitive pay with higher vega in compensation struc-
ture. In addition, CDSs improve overall labor welfare due to wider cash profit sharing
and enhanced health and safety programs. These findings are consistent with the in-
creased workers’ concerns on human capital risk and enhanced interest-alignment
between shareholders and employees in CDS firms.
Chapters 3 and 4 shed new light on the effect of CDSs on financial contracting.
In Chapter 3, we theoretically examine whether creditors’ access to the CDS mar-
ket changes their incentive to use traditional tools of financial contracting, such as
debt covenants, for protection of their interests. We find that CDS-protected lenders
can have a lower incentive to include covenants in loan agreements. But the reason
of this reduced incentive lies not in the substitutive effect of the CDS market, dis-
cussed broadly in empirical literature, rather in its detrimental effect on covenant
effectiveness. Our model demonstrates debt covenants as a more universal tool for
debt protection, the effectiveness of which in the presence of CDS trading is mainly
determined by the probability of creditors to turn into empty creditors and force a
liquidation.
Chapter 4 provides strong empirical support for the comparative statics predic-
tions developed in Chapter 3. Unlike covenants, CDSs do not alleviate, but enhance
investment distortions created by debt overhang. The investment-distortion effect of
CDSs is more prominent for firms with the higher likelihood of the empty creditor
threat, such as for the higher amount of CDS insurance written on firms and/or the
weaker firms’ fundamentals. Further analysis reveals that, in the post - CDS incep-
tion, covenants lose their effectiveness as a mechanism against no-commitment. The
CDS market undermines shareholders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment




The introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) in 1990s, one of the major and the
most controversial financial innovations of recent decades, and the explosive growth
of their market had a significant impact on the debtor-creditor relationship. CDSs
are credit derivatives providing an effective tool for credit risk transfer. Working
similar to insurance contracts, CDSs give lenders protection against credit events
of borrowers (e.g., bankruptcy filing, default on payments) in exchange for periodic
premium payments. The past decade has seen the rapid development of research, both
theoretical and empirical, on the costs and benefits of the CDS market motivated by
CDS-related regulatory changes following the Great Financial Crisis.1 Even though,
the CDS market has demonstrated a continuous decline in notional value after the
crisis from $61.2 trillion in 2007 to $9.4 trillion in 2018, it still remains significant,
representing the third biggest over-the-counter derivatives market in the world and
leaving never ending debates on the effect of CDS trading on welfare (BIS, 2018). We
contribute to this discussion by revealing previously undetected positive and negative
effects of the CDS market.
The thesis comprises three essays. Chapter 2 empirically studies the effect of
CDS trading on one of firms’ key non-financial stakeholders – employees. Chapters 3
and 4 shed new light on the effect of CDSs on financial contracting.
Chapter 2 provides the fist comprehensive assessment of the effect of CDSs
on human capital of reference firms. Human capital is increasingly seen as one of
the most crucial asset for corporate competitive success (Zingales, 2000). As an im-
portant stakeholder of the firm, employees can suffer significant losses when their
1The current literature on CDSs is well summarized in a comprehensive survey of Augustin,
Subrahmanyam, Tang, Wang, et al. (2014).
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employer firms are in distress or file for bankruptcy. Furthermore, employee wealth
can be directly affected by corporate debt and investment policies though its effect
on performance-based compensation and indirectly through adjusting base pay for
changes in overall firm risk. Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we find that the in-
troduction of CDS trading on firms’ debt increases employee compensation for both
non-executive and executive workers (corresponding to a 8% increase in average em-
ployee pay and a 10% increase in total CEO compensation). Using Environmental,
Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) STATS data on employee relationship rat-
ings, we find that the effect of CDSs on general employees is associated not just with
higher base wages, but also in the form of improvement in overall labor welfare, par-
ticularly in broad-based cash profit sharing and health and safety benefits. These
results persist even after addressing the potential endogeneity of CDS introduction
using propensity score matching, reverse causality test, and instrumental variable
estimations.
We identify two channels that drive our results. First, we find that CDSs
affect employee wealth, particularly the base part of employee compensation, through
workers’ inability to fully insure their human capital risk.2 That we label as the
“human capital risk” channel. The growth in credit supply ex ante and probability
of inefficient liquidation ex post following the introduction of CDS trading (e.g., see
Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Saretto and Tookes, 2013; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and
Wang, 2014) raise employees’ concerns on their human capital risk. Consistent with
the stakeholder theory (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Berk, Stanton, and Zechner,
2010; Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2013; Titman, 1984), we find the increase in
general workers’ compensation in response to the increased bankruptcy risk post CDS
inception. These wage differentials, compensating for increased employees’ concerns
on human capital risk, represent indirect costs of financial distress paid by firms ex
ante. Interestingly, we find that general workers in the average firm with traded CDSs
are more concerned about risk of losing their job than executives. In support of the
“human capital risk” channel, we find the stronger CDS effect on employee base pay
in firms with higher employee bargaining power and greater workers’ exposure to
unemployment risk.
Second, to take advantage of the relaxed financing constraints and increased
lenders’ risk tolerance following the introduction of CDS trading (Bolton and Oehmke,
2011; Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Winton, 2013), shareholders of CDS firms have an
2Murphy (1999) emphasizes that risk-averse employees would naturally prefer a dollar increase
in base salary to a dollar increase in “target” bonus or any other variable compensation.
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incentive to further align managers’ interests and encourage their risk taking to max-
imize equity value. That is exactly what we can observe in our results for executive
workers, the growth in total compensation of whom post CDS inception is mainly
driven by the increase in equity-based pay. We label this as the “interest alignment”
channel. In addition to the increased equity-based pay, used to directly link managers’
payoffs to a shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we find the increase in
the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega). Where the increased
vega corresponds to a reduction in managers’ aversion to take “riskier” policy choices
(e.g., in the form of higher firm leverage and more investments in innovation). While
the incentive-based pay is particularly relevant for executive workers, our findings
on improvement in overall labor welfare post CDS inception suggests firms’ efforts
in better treating and motivating both executive and non-executive employees. Fur-
thermore, broad-based profit sharing schemes help CDS firms to minimize voluntary
turnover by partly reducing workers’ concerns on employers’ stability.
In Chapter 3, we theoretically examine whether creditors’ access to the CDS
market changes their incentive to use traditional tools of financial contracting, such
as debt covenants, for protection of their interests. Our study is mainly motivated by
recent empirical findings of Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019), who focus on the effect
of the CDS market on design of corporate debt contracts with particular reference
to loan contractual protection. The authors document less restrictive covenants and
lower collateral requirements in newly issued loans of CDS-traded firms. Based on
these findings, they suggest that the access of creditors to the CDS market improves
contracting efficiency by substituting loan contractual protection and reducing con-
tracting costs. They argue that these results can be explained by lenders’ moral
hazard in the presence of CDSs, which reduces lenders’ incentive to monitor. How-
ever, this argument remains weak.3 To the best of our knowledge, we provide the
first theoretical study that analyses the effect of CDS introduction on debt covenants
and establishes the predictions for empirical analysis to test.
In theory, we can say that one instrument can change the incentive to use
another instrument when it either can replace it as an adequate substitute, or when it
3The argument that the introduction of CDSs weakens creditors’ incentive to monitor remains
controversial. Creditor monitoring of borrowers goes beyond monitoring of loan terms, and it also
represents an important task for bank regulatory compliance. Banks are required to maintain
adequate provisions, reserves and capital levels. Timely monitoring of borrower financial condition
underlies the assessment of an appropriate amount of loan loss reserves, which in turn affects lenders’
Tier 1 regulatory capital (Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses, BIS,
2015). The requirement to comply with supervisory standards (e.g., comprehensive credit risk
management, maintenance of adequate capital levels) remains unchanged for CDS-protected lenders.
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can affect the work of another tool in the joint use. The substitution of one instrument
for another is possible just when it is made to function like the original. In other
words, we can expect that CDS trading can replace covenants in loan agreements, if
it solves problems that are typically addressed by covenants.
Traditionally, debt holders include covenants in loan agreements as a way to
reduce the costs of no-commitment by disciplining and determining the set of policies
that shareholders are committing to. Contract incompleteness and lack of commit-
ment of equity holders to repay a debt and/or implement policies that maximize firm
value create agency conflicts between debt and equity. Examples of these conflicts
are strategic default, dilution of the value of existing debt claims, asset substitu-
tion, underinvestment and leverage ratchet effect in the form of resistance to debt
reductions.
The rise of the CDS market has created a new commitment device for bor-
rowers to repay their obligations. Redistribution of the bargaining power in favour
of creditors following the introduction of CDSs reduces the incidence of strategic de-
fault by making debt renegotiation more difficult (e.g., see Bolton and Oehmke, 2011;
Danis and Gamba, 2018; Kim, 2016). Despite the ability of CDSs to reduce strate-
gic default incentive, it is not clear a priori how CDSs affect agency distortions in
borrowers’ investment and financing decisions caused by lack of commitment. Intu-
itively, with CDSs, self-interested equity holders should reflect in their decisions the
lower possibility of future renegotiation in financial distress. On the one hand, the
increased renegotiation frictions and the subsequent reduction of the occurrence of
strategic default might reduce deviations from firm value maximising decisions.4 On
the other hand, the anticipation of forceful liquidation with no chance to renegoti-
ate the debt might increase the equity holders’ incentive to engage in opportunistic
behaviours, especially when the firm approaches financial distress.
Taking into account that both CDSs and covenants can improve contracting
efficiency by increasing ex post shareholders’ commitment, we theoretically examine if
the presence of one instrument changes the incentives to hold the other. We construct
a two-period model with a levered firm that optimally chooses investment in each
period and decides whether to repay the debt or renegotiate it with the creditors at the
end of the period. The model captures important features of real world contracts such
4For instance, Pawlina (2010), drawing on the results of his theoretical model, suggests that the
debt overhang might be reduced by higher renegotiation frictions such as in public debt, for which
disperse debt holding increases coordination costs and makes renegotiation prohibitively expensive
(Rajan, 1992), and/or in legal systems with strong enforcement of creditors’ rights (Favara, Schroth,
and Valta, 2012).
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as contract incompleteness and lack of commitment of equity holders. The latter leads
to a possibility of strategic default, whereby even in a solvent state the shareholders
threaten to default strategically and renegotiate to appropriate creditors’ wealth. The
presence of risky debt and the lack of commitment to repay it naturally create an
incentive to underinvest given the anticipation that some benefits from investing in
capital might be transferred to the creditors under renegotiation. Overall, the model
generates both underinvestment and strategic default.
Using this baseline model, we examine the rationality for creditors to have
either instrument or both. Specifically, we first measure how effective covenants and
CDSs considered individually in protecting the debt from agency conflicts by reduc-
ing deviations from firm value maximizing investment decisions and shareholders’
incentive to default strategically. Next, by allowing the two instruments together, we
examine any changes in effectiveness of each instrument under the presence of the
other. We find that the access of debt holders to credit insurance can indeed reduce
their incentive to include covenants in loan agreements. But the reason of this re-
duced incentive lies not in the substitutive effect of the CDS market discussed broadly
in empirical literature, rather in its detrimental effect on covenant effectiveness.
Specifically, our model demonstrates debt covenants as a more universal tool
for debt protection, which cannot be replaced by CDS trading. While both CDSs and
covenants increase debt protection by reducing the likelihood of strategic default, the
instruments are not equally effective in reducing distortions of the optimal investment
policy caused by lack of commitment. Unlike covenants, the effect of CDSs on under-
investment is ambiguous (i.e., it can both alleviate or exacerbate the debt overhang
problem) and conditional on the likelihood of the empty creditor threat. In these
situations, credit derivatives and covenants are not substitutes.
Interestingly, we also show a new effect of CDS trading on covenants, which
has been overlooked in the literature. We find that the effectiveness of covenants in
alleviating underinvestment post CDS inception is mainly determined by the prob-
ability that creditors force a liquidation. When there is a high risk for borrowers
being affected by empty creditors, covenants lose their effectiveness in solving the
debt overhang problem.5 These findings are not inconsistent with Shan, Tang, and
5Anecdotal evidence on the empty creditor behavior exists beyond numerous cases in the period
of the Great Financial Crisis. As an example before the crisis, in 2003-2005, underlying companies,
such as an American energy company Mirant and a global designer and producer of vehicle structural
components Tower Automotive, were unable to work out a deal with CDS-protected lenders and
were forced to file for Chapter 11. More recently, CDS protection buyers speculated on the failure of
Caesars Ent. (in 2014), Windstream (in 2019), and Thomas Cook (in 2019). See Danis and Gamba
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Winton (2019) or with other empirical papers on covenants and CDSs, but they pro-
vide a new explanation for why covenants have become looser following CDS trading.
Covenants are costly because they constrain a firm’s behavior. If they are not useful in
addressing the debt overhang problem after the introduction of CDSs, then it makes
sense for the firm and the lender to negotiate looser covenants at loan inception.
Chapter 4 takes a step further and tests empirically the theoretical predictions
developed in Chapter 3. Differently from the study of Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019),
we propose a direct test on the ability of CDS contracts being used as an adequate
substitute for debt covenants by focusing on potential distinctive characteristics of
the two commitment mechanisms. We rely on the existing literature of empirical
investment models considering debt overhang problem, and test individual and joint
effects of CDSs and financial covenants on the investment distortions caused by debt
overhang.
Based on the sample of U.S. private loans, we find strong empirical support
for the comparative statics predictions developed in Chapter 3. We find that the
investment-distortion effect of CDSs dominates. In other words, the negative invest-
ment effect of debt overhang is amplified after the introduction of CDS trading on
firm debt. Furthermore, the investment-distortion effect of CDSs is more prominent
for firms with the higher likelihood of the empty creditor threat, such as for the higher
amount of CDS insurance written on firms and/or the weaker firms’ fundamentals. In
contrast, stricter financial covenants restore investment incentive destructed by debt
overhang. However, in the post - CDS inception, covenants lose their effectiveness
as a mechanism against no-commitment. The CDS market undermines shareholders’
incentive to undertake valuable investment despite the presence of strict covenants in
a loan contract.
In our empirical analysis, we address potential endogeneity concerns with re-
spect to both the timing of CDS introduction and the financial covenant strictness,
using the implementation of the CDS Big Bang Protocol on April 4, 2009 as a quasi-
natural experiment and an instrumental variable approach, respectively. In addition,
we perform various checks and confirm that our findings are robust to alternative
measures of the likelihood of the empty creditor threat and underinvestment.
In summary, the thesis contributes to the ongoing debates on the welfare effects
of the CDS market by revealing previously undetected its positive and negative effects.
On the one hand, we find the positive effect of CDSs on human capital, the firm’s
(2019) for the summary of recent involvement of CDS buyers/sellers in bankruptcy/restructuring.
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asset not listed in the balance sheet but bringing essential economic value for the
firm’s business and the economy as a whole. On the other hand, we demonstrate the
detrimental effect of CDSs on effectiveness of traditional tools of financial contracting,
such as debt covenants, used by creditors to reduce debt-equity agency conflicts.
Notwithstanding the potential loss of covenant effectiveness following the introduction
of CDS trading, debt holders should be particularly careful in loosening strictness of
covenants in credit contracts given its complementary value in reducing the incidence




Credit Default Swaps and Human
Capital
2.1. Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit derivatives providing an effective tool for
credit risk transfer. Recent literature documents the real effects of CDSs on reference
firms’ bankruptcy risk, financial polices, firm value, and even spillover effects to their
suppliers. However, there is ongoing debate on the welfare effects of CDSs. Human
capital is increasingly seen as one of the most crucial asset for corporate competitive
success (Zingales, 2000). As an important stakeholder of the firm, employees can
suffer significant losses when their employer firms are in distress or file for bankruptcy.
Corporate debt and investment policies can affect employee wealth directly though
its effect on performance-based compensation and indirectly through adjusting base
pay for changes in overall firm risk. Does the introduction of CDS trading on a firm’s
debt affect its employee wealth and overall labor welfare? In this study, we empirically
investigate the effect of CDS contracts on one of reference firms’ key stakeholders –
employees.
CDSs can affect employee wealth through various channels. First, through the
inability of employees to fully insure their human capital risk. Corporate financial
distress and bankruptcy can impose significant costs for firms’ employees. To avoid an
immediate bankruptcy, highly levered distressed firms could have a strong incentive
to cut costs associated with employee pay and benefits to ensure full repayment of
debt. Further, if firms are forced into bankruptcy, employees could be fired. That
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generates potential future earning losses for employees associated with long delay
before re-employment and costly job search (Diamond, 1982; Katz and Meyer, 1990;
Lazear, 2009). Consistent with the stakeholder theory, in competitive labor market,
firms with a greater distress risk have to provide higher ex ante wages to compensate
employees’ concerns on human capital risk (e.g., Berk, Stanton, and Zechner, 2010;
Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; Titman, 1984). These compensating wage differentials
represent indirect costs of financial distress paid by firms ex ante.
The introduction of CDS trading on a borrower debt makes hedged creditors
tougher in debt renegotiation through increasing their incentives to impose harsher
loan terms over the process of renegotiation, or, in a case of creditors’ over-insurance,
to push the reference firm into bankruptcy to trigger the payment from their CDS po-
sitions. At the same time, the ability to hedge with CDSs also encourages creditors to
lend more to reference firms ex ante (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). Empirical evidence
confirms firms’ increased leverage, bankruptcy risk and less out-of-court debt restruc-
turing after the introduction of CDS trading on their debt (Danis, 2016; Saretto and
Tookes, 2013; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014), that in turn might raise em-
ployees’ concerns on their human capital risk and result in the ex ante increase in
employee pay post CDS introduction. Since risk-averse employees would naturally
prefer a dollar increase in base salary to a dollar increase in “target” bonus or any
other variable compensation (Murphy, 1999), we expect that the increase in employee
pay due to unemployment concerns is concentrated mainly in the base salaries. Taken
together, we label this as the “human capital risk” channel.
Furthermore, CDSs can affect the employee compensation through the inter-
est alignment between employees and shareholders based on principle-agent concerns.
Back to the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the literature argues that
to implement second-best corporate policies shareholders adjust managerial compen-
sation structure in a way to induce managers to take actions that increase equity
value. Given that these actions might be beneficial for shareholders at the expense
of creditors, creditors price debt issues accordingly (e.g., see Brockman, Martin, and
Unlu, 2010).
The introduction of CDS trading increases credit supply for CDS firms that
can be used to finance more investments projects (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). The
reduced monitoring incentive and increased risk tolerance from CDS-protected credi-
tors also give firms greater flexibility in choosing investments (Morrison, 2005; Parlour
and Winton, 2013). Therefore, to take advantage of the relaxed financing constraints
and increased lenders’ risk tolerance post inception of CDS trading, shareholders of
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CDS firms have an incentive to further align managers’ interests and encourage their
risk taking to maximize equity value. Specifically, we expect the growth in convex
CEO packages through the increase in equity-based pay and vega incentives. While
the incentive-based pay is particularly relevant for executive workers, CDS firms may
also want to increase efforts and productivity of general workers, for instance, through
providing employees additional non-contractual benefits (Edmans, 2011). We label
this as the “interest alignment” channel.
It is worth noting that human capital and interest alignment channels are not
mutually exclusive and can coexist with each other. As an example, the relaxation of
credit constraints and the increased debt capacity post CDS introduction, on the one
hand, lead to higher ex ante wages consistent with greater employees’ concerns on
human capital risk.1 On the other hand, it requires an adjustment of managerial pay
structure to induce managers to implement more aggressive debt policy. Risk-averse
and undiversified managers might be reluctant to support the increase in leverage
post CDS inception, that eventually might hurt their personal interests. Even under
condition of reduced lender monitoring, interests of risk-averse managers would be
largely aligned with those of lenders. Consequently, to align managers’ interests with
those of shareholders, we expect an increase in convexity in executive compensation
that allows to encourage risk-taking by giving managers opportunity to share in the
gains but not all of the losses (e.g., see Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
To empirically investigate the effect of CDSs, we first identify a sample of 953
firms with CDS trading introduced on their debt at some point between 1997 and
2013. We match CDS data against data of employee compensation for both executive
workers (presented by payments to CEOs) and regular workers (presented by aver-
age employee pay). Our baseline results show that the introduction of CDS trading
on firm’s debt leads to an increase in employee compensation for both executive and
non-executive workers. The positive effect of CDS trade initiation is both statistically
and economically significant. On average, the introduction of CDSs corresponds to
a 8% increase in average employee pay and a 10% increase in total CEO compensa-
tion. Interestingly, opposite to regular workers, the compensation of whom is mostly
presented by the fixed (base) pay, we find insignificant changes in CEOs’ salaries
after CDS contracts start trading on the debt of the average firm. The growth in
1Firms with high leverage pay higher ex ante wages to mitigate workers’ concerns on unem-
ployment risk in bankruptcy (e.g., see Berk, Stanton, and Zechner, 2010; Chemmanur, Cheng, and
Zhang, 2013). The positive interaction between financial leverage and firm’s probability of entering
distress are supported by number of studies (e.g. see Ofek, 1993). Ofek (1993) shows that higher pre-
distress leverage increases the probability of employee layoffs and reductions in wages and benefits
in order to meet outstanding debt obligations.
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total CEO compensation instead is mainly driven by the increase in equity-based
(long-term incentive) compensation.
We use multiple methods to address the potential selection bias and endo-
geneity concerns on CDS trading. One potential concern is that CDS traded firms
(henceforth, CDS firms) might be different from non-CDS firms in ways that are sys-
tematically related to firms’ employee-related decisions. In addition to the fixed effects
controls in all model specifications, we apply a propensity score matching procedure
to conduct a matched-sample analysis with CDS firms (as a treatment group) and
non-CDS firms (as a control group). To mitigate a potential bidirectional causal rela-
tion between CDS trade initiation and employee pay policy, we conduct a direst test
on reverse causality by applying the method suggested in Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003). Finally, to further mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we use the instrumen-
tal variable (IV) approach with the lenders’ foreign exchange hedging activities as an
instrument. Lenders with larger foreign exchange hedging positions are more likely to
hedge the credit risk using CDSs (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009). Altogether,
our endogeneity tests support a positive and causal relation between the initiation of
CDS trading and employee pay policy.
Having established the relationship between CDSs and employee pay, we fur-
ther investigate the channels that may drive these results. Consistent with the “hu-
man capital risk” channel, we find the stronger CDS effect on wages (base pay) for
firms whose workers face greater expected exposure to unemployment risk. Specifi-
cally, employees demand higher wages following the introduction of CDSs in industries
with greater layoff propensity and longer delay in workers’ re-employment. In addi-
tion, we find the more pronounced increase in employee pay in less generous US states
that provide low unemployment insurance benefits (i.e., with higher costs to workers
during unemployment). Furthermore, the positive effect of CDS trading on wages in-
creases with employee bargaining power as measured by cross-industry heterogeneity
in labor union coverage. Where highly unionized industries are characterized by a
higher ability to bargain with management for higher wages.
Note that employees’ demand of higher promised wages in response to increased
bankruptcy risk does not require that workers are able to directly assess firms’ credit
risk, observe CDS trading, or track CDS spreads. Brown and Matsa (2016) find that
job seekers accurately perceive firms’ financial condition. The signals regarding em-
ployment stability can be obtained from a variety of sources, such as media report,
credit rating agencies, and even word of mouth. In addition, CDSs can further im-
prove this information environment (Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Kim, Shroff, Vyas,
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and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2018).
Next, we test the “interest alignment” channel. The separation of ownership
creates concerns on principle-agent issue. To align interests, equity-based contracts
can be used to directly link managers’ payoffs to a shareholder value (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). That is exactly what we can observe in our results for executive
workers, the growth in total compensation of whom post CDS inception is mainly
driven by the increase in equity-based pay. In addition, we test how managerial
incentives in CEOs’ compensation packages, such as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to
stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega),
alter in response to the introduction of CDS trading. While the increased delta
in the compensation structure creates effort incentives, the risk-averse and under-
diversified managers may still forgo some positive NPV projects if they are risky.
This can be mitigated by increasing vega incentives, associated with convex payoffs
in the form of option grants and holdings. Controlling for the endogenous feedback
effects of corporate policy choices and managerial incentives in simultaneous systems
of equations (3SLS), we find the increase in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock
return volatility (vega) post CDS inception, that reduces managers’ aversion to take
“riskier” policy choices (e.g., in the form of higher firm leverage and more investments
in innovation).2
Finally, using Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) STATS
data on employee relationship ratings, we find that the effect of CDSs on general
employees is associated not just with higher base wages, but also in the form of
improvement in overall labor welfare, particularly in broad-based cash profit sharing
and health and safety benefits. These results suggest CDS firms’ efforts in better
treating and motivating both executive and non-executive employees. Furthermore,
broad-based profit sharing schemes minimize voluntary turnover in firms by partly
reducing workers’ concerns on employers’ stability.
Our study sheds new light on the real effects of credit derivatives. We provide
the first comprehensive assessment of the effect of CDSs on human capital representing
one of the key non-financial stakeholders of firms. We find that the inception of CDS
trading on borrowers’ debt leads to the increase in employee pay and the improvement
of labor welfare measures. These findings add positively to the ongoing debates on
the welfare effects of CDSs. Our study also helps to improve our understanding of
the determinants of corporate labor relationship and emphasizes the role of credit
2We follow Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and use a term “risky” policy choices based on its
translation into greater firm risk represented by higher stock return volatility.
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derivatives in shaping corporate human capital related policies.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the
relevant literature. Section 2.3 describes data and samples used in the empirical anal-
ysis. Section 2.4 presents baseline empirical results and addresses potential selection
bias and endogeneity concerns. Section 2.5 establishes channels through which CDSs
affect the employee pay policy and documents the CDS impact on corporate labor
welfare. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2. Related Literature
Our study relates to the literature on the real effects of CDSs, stakeholder theory of
capital structure, and managerial compensation and incentives.
2.2.1. Real effects of CDS
The availability to hedge credit risk with CDSs can affect the real side of borrowing
firms by altering the debtor-creditor relationship. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) first
theoretically show that the introduction of CDS trading have both positive and nega-
tive effects on CDS-referenced borrowing firms. On the one hand, the introduction of
CDS reduces the incidence of strategic default due to strengthening bargaining power
of creditors in debt renegotiation. That allows borrowing firms to increase their debt
capacities and finance more positive net present value projects ex ante. On the other
hand, when borrowers face financial distress, CDSs can give rise to inefficient liqui-
dations ex post by producing “empty creditors” who tend to be over-protected with
CDSs and have incentives to push the firm into bankruptcy to trigger the payment
from their CDS positions even though renegotiation would be efficient.3 Danis and
Gamba (2018) further show that while there are both negative and positive effects
of CDSs on firm value, the net effect is positive. After calibrating their theoretical
model, they find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average after the introduction
of CDS trading on firms’ debt. Consistent with the previous literature, they also
demonstrate that the CDS market leads to more liquidations, reduces the probability
of costly debt renegotiation, increases firm leverage and allows firms to invest more.
Morrison (2005) and Parlour and Winton (2013) show that the existence of the CDS
3The problem of empty creditors was firstly introduced by Hu and Black (2008) based on the
idea of separation of creditors’ cash flow rights from their control rights.
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market can lead to disintermediation and reduce banks’ incentives to monitor their
borrowers.
Recent empirical studies generally support the above theoretical predictions.
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) document that the introduction of CDSs
leads to the growth in the probability of bankruptcy filing, while Danis (2016) finds
that bondholders holding CDSs are less likely to engage in an out-of-court debt re-
structuring. Kim (2016) demonstrates that CDS trading leads to reduction in stategic
default -related cost of corporate debt. Saretto and Tookes (2013) support the greater
credit supply for CDS firms, allowing firms to borrow at longer maturity and maintain
higher leverage ratios. However, CDS firms save part of their increased leverage as
cash holdings (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2017). Corporate innovation out-
puts are also increased since CDS-protected creditors are more tolerant to corporate
risk takings (Chang, Chen, Wang, Zhang, and Zhang, 2019). Chakraborty, Chava,
and Ganduri (2015) and Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) motivate their findings of
the effect of CDS trading on debt covenants based on the reduced lenders’ incentive
to monitor CDS firms. Different from the theoretical prediction of increase in firm
value, Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018) find net decrease in firm value because of
the increased cost of capital.4
In addition to the effect of the CDS market on the debtor-creditor relationship,
recent literature explores the externality of CDS contracts to related parties. Li and
Tang (2016) find that suppliers tend to use less leverage because of the increased
bankruptcy risk of CDS-referenced key customers. On the contrary, these suppliers
start using more equity financing with lower issuance costs following the improvement
of information environment after the onset of CDS trading on their key customers’
debts. Li and Tang (2018) further find that CDS-referenced firms gain more market
share from their non-CDS industry rivals through more aggressive pricing strategies.5
Chen, Leung, Song, and Avino (2019) and Hong and Wang (2018) find that CDSs
increase CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) in CEOs’ compensation.
4Theoretically, CDSs can increase or decrease firm value. On the one hand, CDSs can increase
firm value because of the decreased incidence of strategic debt service, relaxed credit constrains and
reduced costly equity financing, that can be used to finance valuable investment projects. On the
other hand, CDSs can decrease firm value due to bankruptcy costs associated with the increased
likelihood of inefficient liquidation ex post.
5Note that the results of Li and Tang (2016, 2018) are also in line with the predictions of the
stakeholder theory of capital structure (e.g., see Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008; Titman, 1984),
indicating that in industries producing unique products the price consumers are willing to pay is a
decreasing function of the probability of firm’s liquidation. While suppliers tend to maintain lower
leverage in response to the increased probability of default of their key customers.
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Differently from the prior studies, we focus on the effect of CDSs on reference
firms’ employees, including both general and executive workers. We analyze the effect
of CDS trading on human capital through examining changes in employee compen-
sation because of “human capital risk” concerns and “interest alignments”. We also
explicitly investigate the effect of CDSs on total labor welfare.
2.2.2. Human capital costs and compensation incentives
Workers are an important stake holder of a firm. Concerns on ex post human capital
risk, associated with significant costs imposed on employees by corporate financial
distress and bankruptcy, increase indirect bankruptcy costs for firms through higher
ex ante wages. These costs might come from long delay before re-employment (Katz
and Meyer, 1990), costly job search (Diamond, 1982) or a limited supply of match-
specific job opportunities (Lazear, 2009). The stakeholder theory of capital structure
emphasizes that these human capital related indirect bankruptcy costs can be large
enough to prevent corporate use of additional debt. Optimal capital structure there-
fore depends on the trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and these ex ante human
compensating costs in addition to the ex post costs of financial distress (e.g., Titman,
1984; Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; Berk, Stanton, and Zechner, 2010).6
Recent empirical papers specifically quantify the employee costs of corporate
bankruptcy and the corresponding effects on ex ante wage premium. Based on
individual-level micro data from Census, Graham, Kim, Li, and Qiu (2019) find
that employee annual earnings decrease by 10% following employer’s bankruptcy and
stay below a pre-bankruptcy level for at least six years. The affected employees are
more likely to leave the firm, industry, and local labor market. Eckbo, Thorburn, and
Wang (2016) find that just one-third of the incumbent CEOs in bankrupt firms main-
tain the executive employment with median zero change in compensation, whereas
the remaining two-thirds leave the executive labor market and suffer compensation
losses. As a result, firms with high leverage need to pay higher ex ante wages to mit-
igate workers’ concerns on unemployment risk in bankruptcy. These human capital
6Traditional trade-off theory of capital structure suggests that the optimal capital structure is
the trade-off between the corporate tax saving benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs. However, the
observed direct bankruptcy costs (i.e., direct expenses associated with the bankruptcy process) is
too low to be a sufficient disincentive for firms to take higher levels of debt and inconsistent with the
observed leverage (e.g., Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Graham, 2000). A growing body of literature
suggests indirect bankruptcy costs as a solution to this puzzle. It shows that the event of liquidation
can impose significant costs for the firm’s stakeholders (customers, workers, and suppliers), that can
also significantly affect the firm’s capital structure.
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costs increase corporate indirect bankruptcy costs and limit the use of debt (Agrawal
and Matsa, 2013; Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2013; Graham, Kim, Li, and Qiu,
2019).7 However, the presence of exogenous factors reducing the human capital loss
in bankruptcy, such as greater unemployment benefits (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013) or
larger labor market (Kim, 2018), is positively associated with the debt usage. Shocks
to employees’ bargaining positions also affect the unemployment risk related ex ante
wage premiums (Singh and Naaraayana, 2018).
Even when there are no liquidation costs for employees, firms have a desire
to keep and maintain their reputation for treating employees fairly given the value
human capital can create. While poor employee welfare, such as high injury rates
in workplace, can decrease firm value because of labour productivity losses, legal-
related expenses, regulatory fines or reputational costs, etc. (e.g., see Cohen and
Wardlaw, 2016). Firms with a high level of employee satisfaction generate superior
long-horizon returns through improved recruitment, retention and better motivation
of current workers (e.g., see Edmans, 2011). Chang, Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015)
and Liu, Mao, and Tian (2017) document an unique importance of human capital in
enhancing corporate innovation performance.
To maximize equity value, shareholders can also adjust employee compensa-
tion structure to align employees’ interest based on principle-agent concerns. That
is particularly important for executive compensation given managers’ involvement
in firm value critical decisions. The alignment of interests can be achieved through
regulation of both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance
and employee wealth. While the higher slope (delta) motivates employees to work
harder due to sharing gains and losses with shareholders. The increase in the con-
vexity (vega) in compensation allows to encourage risk-taking by giving employees
an opportunity to share in the gains but not all of the losses (e.g., see Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document that riskier corporate
policies, such as higher R&D, lower capital expenditures, higher leverage, cause a
higher vega in CEO pay, whereas less risky policy choices cause a higher delta.
Taken together, the prior studies indicate the effect of human capital risk and
principle-agent concerns on employee compensation and corresponding incentives. We
contribute to this literature by documenting the role of credit derivatives in affecting
7Agrawal and Matsa (2013) estimate that the size of ex-ante indirect bankruptcy costs given
unemployment risk is about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. They show
that these costs can explain nearly 90% of the difference between the tax benefits of debt and the
risk-adjusted ex post costs of financial distress calculated in previous studies.
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employee pay and total labor welfare.
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics
Corporate CDS contracts are traded over the counter. We identify our sample of
CDS firms by combining three data sources: CreditTrade (from June 1997 to March
2006), the GFI Group (from 2002) and Markit (from 2002). We use the first trading
date for each firm’s CDS contract in our sample as their CDS introduction date.
The overlapping in samples of the data sources allows us to cross-check and ensure
the accuracy of our identifications of CDS firms and their CDS introduction date.
In the combined sample, we have 953 North American firms that have CDS trading
initiated on their debt at some time during 1997 and 2013.8 Panel A of Table 2.1
reports the distribution of CDS trade initiation by year. The largest number of CDS
contracts was initiated during the 2000-2003 period. Panel B shows the distribution of
CDS firms by industry based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
Our sample of CDS firms is quite diversified across industries with most of firms
operating in manufacturing (35%), finance and insurance (13%), and electric and gas
(10%) industries.9
CDS data are merged with employee compensation data by matching company
names and CDS trading inception dates to company names and corresponding active
dates in employee pay data sources. To make sure that our samples of employee
compensation cover the same time period as CDS data, we consider a period starting
from 1996, one year before the earliest available date of CDS trading, to 2013. We use
annual data given that employee pay data are not reported at the quarterly frequency.
All continuous variables in our analysis are winsorized at the 5% at both tails of their
distributions. All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation using the annual average
CPI index for urban consumers as of 1996 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Following Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) and Akyol and Verwijmeren
(2013), we measure the average employee pay as the ratio of total labor expenses to the
number of employees based on Compustat Industrial Annual database. We exclude
8The starting point of our CDS sample is 1997, which is generally recognized as the origin year
of the broad CDS market. See Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) for details of the sample
construction.
9We do not exclude financial and utilities companies throughout our empirical analysis owing to
the low reporting rate of total labor costs in Compustat. However, keeping financial and utilities
companies in the sample does not affect our results.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of CDS firms. This table reports the distribution of firms
with CDS trading initiated on their debt between 1996 and 2013. Panel A reports
the distribution of CDS trading initiation presented by number of new CDS firms per
year for the sample of all U.S. companies included in the Compustat database, for the
sample of Compustat firms having valid information on total labor expenses and for
the sample of Compustat firms having information on CEO pay from the ExecuComp
database. Panel B reports the distribution of CDS firms across industries based on the
SIC code for the sample of all U.S. companies included in the Compustat database.















1997 12440 36 726 13 1366 29
1998 12557 64 701 15 1438 53
1999 12533 55 659 10 1480 49
2000 12097 105 657 21 1488 90
2001 11585 161 664 35 1450 137
2002 11253 208 644 31 1460 169
2003 11065 100 648 6 1522 77
2004 10898 69 644 12 1510 45
2005 10853 63 628 11 1506 34
2006 10886 25 619 4 1577 20
2007 11044 11 617 1 1950 7
2008 10866 9 600 3 1889 5
2009 10840 28 606 6 1826 5
2010 11078 11 618 3 1822 2
2011 11687 4 861 0 1788 4
2012 11860 2 901 0 1750 2
2013 11782 2 940 0 1718 1
Total 953 171 729
Panel B: Distribution of CDS firms by industry
Industry CDS firms %






Electric, Gas and Sanitary service 99 10.4
Wholesale Trade 18 1.9
Retail Trade 52 5.5
Finance, Insurance 121 12.7
Real Estate 54 5.7
Services 88 9.2
Total 953 100.0 %
companies with less than one hundred employees. We consider the average employee
pay as a general proxy for base (performance-insensitive) compensation given the high
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percentage of base pay (i.e. wages and salaries) in regular employee compensation
structure.10 Total labor expenses is a supplementary income statement item with
about 20% of firms recorded in Compustat having valid information. To address a
potential sample-selection bias created by missing information on total labor expenses
(i.e. if firms are selective in their decision to report this information), we adopt a
Heckman (1979) two-step analysis. In total, there are 12,143 firm-year observations
that have non-missing values for the variables to be included in the baseline regres-
sion of non-executive employee pay. There are 171 distinct CDS-referenced firms
representing 13% of observations in the final sample of non-executive pay analysis.
Data on executive compensation are retrieved from the Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) ExecuComp database, which provides detailed information on compensation
and individual characteristics of the top five executives of more than 3,330 firms from
1992 onward. We measure CEO compensation as CEO total pay and further decom-
pose the total measure into salary, cash bonus, and equity-based pay. We include
the main individual CEO characteristics, such as age, tenure, chairman position and
sex, as controls in our analysis of CEO compensation. In addition, we investigate
the corresponding managerial incentives created by the structure of compensation,
including delta and vega. The calculation of these variables is based on the Black
and Scholes (1973) option valuation model accounting for dividends (Merton, 1973),
which uses information from a variety of data sources, such as ExecuComp, CRSP,
Compustat and FRED Economic data. Our executive pay sample includes 729 firms
with CDS trading over 1997-2013. In total, there are 28,847 firm-year observations,
with 32% of observations represented by CDS firms.
Additionally to compensation variables, we construct a firm level measure of
overall labor welfare determining employee-friendly practices in firms based on data of
Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) performance. We use five
components of employee relations in the calculation of labor welfare: union relation
strength, cash profit sharing, employee involvement, retirement benefits strength, and
health and safety strength. Section 2.5.4 provides detailed description of the database
and the employee relations variables.
The summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis are provided
in Table 2.2. Appendix 2.A1 provide detailed definitions of these variables. We
10Total labor costs in Compustat aggregate salaries and wages, pension costs, payroll taxes, incen-
tive compensation, profit sharing, and other benefit plans. We cannot distinguish the performance-
insensitive and incentive part of compensation for general employees. In Section 2.5.4, we do have
an analysis based on employee relations/welfare ratings which can proxy employees’ motivation.
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exclude observations with missing values for the variables employed in the regressions.
Our sample is comparable to previous studies. On average, CDS traded firms are
larger and more productive (measured by average sales per employee and physical
capital intensity), have lower market-to-book ratios and higher firm leverage than
non-CDS firms. In addition, CDS firms have more employees and higher executive
and non-executive employee wages compared to non-CDS firms. The mean average
employee pay and CEO total compensation are $73.54 thousands and $7.406 million
for CDS firms, while these numbers are $54.99 thousands and $3.095 million for non-
CDS firms. Due to the wide range of employee pay in our sample, we use the natural
log of all employee compensation variables in our analysis to reduce the potential
impact of outliers. We further find that CEOs in CDS firms have significantly higher
mean values of vega and delta than non-CDS firms ($212.32 thousands vs. $74.64
thousands and $705.81 thousands vs. $363.78 thousands, respectively), indicating
stronger risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation. In addition, CDS traded
firms have a significantly higher total labor welfare measure (with mean value of
0.52) than non-CDS firms (with mean value of 0.15). CDS firms outperform non-
CDS firms in each five components of positive performance indicators of employee
relations. However, there is no significant difference in CEO characteristics between
CDS and non-CDS firms. The average CEO age is 56 years, ranging from 29 to 96.
In the sample, 98% of CEOs are male with the average tenure of 7 years. CDS traded
firms differ from non-CDS firms just in the percentage of the CEOs who also serve as
the chairman of the board. On average, in CDS traded firms 77% of CEOs have also
the chairman position in the board versus 60% of those in non-CDS firms.
In our analysis, to construct our instrumental variable, we use data from Fed-
eral Reserve call reports, DealScan syndicated loan database and Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD). We use annual publications of “Significant Pro-
vision of State unemployment insurance (UI) Laws” of US Department of Labor to
get data on UI benefit schedules across US states. To get data on mass layoff statistics
across industries and total industry employment, we rely on information provided by
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) “Mass Layoff Statistics” and the US Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), respectively. To conduct tests on employee bargaining
power, we use the percentage coverage of labor unions across industries based on
“Union Membership and Coverage Database”. Data on stock prices and returns are






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4. CDS and Employee Pay
In this section, we examine the relationship between CDSs and employee pay. We
focus on both the general employee pay and CEO compensation. We then address
the endogeneity of CDS introduction using various approaches. We also address the
sample selection issue given missing information on total labor costs using a Heckman
(1979) two-step analysis.
2.4.1. Baseline results
To investigate the relationship between CDSs and employee pay, we estimate the
following regression
EPi,t = β0 + β1CDS Tradingi,t + β2CDS Firmi
+ β3Xi,t + β4 Industryi + β4 Y eart + εi,t, (2.1)
where employee pay, EPi,t, is non-executive employee compensation (average em-
ployee pay) or CEO compensation (total, salary, bonus and equity-based pay) of firm
i in fiscal year t. Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto and Tookes
(2013), we include two CDS variables in the baseline empirical specification. The key
variable of interest, CDS Tradingi,t, equals one in and after the first year of CDS
trading on a reference firm i and zero otherwise. Therefore, β1 captures the change in
employee pay following CDS trade initiation. To capture unobservable time-invariant
fundamental differences between CDS and non-CDS firms, we include CDS Firmi
which equals one if the firm has CDS traded on its debt at any point during our
sample period. We include year fixed effects (Y eart) to account for time-specific vari-
ation in employee compensation. Whereas industry fixed effects (Industryi) allow to
control high heterogeneity in employee pay across industries.11 The standard errors
11Given that employee pay, while substantially differs across industries, typically changes slowly
from year to year within a company, we include industry fixed effects rather than firm fixed ef-
fects in the analysis. Specifically, our employee pay variables are highly persistent with first-order
autocorrelations of 0.95 for average employee pay and 0.76–0.80 for CEO compensation measures.
The high persistency of variables reduces the power of panel data estimators (Chang, Fu, Low, and
Zhang, 2015; Li and Prabhala, 2007; Zhou, 2001). Liao, Martocchio, and Joshi (2010) emphasize
that while it is not always possible to control for firm fixed-effects in empirical research on employee
compensation due to highly persistent variables, including a set of industry dummy variables is an
absolute must. To control for unobservable time-invariant fundamental differences between CDS and
non-CDS firms, in addition to the industry fixed effects we include the indicator variable CDS Firm.
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are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level.
We further control for an array of firm and individual executive characteristics
(Xi,t) that have been identified as important determinants of employee compensation
in the previous literature (e.g., Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2013; Peters and
Wagner, 2014). In particular, we incorporate Firm Size which is the natural logarithm
of market capitalization of firm i in year t. Employees in larger firms generally have
higher wages than employees in smaller firms (e.g., see Murphy, 1999). Since high
leverage firms need to pay higher compensation (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner, 2010;
Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2013; Graham, Kim, Li, and Qiu, 2019), we also
include Leverage measured as total debt to the market value of assets as a control
variable. We employ the market-to-book ratio (MB) to account for firm growth
opportunities.
In addition, specifically for the non-executive employee sample, we also include
two productivity variables: sales per employee (Sales/employee) and physical capital
intensity (PCI ). Sales/employee measures productivity of the average employee of
the firm. PCI is the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment to total assets.
Capital intensive firms tend to have higher employee pay and be more productive
(Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos, 2009). Specifically for the CEO
sample, following the existing literature showing a positive relation between CEO
compensation and firm performance (e.g. Murphy, 1999), we also include total return
to shareholders (TSR) as a measure of firm performance. We further add a number
of controls for CEO individual characteristics including the age of the CEO (CEO
Age), the gender of the CEO (CEO Male), the number of years in CEO position in a
firm i (CEO Tenure), and a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is also the
chairman of the board (CEO Chairman).
The baseline results are presented in Table 2.3. From columns (1) and (2), we
find a positive and significant coefficient for CDS Trading for both the the average
employee pay and CEO total pay. The results provide preliminary evidence that CDSs
increase employee compensation for both general workers and executive employees.
The coefficients of CDS Trading represent the treatment effect over the entire post-
CDS introduction period, and imply that following CDS introduction the average
employee pay increases by 8% (or by 5.9 thousand dollars), while the total CEO
compensation increases by 10% (or by 740.6 thousand dollars).12 Overall, the increase
12Given that d[ln(y)]/dx = [1/y]× dy/dx and dy = ydx× d[ln(y)]/dx, the effect of the change in
the dummy variable CDS Trading (dx) from 0 to 1 on the change in employee compensation (dy)
is calculated as 73.54× 1× 0.08 = 5.88 (and 7406× 1× 0.10 = 740.6), where $73.54 (in thousands)
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is not only statistically significant, but also economically large.13
Using the detailed CEO compensation structure data, we further examine the
effect of CDSs on different components of CEO remuneration. Specifically, we de-
compose the CEO total compensation into salary, bonus and equity-based compen-
sation. The base (performance-insensitive) component of CEO pay is represented
by salaries. The incentive (performance-sensitive) component of CEO pay is repre-
sented by bonuses and equity-based pay (as the sum of stock options and restricted
stock grants).14 While both bonus and equity-based pay represent incentive pays,
bonus is generally cash-based incentive compensation attached to annual account-
ing performance, that makes it particularly important for lower-level executives. The
equity-based pay can be used to directly link managers payoffs to a shareholder value.
The results are presented in columns (3)-(5) of Table 2.3. Opposite to non-executive
workers, the compensation of whom is mostly presented by the base pay, we find
insignificant changes in CEOs’ salaries after CDS contracts start trading. With re-
gard to performance-sensitive compensation, the coefficient estimate for CDS Trading
of equity-based pay of CEOs is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Interestingly, the effect of CDSs concentrates mainly on long-term incentive plans
(stocks and options), whereas there is no significant effect on short-term incentive
plans (bonuses).
The coefficients of control variable are generally consistent with prior literature.
Larger and highly leveraged firms pay their employees more than smaller firms and
firms with lower leverage. Growth firms (i.e., with high MB) pay their employees less
than fundamentally solid value firms. Chairman position is a positive and significant
determinant of CEO compensation.
and $7406 (in thousands) are mean value of average employee pay and total CEOs’ compensation
for the CDS traded sample, respectively.
13Despite the high magnitude of the results, the growth in employee pay by this amount is practi-
cally realistic. This can be seen on a real example of employee pay policy in one of CDS-referenced
firms, such as American Airlines. In the same year with the introduction of CDS trading on the
company’s debt, in 1997, a labor union, Allied Pilots Association, successfully achieved a 9% wage
increase over the next three years and established the Pilots Stock Option Plan. The Stock Option
Plan granted labor union members to purchase 11.5 million shares of the company, which were ex-
ercisable immediately. See Wall Street Journal, “American Airlines Pilots are Expected by Union
Leaders to Ratify New Pact”, April 7, 1997.
14The CEO incentive pay has grown dramatically in recent years and generally represents the
largest component of compensation, more than 80% during 2000-2014 (Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter,
2017).
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Table 2.3: Effect of CDS trading on employee pay. This table presents the
coefficients and standard errors obtained from the baseline regression for the average
(non-executive) employee pay sample and the CEO pay sample during 1996-2013. The
coefficient of interest is CDS Trading which is a dummy variable that equals one if
a firm has a CDS trading on its debt during a year and zero otherwise. CDS Firm
is an indicator equal to one if there is CDS trading on the firm’s debt at any time
during the sample period. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix
2.A1. Industry and year fixed effect are controlled. Industry group is defined by the
first two digits of the SIC code. The standard errors presented in parentheses are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and *
denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.





CEO Salary CEO Bonus CEO Equity
pay
CDS Trading 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.00 0.05 0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
CDS Firm 0.14*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.22*** -0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Firm size 0.06*** 0.47*** 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Leverage 0.16*** 0.66*** 0.45*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06)
MB -0.01 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.00





TRS 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Male -0.06 -0.05** 0.06 0.00
(0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.06)
CEO Age -0.00 0.01*** 0.01** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chairman 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Constant 3.15*** 4.17*** 4.65*** 2.77*** 3.41***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.19) (0.12)
Observations 12,143 28,847 29,024 15,227 23,573
R-squared 0.52 0.42 0.56 0.40 0.50
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
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2.4.2. Endogeneity
The baseline results suggest a strong positive relationship between the introduction
of CDS trading and corporate employee pay. However, factors determining the as-
signment of CDS contracts to firms can also affect corporate employee pay policy. In
addition, firms with more generous employee pay policy might have a greater propen-
sity to the initiation of CDS trading on their debt. To address these endogeneity
concerns, we employ various approaches as suggested in the previous literature, in-
cluding propensity score matching, reverse causality test and instrumental variable
approach.
Propensity score matching
CDS firms can be different from non-CDS firms in ways that are systematically related
to firms’ corporate decisions. To mitigate this concern, we employ a propensity score
matching approach. Specifically, we first model the firm-level probability of initiating
CDS trading in each year by estimating the following logit model in the sample of
CDS and non-CDS firms:
CDS Tradingi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2 Industryi + β3 Y eart + εi,t, (2.2)
where CDS Trading equals one for the year of CDS introduction, and zero oth-
erwise. For non-CDS-firm, CDS Trading is always zero. X is the array of firm
characteristics reflecting its credit risk and growth opportunities (e.g., see Mar-
tin and Roychowdhury, 2015). To account for firms’ credit risk, we incorporate
Credit rating, Investment grade, Leverage and ROA as explanatory variables. By
including Firmsize, MB, Sales/ employee and PCI as controls, we also account
for the effect of growth opportunities that can affect the demand and supply of CDS
trading. We tabulate the results of the logit model in Table 2.A2 (Column 1). It
shows that the chosen firm characteristics can predict the CDS trade initiation rea-
sonably well, with a pseudo - R2 of 46%. The coefficients of explanatory variables
are generally consistent with prior literature. Large firms, highly leveraged firms, and
those with investment grade ratings are more likely to have CDS trading on their
debt.
Using the predicted probability of CDS trading from the logit model, we then
estimate the propensity score for each firm in each year, and match each CDS firm
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Table 2.4: CDS trading and employee pay: Propensity score matching. This
table presents the estimation of the effect of CDS on employee pay in a sample of
propensity score matched CDS and non-CDS firms. Propensity score matched firms
are selected based on propensity scores estimated from the “Model 1” of prediction
of the probability of CDS trading presented in Appendix 2.A2. The matching proce-
dure is based on selection of one non-CDS firm with the nearest to each CDS firm’s
propensity score in the same industry and within of difference of 1%. The propensity
scores are compared in the year prior to CDS trade initiation. We employ matching
with replacement, when a non-CDS firm can be matched to multiple CDS firms. The
definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2.A1. Industry and year fixed effect
are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first two digits of the SIC code. The
standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clus-
tered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.






CEO Salary CEO Bonus CEO Equity
pay
CDS Trading 0.11** 0.11*** -0.06 0.04 0.13**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
CDS Firm 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Firm size 0.00 0.35*** 0.13** 0.31*** 0.44***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Leverage 0.16* 0.59*** 0.58 0.52*** 0.63***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.21) (0.16) (0.14)
MB -0.00 0.01 -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.05***





TRS 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.45*** 4.90*** 5.20*** 3.03*** 3.65***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.57) (0.35) (0.28)
Observations 2,072 9,471 8,619 5,161 8,296
R-squared 0.73 0.43 0.42 0.35 0.44
CEO characteristics NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
in the year prior to CDS trade initiation to one non-CDS firm in the same industry
with the closest propensity score but within the difference of 1%. When a non-CDS
firm can be matched to multiple CDS firms, we employ matching with replacement.
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Roberts and Whited (2012) point out that using a single (i.e., the best) match with
replacement and a tighter caliper leads to the least biased and most credible estimates,
although some subjects could not be matched.
Table 2.4 reports the employee pay regression results in the propensity score
matched sample. The coefficient estimates for CDS Trading remain significantly
positive at the 1% and 5% for CEO total compensation and average employee pay,
respectively. Therefore, the employee pay (both non-executive and executive) in-
creases after the onset of CDS trading, even after adjusting for the propensity for
CDS trading. Consistent with the baseline analysis, the growth in total compensa-
tion of CEOs is determined by the increase in equity-based pay. It is worth noting
that CDS Firm variable is not significant in any model specification in Table 2.4,
which shows the effectiveness of our matching procedure.
Test on reverse causality
To mitigate a potential bidirectional causal relation between CDS trade initiation
and employee pay policy, we conduct a direst test on reverse causality by applying
the method suggested in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Specifically, we consider
changes in employee pay policy in years around the CDS trade initiation. We replace
CDS Trading variable in the baseline regression Eq. (2.1) by four indicator variables
Y ear−1, Y ear0, Y ear+1 and Y ear>=+2. Y ear−t (Y ear+t) equals one if CDS trading
will be initiated in t years (was initiated t years ago) and zero otherwise.
The results of the test are presented in Table 2.5. For the sake of brevity, we
only report the coefficients and standard errors of year-indicators. For all employee
pay specifications, the Y ear−1 coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from
zero. Whereas the Y ear+1 and Y ear>=+2 coefficients are positive and significant for
both non-executive and executive (total and equity-based pay) samples. The CDS
effect becomes stronger over time for all employee pay specifications. Overall, these
findings indicate that the increase in employee pay appear just after CDS trading
begins, justifying forward causality emanating from the inception of CDS trading
to employee pay policy. In addition, we find that the effect of CDS trading on
executive compensation manifests faster than on average employee pay given the
positive and statistically significant coefficients for Y ear0 in the CEO pay (total and
equity-based) samples. That might be explained by the unique position of CEO
in corporate structure compared with general workers, and the presence of different
mechanisms through which CDS trading might affect compensation of workers.
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Table 2.5: CDS trading and employee pay: Test on reverse causality. This
table presents the coefficients and standard errors obtained from the baseline regres-
sion with CDS Trading replaced by four dummy variables Y ear−1, Y ear0, Y ear+1
and Y ear>=+2, for the average (non-executive) employee pay sample and the CEO
pay sample during 1996-2013. Y ear−1 is an indicator that equals one if CDS trading
will be initiated in one year and zero otherwise. Y ear0 is an indicator that equals
one if CDS trading is initiated this year and zero otherwise. Y ear+1 (Y ear>=+2) is
an indicator that equals one if CDS trading was initiated one (two or more) year(s)
ago and zero otherwise. The coefficients of control variables are not tabulated. The
definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2.A1. Industry and year fixed effect
are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first two digits of the SIC code. The
standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clus-
tered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.






CEO Salary CEO Bonus CEO Equity
pay
Y ear−1 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Y ear0 0.05 0.09*** 0.01 0.02 0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Y ear+1 0.07** 0.12*** 0.03 0.06 0.20***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Y ear>=+2 0.10*** 0.14*** -0.02 0.11* 0.26***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 12,143 28,847 29,024 15,227 23,573
R-squared 0.52 0.54 0.59 0.42 0.50
CEO characteristics NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
The instrumental variable approach
To further mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we adopt the instrumental variable
approach in the spirit of Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) and Saretto and
Tookes (2013). Specifically, we use lenders’ hedging activities on foreign exchange
(FX) as an instrumental variable for CDS trading. Minton, Stulz, and Williamson
(2009) document that lenders with larger foreign exchange hedging positions are more
likely to hedge their credit risk using CDSs. An instrument is valid when it satisfies
the relevance and exclusion conditions (Roberts and Whited, 2012). The relevance
condition requires that the partial correlation between the instrument and the endoge-
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nous variable not be zero. That also applies in our case given the observed positive
correlation between lending banks’ FX hedging activities and banks’ hedging demand
for CDS contracts on their borrowers. In conjunction with the first condition, the
exclusion restriction implies that the only role that the instrument plays in influenc-
ing the outcome (i.e., employee pay policy) of the baseline model is via its effect on
the endogenous regressor (i.e., CDS trading). In our case, the proposed instrument is
also likely to meet the required condition given the main purpose of FX derivatives to
hedge foreign exchange risks, with its relation to macro risks rather than to firm-level
risks. Consequently, we expect that a borrowing firm’s employee pay policy should
not be directly affected by lenders’ hedging positions in FX derivatives.
To avoid forbidden regressions, we use the three-stage instrumental variable
approach. The three-stage procedure has several advantages over two-stage instru-
mental variable approach by taking into account the binary nature of the endogenous
variable and not requiring the first stage to be correctly specified. At the same
time, the standard errors of the standard IV approach remain asymptotically valid
(Wooldridge, 2010, p.623).
In the first stage, we estimate the probability of CDS Trading using Lender
FX Hedging as an instrument in the logit model in Eq. (2.2). We construct the
instrument as the average notional amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for
hedging purposes relative to the bank’s total assets across all bank lenders and bond
underwrites that a firm has borrowed from over the past five years. The results of
the first stage are reported in the second column of Table 2.A2. The instrument
positively and significantly predicts CDS Trading, suggesting that the instrument
satisfies the relevance condition. In addition, we can reject the hypothesis of a weak
instrument given that p-value is less than 0.01 and Sargan F -test statistic is above 10.
In the second and third stages, we run the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS)
approach with the fitted value of CDS Trading resulting from the first stage as the
instrument, that allows us to mitigate the possible effect of misspecification in the
first-step logit model. The final results with the instrumented CDS trading variable
are presented in Table 2.6. We again find positive and significant effects of CDS
introduction on employee pay. Consistent with the baseline results, the growth in
total CEO compensation is mainly driven by the increase in equity-based pay.
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Table 2.6: CDS trading and employee pay: Instrumental variable approach.
This table presents the results of the third stage estimation of the instrumental vari-
able approach for the employee pay samples during 1996-2013. The instrument is
Lender FX Hedging defined as a measure of the foreign exchange derivative activi-
ties aimed at hedging purposes of the firm’s lenders and bond underwriters over the
past five years. The coefficient of the interest is InstrumentedCDS Trading esti-
mated from the instrumental variable based on the “Model 2” presented in Appendix
2.A2. We use the same control variables as we use in the baseline regressions. The
definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2.A1. Industry and year fixed effect
are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first two digits of the SIC code. The
standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clus-
tered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.












Instrumented CDS Trading 0.21** 0.25*** -0.04 0.02 0.15**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07)
Firm size 0.05*** 0.42*** 0.17*** 0.36*** 0.49***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Leverage 0.11 0.80*** 0.49*** 0.75*** 0.80***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07)
MB -0.01 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.02***





TRS 0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.11*** 4.61*** 4.75*** 2.87*** 3.73***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) (0.13)
Observations 10,877 25,176 25,161 13,169 20,693
R-squared 0.54 0.41 0.58 0.41 0.49
CEO characteristics NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
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2.4.3. Missing data on total labor expenses
In addition to controlling for the selection of firms into the CDS traded sample, we
also address a potential-selection bias created by missing information on total labor
costs in Compustat for the average employee pay sample. Specifically, to control
whether firms are selective in their decision to report their labor expenses, we adopt
a Heckman (1979) two-step analysis. To do this, we first estimate a probit model of
the firm-level probability of reporting labor expenses:
Reportingi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Exchangei,t + β3 Industryi,t + β4 Y eart + εi,t, (2.3)
where Reporting is the dependent indicator variable equal to one if the data on labor
costs are non-missing and zero otherwise. We follow Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang
(2013) and include the dummies of the firms’ listing exchange (Exchange) and a set of
control variables X. Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) show that Exchange, as
a chosen instrument, meets both the relevance and the exclusion conditions through
different reporting behavior across firms on different exchanges and no effect on the
magnitude of reported average employee compensation. The results of the first-stage
analysis presented in column (1) in Table 2.7 confirm this assumption. Listing ex-
change dummies are jointly significant. The coefficients of other control variable are
also consistent with prior literature.
Next, based on the first stage, we calculate the predicted Inverse Mills ratio
(Lambda) and include it as a predictor in Eq. (2.1) (Wooldridge, 2010). The results of
the second stage are reported in column (2) in Table 2.7. We find further evidence of
positive and significant effect of CDS trading on average employee pay. Whereas the
significant coefficient for Lambda implies that its inclusion is necessary to mitigate
the sample selection bias.
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Table 2.7: CDS trading and average employee pay: Heckman two-step anal-
ysis. This table presents the coefficients and standard errors obtained from a Heck-
man two-step analysis for the average (non-executive) employee pay sample during
1996-2013. The first stage estimates a probit model with the dependent variable
equal to one if the data on labor expenses are non-missing and zero otherwise. In
addition to the control variables used previously, we also include the dummies of the
firm’s listing exchange. In the second stage, we examine the effect of CDS trading on
average employee pay. The coefficient of interest is CDS Trading which is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm has a CDS trading on its debt during a year and
zero otherwise. The Inverse MillsRatio (Lambda) derived from the probit model is
included as a regressor in the second stage. The definitions of variables are presented
in Appendix 2.A1. Industry and year fixed effect are controlled. Industry group is
defined by the first two digits of the SIC code. The standard errors presented in
parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level. The symbols
***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2)
Variables First stage: Second stage:















Exchange dummies Jointly significant





Censored observations 75,178 75,178
Uncensored observations 12,143 12,143
Year FE YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES
Wald chi-square (p-value) 12,248.04 12,248.04
(0.00) (0.00)
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2.5. Channels and Total Labor Welfare
In this section, we conduct a number of tests to investigate the potential channels
through which CDSs can affect employee pay policy, including both human capital
risk channel and interest-alignment channel. We also examine whether the effect
of CDSs goes beyond wages and affects overall labor welfare, representing general
employee relationship and working conditions in firms.
2.5.1. Unemployment risk
Workers face nontrivial costs from unemployment. Employees with greater concerns
on human capital risk are more likely to demand a higher compensation ex ante
in response to the increased probability of corporate bankruptcy (Berk, Stanton,
and Zechner, 2010; Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; Titman, 1984). We identify settings
when the human capital risk concern is more severe and compare the effect of CDSs
among firms with low and high concerns based on layoff propensity, workers’ costs
during unemployment, and delay before re-employment. We expect a stronger effect
of CDSs on employee base compensation (i.e., wages and salaries) when labor has
greater exposure to unemployment risk, which is consistent with the “human capital
risk” channel.
Specifically, we first examine the cross-industry heterogeneity in the propensity
to lay off workers. The long-run propensity for layoffs based on systematic differences
across industries can affect the workers’ expected exposure to unemployment risk.
Employees in industries with high layoff rates are exposed to greater unemployment
risk. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we measure layoff separation rates as the
ratio of workers affected by mass layoffs to total industry employment for three-digit
NAICS industries. The layoff separation rates show significant variations across in-
dustries with the average value of 1.5% and the median of 0.8%. The lowest layoff
rates (below 0.1%) are in industries such as real estate, educational services, various
health care and social assistance, gasoline stations and auto parts dealers. The high-
est layoff rates are in agriculture and forestry support activities (18.4%), passenger
ground transportation (5.9%), and heavy and civil engineering construction (5.7%).
Second, we measure workers’ exposure to unemployment risk by costs borne
by workers during unemployment period. To determine these costs, we use unem-
ployment insurance (UI) benefits across US states. According to the UI system of the
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United States, workers who have become unemployed through no fault of their own
are able to receive unemployed benefits (temporary income) during a specified period
of time. However, UI benefits vary across states in wage benefit amounts and dura-
tion of time during which unemployed worker is eligible to receive weekly payments.
That allows us to split our sample between firms located in less and more generous
state UI systems, where firms are assigned to a state according to the location of
firms’ headquarters.15 Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we define the generosity
of the state UI system as the product of the maximum amount of a weekly benefit
payment and the maximum duration allowed eligible claimants to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. Employees in less generous state UI systems have higher costs during
unemployment, that results in greater workers’ exposure to unemployment risk.
Third, we split our sample based on potential delay in workers’ re-employment.
We rely on findings of previous studies documenting that workers in “new economy”
firms can be reemployed faster than employees in other industries. For instance,
Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000) show that “new economy” firms competing
in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking fields are
characterized by stronger and intense demand for key managerial employees, and have
a higher employee turnover than in other industries. That results in higher reduction
in human capital of employees working in “old economy” bankrupt firms compared
to those working in “new economy” bankrupt firms. We follow Anderson, Banker,
and Ravindran (2000) and define “new economy” firms as those in the hardware,
software and telecommunications (see Appendix 2.A1 for detailed classification). “Old
economy” firms are defined as the rest of the firms in our sample.
We then reestimate Eq. (2.1) separately for different levels of workers’ expected
exposure to unemployment risk: industries with high and low layoff separation rates,
less and more generous states, “new economy” and “old economy” firms. The results
are presented in Table 2.8. As expected, we find that the effect of CDSs on average
employee pay increases with workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. Specifically,
regular workers demand higher compensation following the introduction of CDSs in
industries in which layoffs occur with high frequency and in “old economy” firms,
which are characterized by longer delay in workers’ re-employment. In addition, fol-
lowing the onset of CDS trading, we find the more pronounced increase in employee
base pay for non-executive workers in the states providing low unemployment insur-
ance benefits, that creates higher costs to workers during the unemployment period.
15In the spirit of Agrawal and Matsa (2013), given the fact that some workers of firms can be
located in different states than firms’ headquarters, we exclude industries with large percentage of
geographically dispersed workforce (e.g., retail, wholesale and transport).
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Table 2.8: CDS trading and employee pay: Unemployment risk. This table
demonstrates the CDS - base pay relation estimated from the baseline regression for
different levels of workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. Panel A measures workers’
exposure to unemployment risk by industry propensity to lay off workers. Industries
with high (low) layoff propensity are represented by industries above (below) median
layoff separation rate. Panel B measures workers’ exposure to unemployment risk
by generosity of state unemployment insurance (UI) benefit laws, representing costs
borne by workers during unemployment period. Low (high) state generosity is repre-
sented by states with low (high) UI benefits, i.e. below (above) the 70th percentile.
Panel C splits sample by “new economy” firms and “old economy” firms. “Old econ-
omy” firms are characterized by longer delay in workers’ re-employment than “new
economy” firms. We use the same control variables, including CDS Firm, as we
use in the baseline regressions. % CDS is the percentage of CDS firms in subsam-
ples. Industry and year fixed effect are controlled. The standard errors presented in
parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level. The symbols
***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Average employee pay CEO Salary
Panel A: Industry layoff propensity
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Trading 0.01 0.12** -0.04 0.19*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
Observations 5,044 4,534 9,311 12,569
% CDS 10% 14% 32% 30%
R-squared 0.76 0.57 0.52 0.50
Panel B: Generosity of state UI benefit laws
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Trading 0.13** 0.09 0.04* -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1,908 1,873 11,285 11,715
% CDS 21% 25% 35% 29%
R-squared 0.61 0.75 0.55 0.58
Panel C: “New economy” firms vs. “old economy” firms
New Old New Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Trading -0.15 0.10*** -0.16 0.02
(0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02)
Observations 1,455 11,010 4,029 24,799
% CDS 5% 13% 20% 34%
R-squared 0.45 0.66 0.44 0.56
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Interestingly, while the baseline results suggest no significant change in CEO
base salary after the onset of CDS trading on the debt of the average firm, we find
some evidence of the positive CDS effect on CEOs’ salaries in industries with high
layoff propensity and US states providing low UI benefits.
2.5.2. Employee bargaining power
We further examine the CDS-wage relation for different levels of worker-firm bar-
gaining environment. We measure an employee bargaining power by a percent of
employed workers who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement based on
data from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. Given the fact that em-
ployees at unionized workplaces on average earn higher wages than non-unionized
labor (e.g., see Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003), we expect that workers in firms
operating in highly unionized industries (i.e., with higher barging power) should be
more successful in demanding a higher compensating wage based on employment pro-
tection incentives in response to the growth in firm default risk following the CDS
introduction.
Table 2.9: CDS trading and employee pay: Employee bargaining power. This
table demonstrates the CDS - base pay relation estimated from the baseline regression
for different levels of the worker-firm bargaining environment. We measure employee
bargaining power across industries by a percent of employed workers who are covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, based on data of the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Industries with high (low) employee bargaining power are represented by
industries above (below) median union coverage. We use the same control variables,
including CDS Firm, as we use in the baseline regressions. % CDS is the percentage
of CDS firms in subsamples. Industry and year fixed effect are controlled. The
standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered




Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Trading 0.03 0.12*** -0.05** 0.03**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 4,863 7,280 11,521 17,503
% CDS 7% 10% 19% 25%
R-squared 0.69 0.33 0.49 0.64
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To test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of CDS trading on employee
base pay (average employee pay and CEOs’ salaries) in firms operating in industries
with high and low employee bargaining power (i.e., above and below median union
coverage), respectively. The results tabulated in Table 2.9 demonstrate a positive and
highly significant effect of CDS trading on average employee pay in highly unionized
industries associated with greater employee bargaining power. Different from the
baseline results, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of CDSs on CEO
salaries in firms operating in highly unionized industries. For firms operating in
industries with low union coverage, the coefficients on CDS Trading for the base pay
of general workers are positive, but not statistically significant. In this setting, there
is even some evidence of decrease in CEO base salary after CDS introduction.
2.5.3. Managerial incentives
In this section, we investigate the effect of CDS introduction on CEO incentives.
Consistent with the “interest alignment” channel discussed above, to take advantage
of the relaxed financing constraints and increased lenders’ risk tolerance following the
introduction of CDS trading, shareholders of CDS firms have an incentive to further
align managers’ interests and encourage their risk taking to maximize equity value.
Thereby, in addition to the increased equity-based pay in CEOs’ compensation struc-
ture, we expect the increase in the convexity of the relation between firm performance
and CEO wealth (vega), that corresponds to greater risk-taking incentives.
Managerial incentives and corporate policy choices can be jointly determined
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Given the potential causation, the estimation
of ordinary least squares (OLS) with regressors endogenously determined along with
the dependent variable will produce biased parameter estimates. To account for the
CDS effect on the structure of CEOs’ compensations and corresponding incentives,
we follow Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and estimate simultaneous systems of
equations (3SLS) in which the jointly determined variables are corporate policy choice,
vega and delta:
Policyi,t = β10 + β11CDS Tradingi,t + β12 V egai,t + β13Deltai,t + β14Xi,t + εi,t,
V egai,t = β20 + β21CDS Tradingi,t + β22 Policyi,t + β23Deltai,t + β24Xi,t + εi,t,
Deltai,t = β30 + β31CDS Tradingi,t + β32 Policyi,t + β33 V egai,t + β34Xi,t + εi,t,
(2.4)
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where Policy is defined as either R&D (research and development expenses scaled
by assets) or Leverage. Control variables for each single equation in Eq. (2.4) have
been chosen in the spirit of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). For identification in the
simultaneous equations model, we use industry variables as determinants for corporate
policy choices and managerial incentives. As previously, we control for industry and
year fixed effects, and unobservable time-invariant fundamental differences between
CDS and non-CDS firms by including CDS Firm variable. Definitions of all variables
used in Eq. (2.4) are presented in Appendix 2.A1.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 2.10. Consistent with prior
literature, we find that corporate debt and investment policies are intertwined with
managerial incentives, as evidenced by significant coefficients for R&D, leverage, vega
and delta. Leverage and R&D investment positively (negatively) affect vega (delta),
and vice versa. More importantly, leverage, R&D and vega increase following the
onset of CDS trading in the joint estimation. The coefficients for CDS Trading are
positive and statistically significant at the 1%. The increase in the sensitivity of
CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega) post CDS inception corresponds to the
reduced managers’ aversion to take “riskier” policy choices, i.e. in the form of higher
firm leverage and more investments in innovation.
2.5.4. Labor welfare
The effect of CDSs on human capital of general workers can be broader than just
the effect on their base pay. In addition to base wages, compensation of workers
can be in the form of any additional non-contractual employee benefits and general
improvements of working conditions. Firms have a desire to keep and maintain their
reputation for treating employees fairly given the value human capital can create,
particularly for those emphasizing quality and innovation (Edmans, 2011; Liu, Mao,
and Tian, 2017). The relaxed financing constraints and increased lenders’ risk toler-
ance after CDS introduction can encourage CDS firms to improve employee welfare
to motivate employees better for value maximizing efforts.16 Furthermore, providing
additional employee benefits can minimize voluntary turnover of workers induced by
their concerns on employers’ stability.
16Consistent with the improved employee welfare and motivations, Chang, Chen, Wang, Zhang,
and Zhang (2019) find that CDSs increase corporate innovation outputs and innovation efficiency.
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Table 2.10: CDS trading and managerial incentives. This table reports the
coefficients and standard errors obtained from the simultaneous equations (3SLS) of
corporate policy choice (Leverage or R&D) and CEO incentives (Vega and Delta) for
the CEO pay sample during 1996-2013. Models (1)-(3) are for leverage and CEO
incentives. Models (4)-(6) are for R&D and CEO incentives. The coefficient of
interest is CDS Trading, which captures the impact of the inception of CDS trading
on corporate policy choice, vega and delta. See Appendix 2.A1 for variable definitions.
The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Leverage and incentives Panel B: R&D and incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Leverage Vega Delta R&D Vega Delta
CDS Trading 0.08*** 0.14*** -0.09*** 0.01*** 0.23*** 0.03
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
CDS Firm 0.03*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 0.00 -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
Vega 0.06*** 0.21*** 0.01*** 0.23***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Delta -0.01 0.08*** -0.01*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Leverage 1.60*** -1.46*** -0.04*** 0.15** -0.27***
(0.24) (0.19) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05)
R&D -0.12*** 1.79*** -0.53*** 3.33*** -2.46***
(0.02) (0.14) (0.12) (0.96) (0.74)
Industry Vega 0.62*** 0.51***
(0.03) (0.03)






Firm size 0.01 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.00 0.51*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
MB 0.07*** 0.03 0.32*** 0.02*** -0.10*** 0.23***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
CAPEX -0.14 0.66*** -0.26 0.80***
(0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13)
Return volatility 0.04*** -0.02 0.04*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
CEO Tenure 0.00 0.06*** 0.00** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Cash compensation 0.06*** 0.23*** 0.00 0.33***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Observations 18,172 18,172 18,172 18,172 18,172 18,172
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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We construct our firm-level labor welfare measures using Environmental, So-
cial and Corporate Governance (ESG) performance data from MSCI ESG STATS
database. It covers the 3000 largest publicly traded U.S. companies (Russell 3000)
by market capitalization since 2003. The data have been widely used for evaluating
firms’ strengths and concerns in employee relations (e.g., Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011;
DiGiuli and Kostovetsky, 2014).17
To measure labor welfare, we follow Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) and use five
positive performance indicators of employee relations, including 1) union relations, i.e.
the company has taken exceptional steps to treat its unionized workforce fairly; 2) cash
profit sharing, i.e. the company has a cash profit sharing program through which it has
recently made distributions to a majority of its employees; 3) employee involvement,
i.e. the company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership through
stock option plans, gain sharing, sharing of financial information, or participation
in management decision making; 4) retirement benefits strength, i.e. the company
has a notably strong retirement benefits program; and 5) health and safety strength,
i.e. the company has a strong health and safety program. The sum of these five
categories, each rated 0 or 1, gives our baseline firm-level labor welfare measure. By
construction, better labor welfare manifests in a higher value with the maximum score
of five. In total, there are 12,197 firm-year observations during 2003-2009 that have
non-missing values for each category of employee relations used in the calculation
of the baseline labor welfare measure. The sample ends in 2009 since the rating
for “retirement benefits strength” discontinued after that. As a robustness check,
we calculate the labor welfare measure using the remaining four ratings categories,
excluding “retirement benefits strength”, with an extended sample period of 2003-
2013.
Table 2.11 Panel A presents the results of the effect of CDS Trading on corpo-
rate labor welfare. Column (1) measures labor welfare using the sum of all five rating
categories. Although the sample period for labor welfare is shorter than for the base-
line analysis of employee pay, the sample includes 524 firms that have CDS trading
initiated on their debt. The coefficient estimate for CDS Trading is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms’ labor welfare improves
17ESG STATS provides extensive information on the ratings with respect to firm-level social
performance in seven major qualitative areas: environmental impact, community relations, corporate
governance, workforce diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product quality and safety.
The ratings are assigned based on direct communication with company officers and scanning public
databases, including company filings, government data and general media sources. ESG STATS is
previously known as KLD STATS. Prior to 2003, it only covers S&P 500 companies since 1991.
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following the introduction of CDS trading on their debt.18 Column (2) measures the
labor welfare as the sum of four employee relation rating categories available during
2003-2013. Columns (3) and (4) further address the endogeneity of CDS trading using
propensity score matching and IV approaches as discussed in Section 2.4.2. We again
find the increase in labor welfare after CDS contracts start trading on firms’ debt.
Table 2.11 Panel B further investigates the effect of CDSs on each individual
employee relation rating category for additional implications of the channels. We
find interesting variations of the CDS effect on different aspects of employee wel-
fare measure. The increase in labor welfare after the introduction of CDSs mainly
comes from better scores for “cash profit sharing” and “health and safety” indica-
tors. There is some evidence of increase in “employee involvement”, although the
change is only marginally significant. These results demonstrate a firm’s incentive
to improve interest alignments through increasing workers’ efforts and productivity.
Furthermore, broad-based profit sharing payments give a positive signal to workers
regarding firms’ financial stability and current profitability. That might partly alle-
viate employees’ concerns on human capital risk associated with the increased firms’
default probability, and enhance employment stability through minimizing voluntary
turnover.19 Together with the average employee pay findings in previous sections, we
find evidence that CDSs improve wealth and working conditions for general workers.
2.5.5. Other tests
In appendix 2.A4 - 2.A5, we also examine the role of default risk and financial con-
straints in the CDS effect on employee pay. As a measure of default risk, we use
Atman’s Z-score, with low values indicating high default risk. To measure the tight-
ness of firm’s financial constraints, we use WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006) and
firm size. The prior literature indicates that smaller firms and firms with a high WW
index are more likely to face difficulty in raising external financing.
18The coefficient estimate for CDS Firm has an opposite sign, however it is not statistically
significantly different from zero. The results of Table 2.11 indicate that CDS firms do not funda-
mentally differ in terms of labor welfare from non-CDS firms, however they experience a significant
improvement in general working conditions in the years following CDS introduction.
19The current literature on compensation of non-executive workers provides mixed evidence on
the use of broad-based plans, such as profit-sharing and stock option grants, just for effort and
productivity enhancement reasons (e.g., see Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Kim and Ouimet, 2014; Oyer,
2004). Many studies argue that free-riding among employees can outweigh any incentive motives of
compensation based on collective firm’s performance. Instead, it can be used to retain workers and
enhance employment stability (e.g., see Kruse, 1993; Oyer, 2004).
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Table 2.11: CDS trading and labor welfare. This table presents the estimation
of the effect of CDS trading on labor welfare measures. Panel A reports the baseline
results (column 1), propensity score matching results (column 3), results of the instru-
mental variable approach (column 4) for the baseline labor welfare measure, which is
constructed based on five positive performance indicators of employee relations dur-
ing 2003-2009 from MSCI ESG STATS database. There are 524 firms in the sample
that have CDS trading initiated on their debt. Column 2 shows the baseline results
for the alternative measure of the labor welfare during 2003-2013, which excludes the
“retirement benefits” indicator from the calculation given termination in its reporting
after 2009. The sample for the alternative measure includes 564 firms that have CDS
trading initiated on their debt. Panel B presents the estimates of the firm’s proba-
bility of receiving positive performance indicators for each individual component of
the employee relations. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2.A1.
Industry and year fixed effect are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first
two digits of the SIC code. The standard errors presented in parentheses are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Labor welfare
Labor welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS Trading 0.19*** 0.16** 0.21***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Instrumented CDS Trading 0.38***
(0.10)
CDS Firm -0.01 -0.07 -0.19
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
Firm size 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Leverage 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.27) (0.06)
MB -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
Sales/employee 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PCI 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.50*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03)
Constant -0.61*** -0.57*** -1.62*** -0.40***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.41) (0.07)
Observations 12,197 13,139 2,356 11,560
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.30 0.22
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.11 - Continued
Panel B: Individual components of labor welfare measure











CDS Trading -0.24 0.38*** 0.11* 0.06 1.33***
(0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.42)
CDS Firm -0.06 -0.31*** -0.07 0.29*** -0.97**
(0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.42)
Firm size 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.56***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Leverage 0.55*** 0.02 -0.43*** -0.27** 0.30*
(0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17)
MB -0.22*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.24***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Sales/employee 0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PCI 0.62*** 0.45*** 0.10* 0.57*** 0.41***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Constant -3.80*** -2.42*** -2.73*** -2.09*** -5.64***
(0.41) (0.25) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37)
Observations 13,982 17,054 17,846 13,562 16,817
Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.36
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
We find greater effect of CDSs on average employee pay in more financially
constrained firms and those with greater default risk. The findings are consistent
with the “human capital risk” channel.20
With respect to the “interest alignment” channel, we expect a higher share-
holders’ incentive to align their interests with executive workers in safer firms, that
can benefit more from the introduction of CDS trading in terms of decreased borrow-
ing costs and relaxed financing constraints (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). As expected,
we find greater increase in CEO equity-based pay post CDS inception in financially
constrained firms with lower default risk.
20Agrawal and Matsa (2013) emphasize that firms’ financing frictions are associated with higher
unemployment risk, that encourages workers to demand higher wage premiums. The inability of
firms to raise external financing, that can be used to buffer negative economic shocks instead laying
off workers, raises workers’ concerns on human capital risk (Ofek, 1993).
45
2.6. Conclusion
This study provides a comprehensive assessment of the effect of CDSs on human
capital. Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we find the increase in average employee
pay and CEOs’ total pay by 8% and 10% respectively, following the introduction of
CDS trading on firms’ debt. These results persist even after addressing the potential
endogeneity of CDS introduction using propensity score matching, reverse causality
test, and instrumental variable estimations.
Consistent with employees’ concerns on human capital risk, we find the more
pronounced positive effect of CDSs on employee base pay in firms with higher em-
ployee bargaining power and greater workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. Fur-
thermore, we find that regular workers in the average firm with traded CDSs are more
concerned about risk of losing their job than executives. On the contrary, the growth
of CEOs’ compensation is mainly driven by equity-based pay with higher vega in the
compensation structure. Using ratings on employee relationship from ESG STATS,
we find the increase in overall labor welfare after CDS introduction, particularly for
firm-level ratings on broad-based cash profit sharing, and health and safety bene-
fits. While our baseline measure of compensation of regular workers is dominated
by the fixed (performance insensitive) part, the increased labor welfare post CDS
inception suggests firms’ efforts in better treating and motivating both executive and
non-executive employees. Furthermore, broad-based profit sharing schemes minimize
voluntary turnover in firms by partly reducing workers’ concerns on employers’ sta-
bility.
Previous literature have documented both the positive and negative effects of
CDSs on reference firms and other financial stakeholders (Augustin, Subrahmanyam,
Tang, and Wang, 2016). Our study contributes to the understanding of the real effects
of CDSs on corporate non-financial stakeholders. Our findings of the positive effect
of CDSs on human capital, a firm’s asset not listed in the balance sheet but bringing
essential economic value to the firm’s business and the economy as a whole, can be
useful for policymakers in discussion regarding the welfare effects of the CDS market.
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2.7. Appendix
Table 2.A1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
CDS variables
CDS Trading A dummy variable that equals one in and after the year of inception
of CDS trading on a reference firm’s debt. Source: CreditTrade, GFI,
Markit
CDS Firm A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CDS trading on
its debt at any time during the sample period 1996-2013. Source:
CreditTrade, GFI, Markit
Instrumented CDS Trading A dummy variable of CDS trading estimated by the instrumental vari-
able (IV) approach.
Lender FX hedging The instrument in the IV approach. The average notional amount of
foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging (not trading) purposes
to the bank’s total assets across all banks, lenders and bond under-
writes, a firm has borrowed from over the past five years. Source:
DealScan, FISD, Federal Reserve Call Reports
Employee pay
Average employee pay Total labor expense divided by number of employees. Source: Com-
pustat
CEO Total pay Salary + Bonus + Other annual + Restricted stock grants + LTIP
(long-term incentive plan) + All other + Value of option granted.
Source: ExecuComp
CEO Salary Salary. Source: ExecuComp
CEO Bonus Bonus. Source: ExecuComp
CEO Equity-based pay Options granted + Restricted stock grant. Source: ExecuComp
Labor welfare measure The sum of five positive performance 0/1 indicators of employee rela-
tions: union relations + cash profit sharing + employee involvement +
retirement benefits strength + health and safety. Better labor welfare
(higher investment in employee well-being) manifests in higher score,
with the maximum score of five. Source: MSCI ESG STATS database
created by KLD Research & Analytics
CEO characteristics
Male A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is male. Source: Execu-
Comp
Age Age of the CEO. Source: ExecuComp
Tenure Number of years in CEO position in a particular firm. Source: Exe-
cuComp
Chairman A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman.
Source: ExecuComp
Vega The dollar change in the value of the CEO’s wealth associated with
a 0.01 change in the annualized stock return volatility. In the calcu-
lation, we follow steps provided by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2013),
who use the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model accounting
for dividends (Merton, 1973). Source: ExecuComp, CRSP, Compus-
tat, FRED Economic Data
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Table 2.A1 - Continued
Variable Description
Delta The dollar change in the value of the CEO’s wealth associated
with a 0.01 change in the stock price. In the calculation, we fol-
low steps provided by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2013), who use
the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model accounting for
dividends (Merton, 1973). Source: ExecuComp, CRSP, Compus-
tat, FRED Economic Data
Industry vega (delta) The mean vega (delta) across all firms in the two-digit SIC code.
Firm characteristics
Market capitalization Market value of equity: stock price multiplied by number of shares
outstanding at the end of a fiscal year. Source: Compustat
Firm size Log (market capitalization). Source: Compustat
Leverage Total debt to sum of total debt and market value of equity. Source:
Compustat
MB Market-to-book ratio: market value of assets divided to book
value of assets. Source: Compustat
Sales/employees Total amount of sales scaled by number of employees. Source:
Compustat
PCI Physical capital intensity: gross property plant, and equipment
scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat
TRS Total shareholder return: (stock price at year t - stock price at
year t-1 + dividend per share)/stock price at year t-1. Source:
Compustat
R&D Research and development expenditure to assets. Missing values
are replaced by zero. Source: Compustat
CAPEX Net capital expenditure (capital expenditure - sale of property,
plant and equipment) to assets. Source: Compustat
Return volatility Log (standard deviation of daily stock returns estimated over 360
days prior the end of the fiscal period). Source: CRSP
ROA Return on assets: operating income after depreciation to assets.
Source: Compustat
Rated A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) rating. Source: Compustat
Investment grade A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has an investment
grade rating, BBB or higher. Source: Compustat
Industry leverage (R&D) The mean market leverage (R&D) across all firms in the two-digit
SIC code.
Z-score Altman’s Z-score defined as 3.3 piq/atq + saleq/atq + 1.4 req/atq
+ 1.2 (actq-lctq)/atq. Source: Compustat
WW index WW Index defined as -0.091 (ib + dp)/at – 0.062
(dividend indicator) + 0.021 dltt/at – 0.044 log(at) + 0.102
(average industry sales growth) – 0.035 (sales growth). Source:
Compustat
Employee bargaining power
Labor union coverage Percent of employed workers who are covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Source: “Union Membership and Coverage
Database” constructed and updated annually by Barry Hirsch and
David Macpherson based on the monthly household Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) using BLS methods.
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Table 2.A1 - Continued
Variable Description
Unemployment risk
Generosity of state UI laws Maximum amount of a weekly benefit payment × Maximum duration
allowed eligible claimants to receive unemployment benefits. Com-
panies with primary SIC designations of 4000-4800 (Transportation),
5000 - 5999 (Wholesale and Retail Trade) are excluded from the analy-
sis given the large percentage of geographically dispersed workforce in
these industries. Source: Annual publications “Significant Provision
of State UI Laws” by US Department of Labor
Industry layoff propensity Ratio of workers affected by mass layoffs to total industry employment.
BLS defines workers affected by mass layoffs when at least 50 initial
claims are filed against an institution during a consecutive five-week
period and at least 50 workers have been separated from their jobs
for more than 30 days. Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics “Mass
Layoff Statistics” and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
“New economy” firms Companies with primary SIC designations of 3570 (Computer and
Office Equipment), 3571 (Electronic Computers), 3572 (Computer
Storage Devices), 3576 (Computer Communication Equipment), 3577
(Computer Peripheral Equipment), 3661 (Telephone & Telegraph Ap-
paratus), 3674 (Semiconductor and Related Devices), 4812 (Wire-
less Telecommunication), 4813 (Telecommunication), 5045 (Comput-
ers and Software Wholesalers), 5961 (Electronic Mail-Order Houses),
7370 (Computer Programming, Data Processing), 7371 (Computer
Programming Service), 7372 (Prepackaged Software), and 7373 (Com-
puter Integrated Systems Design).
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Table 2.A2: Probability of CDS trading. This table presents the estimation of
probability of CDS trading obtained by using a logit model. The sample period is
1996-2013 based on yearly observations. “Model 1” is used to estimate the firm-level
probability of CDS trade initiation as a function of borrowing firms’ characteristic
for the propensity score matching analysis. “Model 2” is used to estimate the firm-
level probability of CDS trade initiation for the first stage of the instrumental variable
approach with Lender FX Hedging as an instrument. Lender FX Hedging is a mea-
sure of the foreign exchange derivative activities aimed at hedging purposes of the
firm’s lenders and bond underwriters over the past five years. Industry and year fixed
effect are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first two digits of the SIC code.
The standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
Variables Model 1 Model 2














Investment grade 1.03*** 0.98***
(0.04) (0.04)





Pseudo R-squared 0.46 0.47
Year FE YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Clustered SE YES YES
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Table 2.A3: CDS firms vs. non-CDS firms: Before/After propensity score
matching. This table compares differences in means of propensity scores and firm
characteristics between CDS traded firms and non-CDS traded firms for the baseline
samples (Before matching) and the propensity score matched sample (After match-
ing). Propensity score matched firms are selected based on propensity scores esti-
mated from the “Model 1” of prediction of the probability of CDS trading presented
in Appendix 2.A2. The matching procedure is based on selection of one non-CDS firm
with the nearest to each CDS firm’s propensity score in the same industry and within
of difference of 1%. In the matching procedure, the propensity scores are compared in
the year prior to CDS trade initiation. We employ matching with replacement, when
a non-CDS firm can be matched to multiple CDS firms. The definitions of variables
are presented in Appendix 2.A1.The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Variables Difference before matching Difference after matching
(CDS Firm - Non-CDS Firm) (CDS Firm - Non-CDS Firm)






Propensity score 0.26*** 0.05
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Table 2.A4: CDS trading and employee pay: Default risk. This table presents
the coefficients and standard errors obtained from the baseline regression. The coeffi-
cients of interest are CDS Trading and the interaction term CDS Trading×Z-score.
The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2.A1. Industry and year fixed
effect are controlled. Industry group is defined by the first two digits of the SIC code.
The standard errors presented in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Average
employee pay
CEO Salary CEO Bonus CEO Equity
pay
CDS Trading 0.23*** 0.04 0.22** 0.28***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06)
CDS Trading × Z-score -0.06*** -0.00 -0.00 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Z-score -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 10,198 24,986 12,924 20,312
R-squared 0.47 0.44 0.23 0.30
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Table 2.A5: CDS trading and employee pay: Financial constraints. This
table presents the coefficients and standard errors obtained from the baseline re-
gression. The coefficients of interest are CDS Trading and the interaction term
CDS Trading×WW index or CDS Trading×Small Size . WW index is the Whited
and Wu (2006) financial constraint index. Small Size equals one if the firm size is in
the lowest quartile. Industry and year fixed effect are included. Industry is defined
by the first two digits of the SIC code. The standard errors presented in parentheses
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm level. The symbols ***,**, and
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Average
employee pay
CEO Salary CEO Bonus CEO Equity
pay
Panel A: Financial constraints (WW index)
CDS Trading 0.51** 0.60*** 0.17 0.55***
(0.21) (0.07) (0.23) (0.20)
CDS Trading × WW 1.04** 1.53*** 0.14 1.04**
(0.47) (0.18) (0.61) (0.51)
WW -1.70*** -1.79*** -3.94*** -2.84***
(0.53) (0.37) (1.10) (0.89)
Observations 5,925 12,878 6,820 11,001
R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.48 0.58
Panel B: Firm size
CDS Trading 0.08** 0.07*** 0.25*** 0.44***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
CDS Trading × Small size 0.58*** 0.01 0.33** 0.10*
(0.15) (0.04) (0.13) (0.11)
Small size -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.63*** -0.94***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 12,143 29,024 15,227 23,573
R-squared 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.37
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Chapter 3
Credit Default Swaps and
Financial Contracting: Theory
3.1. Introduction
The introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) and the explosive growth of their
market in recent years had a significant impact on the debtor-creditor relationship.
The past decade has seen the rapid development of research, both theoretical and
empirical, on the costs and benefits of the CDS market motivated by CDS-related
regulatory changes following the last financial crisis. However, little attention has
been paid to how the presence and availability of CDSs might affect financial con-
tracting in general.
The optimality of financial contracts is at the heart of corporate finance lit-
erature since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The literature has
recognized its importance in understanding mechanisms which help to overcome var-
ious frictions between claim holders associated with outside financing. Contract in-
completeness and lack of commitment of equity holders to repay a debt and/or im-
plement policies that maximize firm value create agency conflicts between debt and
equity. Any contract is incomplete because it is impossible to anticipate and specify
all future states of the world (Coase, 1937). That might lead to an opportunistic be-
haviour by the party with the stronger bargaining position in states of the world not
covered by the contract. Examples of this behaviour are strategic default, dilution
of the value of existing debt claims, asset substitution, underinvestment and leverage
ratchet effect in the form of resistance to debt reductions.
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Our theoretical study is mainly motivated by recent empirical findings of Shan,
Tang, and Winton (2019), who focus on the effect of the CDS market on design of
corporate debt contracts with particular reference to loan contractual protection. The
authors document less restrictive covenants and lower collateral requirements in newly
issued loans of CDS-traded firms. They argue that these results can be explained by
lenders’ moral hazard in the presence of CDSs, which reduces lenders’ incentive to
monitor. However, this argument remains controversial. Creditor monitoring of bor-
rowers goes beyond monitoring of loan terms, and it also represents an important
task for bank regulatory compliance. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
developed twenty-nine core principles for effective banking supervision, which are the
de facto minimum standard for regulation and supervision of banks and banking sys-
tems (Core principles for effective banking supervision, BIS, 2019). In accordance
with Basel Core Principles 15 - 18, banks are required to have a comprehensive credit
risk management process, that includes policies and processes to identify, measure,
evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate credit risk on a timely basis. In
addition to these requirements, banks are required to maintain adequate provisions,
reserves and capital levels. Timely monitoring of borrower financial condition un-
derlies the assessment of an appropriate amount of loan loss reserves, which in turn
affects lenders’ Tier 1 regulatory capital (Guidance on credit risk and accounting for
expected credit losses, BIS, 2015).1 The requirement to comply with supervisory stan-
dards (e.g., comprehensive credit risk management, maintenance of adequate capital
levels) remains unchanged for CDS-protected lenders. When a bank is not complying
with regulations, the supervisor has power to impose a range of sanctions, revoke the
bank’s licence, etc.
Based on the findings of looser loan terms post inception of CDS trading,
Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) suggest that the access of creditors to the CDS mar-
ket improves contracting efficiency by substituting loan contractual protection and
reducing contracting costs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical study
that analyses the effect of CDS introduction on financial contracting and establishes
predictions for empirical analysis to test. In our study, motivated by Shan, Tang,
and Winton (2019), we examine whether the introduction of CDS trading affects
creditors’ incentives to use traditional tools of financial contracting, such as financial
(accounting-based) covenants, for protection of their interests in loan agreements.
1In US, Basel Core Principles are adopted, among others, in ASC 310/FAS 114, which requires
banks to maintain a loan classification to assess credit risk and determine an appropriate amount of
loan loss reserves. While the loan loss reserves should be timely adjusted for any increase in credit
risk, due to its effect on earnings it also results in a decreased level of lenders’ Tier 1 regulatory
capital.
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In theory, one instrument can change the incentive to use another instrument
when it either can replace it as an adequate substitute, or when it can affect the
work of another tool in the joint use. The substitution of one instrument for another
is possible just when it is made to function like the original. In other words, we
can expect that CDS trading can replace covenants in loan agreements, if it solves
problems that are typically addressed by covenants.
Traditionally, debt holders include covenants in loan agreements as a way to
reduce the costs of no-commitment by disciplining and determining the set of policies
that shareholders are committing to. Specifically, the presence of covenants moti-
vates shareholders to adjust their firm policies ex ante to minimise the likelihood
of triggering a covenant violation, which might result in a costly renegotiation. In
addition, covenants can be used ex post as a contractible signal of the need of rene-
gotiation and allow to allocate control (decision) rights between contracting parties
on a state-contingent manner. Whereas, the transfer of control rights to creditors
allows to take remedial actions and discipline borrowers both outside and in financial
distress (e.g., see Chava and Roberts, 2008; Gorton and Kahn, 2000). Consequently,
the actions employed by creditors in response to a covenant violation allows to im-
prove the value of violating firms through changes in their investment and financing
behaviour (Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009). Overall, Gamba and Triantis (2014) show
that while covenants affect corporate policies both ex ante and ex post, much of the
effect occurs ex ante, away from the covenant violation point.
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) are the first to show theoretically that the emer-
gence of the CDS market strengthened bargaining position of creditors and provided
a new commitment device for borrowers to repay their obligations. Access to credit
insurance makes renegotiation more difficult as creditors demand a higher payoff
and impose hasher loan terms in debt renegotiation or, in a case of creditors’ over-
insurance, push borrowers into bankruptcy (as an “empty creditor”) following the
non-payment of debt.2 Despite the discussed above commitment benefits of CDSs, it
is not clear a priori how CDSs affect agency distortions in borrowers’ investment and
financing decisions. Intuitively, with CDSs self-interested equity holders should reflect
in their decisions the lower possibility of future renegotiation in financial distress. On
the one hand, the increased renegotiation frictions and the subsequent reduction of
the occurrence of strategic default might reduce deviations from firm value maximis-
ing decisions.3 On the other hand, the anticipation of forceful liquidation with no
2The problem of empty creditors was firstly introduced by Hu and Black (2008) based on the
idea of separation of creditors’ cash flow rights from their control rights.
3For instance, Pawlina (2010), drawing on the results of his theoretical model, suggests that the
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chance to renegotiate the debt might increase the equity holders’ incentive to engage
in opportunistic behaviours, especially when the firm approaches financial distress.
Taking into account that both CDSs and covenants can improve contracting
efficiency by increasing ex post shareholders’ commitment, we theoretically examine
if the presence of one instrument changes the incentives to hold the other. We con-
struct a two-period model with a levered firm that optimally chooses investment in
each period and decides whether to repay the debt or renegotiate it with the credi-
tors at the end of the period. The model captures important features of real world
contracts such as contract incompleteness and lack of commitment of equity holders.
The latter leads to a possibility of strategic default, whereby even in a solvent state
the shareholders threaten to default strategically and renegotiate to appropriate cred-
itors’ wealth. That also creates an incentive to underinvest at an earlier date given
the anticipation that some benefits from investing in capital might be transferred to
creditors under renegotiation. Overall, the model generates both underinvestment
and strategic default. Using this baseline model, we examine the rationality for cred-
itors to have either instrument or both. Specifically, we first measure how effective
covenants and CDSs considered individually in protecting the debt from agency con-
flicts by reducing deviations from firm value maximizing investment decisions and
shareholders’ incentive to default strategically. Next, by allowing the two instru-
ments together, we examine any changes in effectiveness of each instrument under
the presence of the other.
The analysis of rationality for creditors to have either commitment mechanism
shows that CDSs and covenants can serve the same purpose.4 More specifically, both
tools increase the protection of debt by reducing the occurrence of strategic default.
Debt covenants, by imposing constraints on firm policies and moving endogenous
investment closer to the one maximizing the firm value, lead to an increase in the
firm continuation value and a reduction in the scope for renegotiation. As a result, the
covenant-enhanced model generates a lower renegotiation threshold (i.e., the threshold
such that equity holders are indifferent between repayment and renegotiation). The
way CDS contracts affect strategic-debt service is different. In the presence of CDS
trading, creditors are less concerned about liquidation costs due to their confidence in
debt overhang might be reduced by higher renegotiation frictions such as in public debt, for which
disperse debt holding increases coordination costs and makes renegotiation prohibitively expensive
(Rajan, 1992), and/or in legal systems with strong enforcement of creditors’ rights (Favara, Schroth,
and Valta, 2012).
4Throughout the thesis, we follow DeMarzo (2019) and use the term “commitment mechanism”
to define any countervailing force against no-commitment. As widely used commitment mechanisms
in practice, DeMarzo (2019) discusses collateral, seniority provisions, and restrictive covenants.
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collecting an insurance payment following a credit event. Consequently, renegotiation
frictions increase. Hence, the stricter the covenant, or the greater creditors’ protection
in the CDS market, the lower wealth transfer from debt to equity caused by future
strategic debt service.
As for distortions of the optimal investment policy caused by lack of commit-
ment, we find that covenants and CDSs are not equally effective at preventing them.
Specifically, we provide an additional theoretical confirmation on covenants’ ability
to restore the shareholders’ investment incentive reduced by debt overhang. The aim
of avoiding technical default and large renegotiation costs reduce the occurrence of
investment decisions that are highly costly to debt holders. The stricter financial
covenants, the lower the deviation from the firm value optimizing investment policy.
On the contrary, the effect of CDS contracts on investment-related agency distortions
is ambiguous, and it can both alleviate or exacerbate the debt overhang problem.
The ambiguity of CDS effect is driven by two economic forces conditional
on the renegotiation (liquidation) event. According to our model, the likelihood of
CDS-protected creditors to turn into empty creditors, who always prefer to force the
firm into bankruptcy even though renegotiation would be efficient, increases with the
creditors’ protection in the CDS market and decreases with firm financial stability.
When the probability that creditors force a liquidation is low and debt renegotiation
feasible, the introduction of CDSs allows to reduce underinvestment. In contrast,
when the probability that creditors force a liquidation is high and debt renegotiation
is ruled out, creditors’ protection in the CDS market increases underinvestment. In
other words, shareholders, fearing forceful liquidation caused by empty creditors and
sharing the return of equity-financed investment with debt holders in default, will
pass up valuable investment opportunities. As a result, borrowers that are most af-
fected by the empty creditor problem are more likely to face adverse effects of CDS
trading on their default risk, investment activity and firm value. The exacerbation of
debt overhang problem is also consistent with the recent theoretical study of Wong
and Yu (2018), who by introducing a Leland’s (1994) type model with dynamic in-
vestment opportunities show that the CDS market increases debt overhang via the
empty creditor channel.
Taken together, the current analysis does not support the inference offered in
recent empirical study of Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019), which suggests that the
covenant protection can be replaced by CDS trading. Rather, our findings demon-
strate that debt covenants are a more universal tool for debt protection and so the
reason of a negative correlation observed empirically between covenants and CDSs
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might be found elsewhere. That is consistent with a new paper-discussion by Demer-
jian (2019), which came to our attention while the thesis was being prepared for final
submission. Similarly to our study, Demerjian (2019) raises a question of whether
weakened loan provisions in CDS firms could be associated with an improved con-
tracting efficiency and a substitution of loan contractual protection, as suggested in
Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019). He discusses aspects why CDSs may or may not
be a substitute for traditional tools of financial contracting. The paper emphasizes
that CDS and covenants serve distinct purposes, with CDS addressing all credit risk
and covenants addressing agency conflicts.5 Given the complexity of the problem,
Demerjian (2019) highlights the importance for future research to understand the full
nature of risk that CDSs and covenants address. Because the reality might be more
complex, and a negative correlation observed empirically between these instruments
might be not due to the substitution effect. This thesis answers the questions raised
by Demerjian (2019).
Next, considering the two commitment mechanisms at the same time, we show
the lowest wealth transfer from debt to equity caused by future strategic debt service,
and the reduction in the likelihood of inefficient liquidation caused by CDS-protected
empty creditors. On the other hand, the presence of CDS trading can negatively affect
covenant effectiveness at alleviating underinvestment. When the empty creditor issue
is likely, covenants prove ineffective given underinvestment is still the equilibrium out-
come. Such loss of covenant effectiveness provides an explanation to current empirical
findings. First, it explains empirical findings of Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri
(2015), who document no creditors’ intervention in investment policies of CDS traded
firms, including those with agency problems, following covenant violations. Thus, the
loss of covenant effectiveness as a debt protection tool can be much broader, and also
be related to its ex post disciplining effect on corporate policies following technical
default. Next, our findings provide a new explanation for the empirically observed
negative effect of the introduction of CDS contracts on covenant tightness in Shan,
Tang, and Winton (2019). Covenants are costly because they constrain a firm’s be-
havior. If they are not useful in addressing the debt overhang problem after the
introduction of CDSs, then it makes sense for the firm and the lender to negotiate
looser covenants at loan inception.
The remaining part of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes
5Differently from Demerjian (2019), we also provide the model which is able to explain channels
through which (and to what extent) CDS protection affects agency conflicts. We show that CDSs
are not an adequate substitute for covenants owing to a possible exacerbation of agency conflicts by
CDS trading.
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the relevant literature and explains a conceptual link between CDSs and covenants.
Section 3.3 details a baseline model with agency conflicts caused by shareholders’
lack of commitment absent covenant restrictions and CDSs. Section 3.4 examines
the effect of each commitment tool on the shareholder optimal policy individually
by solving analytically a constrained second-best optimization problem. Section 3.5
examines the rationality for lenders to use covenants and CDSs together by measuring
changes in effectiveness of each instrument under the presence of the other. Section
3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2. Literature Review
A key feature of our model is the inability of firms to commit to debt repayment and
firm value maximizing policies, which in turn results in creditor wealth expropriation.
Despite decades of research, the commitment problem remains an important question
in corporate finance literature. For instance, the recent theoretical study of DeMarzo
(2019) has reframed the question of capital structure through demonstrating that the
static predictions of standard trade-off theory do not apply (either disappear with
complete contracts, or become irrelevant absent commitment) in a dynamic context,
and equilibrium outcomes depend almost entirely on the commitment mechanisms
(such as collateral, seniority provisions, restrictive covenants, regulatory constraints)
available to firms. To examine the resulting magnitude of agency costs, we exclude any
commitment mechanism (countervailing force) that aligns interests of shareholders
and debt holders from the baseline model.
First, our model incorporates the debt-equity agency conflict associated with
strategic default. Strategic debt-service was firstly introduced by Hart and Moore
(1989, 1994), who showed that default might occur not just in a situation of insuffi-
cient cash flow (“liquidity default”), but also owing to equity holders’ aspiration to
distract cash to themselves. It means that even in the case when equity holders have
sufficient cash to make contractual payments, there is the risk for debt holders that
borrowers under-perform on servicing their obligations (“strategic default”). Such
opportunistic behaviour is likely in states in which debt holders are less likely to ini-
tiate liquidation or bankruptcy. High bankruptcy costs and low continuation value in
states in which the firm is insolvent make bankruptcy inefficient and create a scope
for renegotiation. The equity holders’ incentive to act strategically by forcing conces-
sions in debt-service obligation from debt holders is based on the fact that firms are
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closer to financial distress and debt is risky. As emphasized by Mella-Barral and Per-
raudin (1997), when the debt becomes risky, equity holders are no longer the residual
claimants on the firm’s income stream because the debt value is close to the firm’s
liquidation value. The importance of the effect of strategic debt service on credit risk
is highlighted, among others, by Garlappi and Yan (2011), who show its significant
role in explaining the distress puzzle. The empirical literature also demonstrates the
reflection of strategic default in credit spreads, equity beta and volatility (Davydenko
and Strebulaev, 2007; Favara, Schroth, and Valta, 2012).
The emergence of the CDS market has provided a commitment device allowing
to reduce the likelihood that shareholders may default for strategic, rather than sol-
vency, reasons. The access to credit insurance makes creditors less concerned about
liquidation costs due to their confidence in collecting an insurance payment from a
protection seller following a credit event. As a result, strengthening bargaining power
of creditors and their more aggressive behaviour over renegotiation reduces the inci-
dence of strategic default (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Danis and Gamba, 2018; Kim,
2016). Despite the broad use of covenants by debt holders as a tool intended to reduce
the costs of no-commitment, the current literature does not link it to the instruments
allowing to mitigate strategic debt service. We fill this gap by building a model
which enables to assess the channels through which (and to what extent) CDSs and
covenants considered individually and in combination affect the likelihood of strategic
default. Specifically, we follow Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Danis and Gamba (2018)
and consider the strategic interaction between claim holders in two games. First, the
firm strategically decides whether to repay the debt or renegotiate it with creditors at
the repayment date. Second, at the moment of renegotiation, claim holders, seeking
to extract some surplus (i.e., to get payoff above their outside options), play a Nash
bargaining game. We use the equilibrium outcome of the game to derive the thresh-
old such that shareholders are indifferent between repayment and renegotiation. That
allows us to understand the mechanisms through which commitment devices affect
the likelihood of strategic default.
Next, the model incorporates distortions of firm policies caused by lack of
commitment. We do not try to capture all known types of agency costs associated
with endogenous deviations from firm maximizing policies, and focus particularly
on investment-related agency costs associated with outstanding debt, which can be
renegotiated. The presence of risky debt and the lack of commitment to repay it
naturally create an incentive to underinvest given the anticipation that some benefits
from investing in capital might be transferred to the creditors under renegotiation.
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The discussion on the relation between underinvestment and renegotiable debt can
be found in Sundaresan and Wang (2007) and Pawlina (2010). Pawlina (2010) shows
the possibility of debt renegotiation at the times of financial distress exacerbates
Myers (1977) underinvestment problem upon the firm’s expansion. Underinvestment
caused by debt overhang is one of the central focus of the debt-equity agency litera-
ture.6 Moyen (2007), analysing the effect of underinvestment in a dynamic stochastic
framework, demonstrates that the magnitude of agency costs is large, and represents
2.61% (4.98%) of the firm value for long-term (short-term) debt. The relevance of
underinvestment problem is supported not just theoretically, but also empirically
(Hennessy, 2004).
We use the underinvestment baseline condition to measure how effective a pro-
tective debt covenant and a CDS contract per se and in combination can be in moving
equity holders’ investment policy closer to the firm value maximizing one. The litera-
ture indicates that covenants is a traditional welfare improving tool broadly included
in loan agreements.7 The main rationales for covenants can be classified according to
the “conflict” and “control” views (Tirole, 2010). The first view assumes an ability
of covenants to prevent equity holders from taking actions that might be privately
optimal for them but would expropriate the lenders. Based on the “control” view,
covenants enable to define a range of circumstances under which claim holders get the
right to intervene in management. Consequently, the inclusion of covenants allows to
limit debt-equity conflicts through reducing distortions on investment and financing
decisions related to lack of commitment of shareholders. One of the first detailed ev-
idence was provided by Smith and Warner (1979) who investigate mitigating agency
problems by different types of covenants. This idea also has been confirmed by more
recent theoretical studies such as Gârleanu and Zwiebel (2009), Gamba and Triantis
(2014), Arnold and Westermann (2016), and Xiang (2019). Despite most of empir-
ical studies concentrates mainly on creditors’ intervention in corporate policies as a
result of renegotiation following technical default (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini,
Smith, and Sufi, 2009), Gamba and Triantis (2014) and Xiang (2019) provide the
theoretical evidence that covenants alter corporate policies more generally and across
many states, and not simply at points where covenants are violated. Another recent
theoretical study of Gamba and Mao (2019) highlights the importance of the presence
of renegotiation frictions for the ex ante positive effect of covenants on firm value.
6For instance, see Mello and Parsons (1992), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Hennessy (2004),
Moyen (2007), Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2015), and Chen and Manso (2016).
7Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Christensen, Nikolaev, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2016) provide
good surveys on the literature on debt covenants that emphasizes its ability to enhance contracting
efficiency.
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They show that the renegotiation triggered by technical default improves the ex post
firm value at an ex ante cost and may generate value losses similar to those absent
shareholders’ commitment. We complement these works by studying the effect of
debt covenants on strategic debt service, and the relation between covenant tightness
and mitigation of agency policy distortions.
In addition, our study contributes to the literature that examines effects of
introducing CDSs on the debtor-creditor relationship.8 In recent years, there has
been many contributions in this area stimulated by the 2007/2008 financial crisis and
the ensuing regulation. As it was emphasized earlier, Bolton and Oehmke (2011)
show theoretically the positive and negative real effects of the introduction of CDSs
on a borrower’s debt. Another theoretical study of Danis and Gamba (2018) shows
that while the introduction of CDSs has both positive and negative effects on firm
value, the net effect is positive. The empty creditor hypothesis is supported by
empirical studies of Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) and Danis (2016). Sub-
rahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) document that the introduction of CDSs leads
to the growth in the probability of filing for bankruptcy, while Danis (2016) demon-
strates that bondholders holding CDSs are less likely to engage in an out-of-court debt
restructuring. Some positive effects of introducing CDSs were highlighted by Saretto
and Tookes (2013), who report that the presence of CDSs makes credit supply to firms
greater and allows firms to borrow at longer maturity. In addition, there are other
theoretical studies by Morrison (2005) and Parlour and Winton (2013) which inves-
tigate the effect of CDS introduction on the debtor-creditor relationship in terms of
banks’ incentives to monitor. The above-mentioned authors show that the existence
of the CDS market may lead to disintermediation and may reduce banks’ incentives
to monitor their borrowers. We complement these works by studying whether CDS
contacts, used as a commitment device for borrowers to repay the debt, can also
affect distortions to the value maximizing investment policy caused by lack of com-
mitment. Our work is most closely related to the recent theoretical study of Wong
and Yu (2018), who introduce a Leland’s (1994) type model with dynamic investment
opportunities and show that the CDS market drives debt overhang via the creditor
channel. They show that debt overhang arises from the acceleration of the equity’s
bankruptcy time following the inception of CDS trading, that endogenously shifts
the distribution of investment benefits towards the debt holders and forces the firm
to forgo some positive net preset value (NPV) projects. Another related theoretical
study is by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016), who demonstrate underinvestment as a
8The current literature on CDSs is well summarized in a comprehensive survey of Augustin,
Subrahmanyam, Tang, Wang, et al. (2014).
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product of uncovered CDS positions. While the above cited works is focused mostly
on the debt overhang as a result of the empty creditor channel, our model deter-
mines two possible mechanisms through which CDS trading can affect, alleviate or
exacerbate, underinvestment.
Finally, our study sheds light on empirical works that study the effect of credit
derivatives trading on financial contracting. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first who theoretically investigate whether the emergence of the CDS market
changes creditors’ incentive to use traditional tools of financial contracting, such as
debt covenants. Our analysis is built on understanding whether CDS contracts can
be considered as an adequate substitute for debt covenants, and whether the pres-
ence of CDS trading changes its effectiveness as a countervailing force against no-
commitment. Thereby, our model provides a more complete theoretical foundation
to current empirical research, that motivate their test hypotheses mainly by potential
reduction in creditors’ incentive to monitor and ignoring possible changes in effec-
tiveness of covenants post CDS introduction. For instance findings of Shan, Tang,
and Winton (2019), that demonstrate less restrictive covenants and lower collateral
requirements in newly issued loans of CDS-traded firms, suggesting that loosening
loan contractual protection by introducing CDS is beneficial to both claim holders in
terms of reducing contracting costs. Another empirical study of Chakraborty, Chava,
and Ganduri (2015) analyses how the presence of CDSs on debt affects the exercise of
control rights by creditors after covenant violation. They document that CDS traded
firms, including those with agency problems, do not decrease their investments after
covenant violation in contrast to a significant reduction in investment of otherwise
equivalent firms without CDSs (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, cumulative
abnormal returns of CDS traded firms in the post-violation period are not signifi-
cantly different from zero and even negative in the long run in contrast to significant
positive stock returns of otherwise equivalent non-CDS firms.9
3.3. A Baseline Model With Underinvestment
The baseline model features limited commitment, endogenous investment, and default
decisions aimed at maximizing equity value, under the assumption that the level of
debt cannot be changed. The baseline model excludes any countervailing force that
9Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) show that an improvement in firm value as a result of creditor
intervention over renegotiation following covenant violation manifests itself in higher cumulative
abnormal returns in the long run.
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aligns interests of shareholders and debt holders. The lack of commitment of equity
holders to repay debt results in strategic debt service. The inability of equity holders
to commit to the value maximizing investment policy in the presence of risky rene-
gotiable debt creates an incentive to underinvest. To single out an underinvestment
agency issue, we benchmark the optimal equity-maximizing policy against the firm
value maximizing one.
3.3.1. Economic and financial settings
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. A firm makes real investment and default decisions
to maximize the equity value. The firm’s operating cash flow at t is π(θt, kt) =
θtk
α
t , where α ∈ (0,1) to model decreasing returns to scale. The capital stock kt >
0 depreciates at a constant rate δ = 1.10 The firm’s productivity, θt > 0, is an
i.i.d. continuous-state random variable with cumulative probability distribution Ψ(θt)
given compact support with density ψ(θt). We assume zero discount rate and do not
consider taxes because they are inessential to our argument.
At dates t = 0, 1, after the productivity shock θt is realized and observed, the
equity holders optimally invest, It = kt+1 − kt(1− δ) = kt+1, to get the capital stock
for next period, kt+1. At t = 0, contemporaneously with the investment decision, the
firm issues a two-period debt contract in the amount of d(θ0, k0) with a contractual
repayment b at t = 2. Equity holders and debt holders are risk neutral. If the
operating cash flow plus the proceeds from issuing debt minus the investment is
positive, π(θ0, k0) + d(θ0, k0) ≥ I0, the residual after funding investment is paid as
dividend. Otherwise, the firm costlessly raises equity to finance the gap. At t = 1,
no debt is issued, any difference between the current cash flow and the amount the
firm invests at this date being adjusted trading in the equity market.
At date t = 2, when the contractual repayment takes place, given the previously
installed capital stock k2 and the observed shock θ2, the firm decides whether to
repay the debt b in full or to default strategically and renegotiate the debt by paying
br < b. The debt payment in renegotiation, br, is optimally derived later. Thus,
given equity holders’ lack of commitment and their aspiration to distract cash flow to
themselves, even in a solvent state the shareholders may decide to default strategically
and renegotiate the debt with the creditors. Such opportunistic behavior might take
10The assumption of fully depreciation is not a necessary assumption for our results, but it greatly
simplifies the analytical expressions.
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place in states in which the debt holders are less likely to initiate liquidation or
bankruptcy. That, as a result, creates scope for renegotiation.
The timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 3.1. The baseline model
in absent any covenant restrictions and CDSs (i.e., creditors’ hedge ratio in the CDS





No covenant: k1 ≥ 0




No covenant: k2 ≥ 0




h = 0 : repay or renegotiate
0 < h ≤ H : repay or renegotiate
h > H : repay or default
Figure 3.1: Timeline of the model
3.3.2. Firm value maximizing policy
As a benchmark for the case with lack of commitment, we first examine the firm
value maximization, where at t = 0, 1 the firm selects an investment policy aimed at
maximizing total firm value, given constant debt. The model is solved by backward
induction.
At t = 2, the firm value is
F (θ2, k2) = θ2k
α
2 .
At t = 1, the firm chooses the first best investment policy in order to




1 − k2 + E1[F (θ2, k2)], (3.1)




2 ψ(θ2)dθ2 is the continuation value of the firm at t = 1.
Taking into account the optimal decision at t = 1, the value of the firm at
t = 0 is




0 − k1 + E0[F (θ1, k1)]. (3.2)
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The following proposition summarizes the optimal investment policy at t = 0, 1
based on equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal investment policy). The optimal investment policy








where kF2 is independent of k1 given the investment decision at t = 1 is unconstrained,
i.e. there are non-negativity constraints and no costs on equity issuance.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3.3. Equity value maximizing policy
We now turn to the optimal policy from the equity’s perspective with lack of com-
mitment i.e. when shareholders do not commit to firm value maximization in future
decisions.
At t = 2, equity holders optimally choose whether to repay the debt b in full, or
default strategically and renegotiate the debt by paying br < b, or file for bankruptcy.
Where br is the debt payment derived as the equilibrium outcome of a Nash bargaining
game between the equity holders and the debt holders in renegotiation based on their
bargaining power, q ∈ [0,1] for the debt holders and 1− q for the equity holders,





1−q · [p− `θ2kα2 ]
q ,
in which the set of feasible decisions A(θ2,k2) is such that `θ2kα2 ≤ p ≤ θ2kα2 , where
`θ2k
α
2 is the liquidation value of assets reduced by proportional bankruptcy costs
1 − ` ∈ (0,1). The constraint defining the feasible set shows that both parties are
seeking to extract some surplus from the renegotiation to make sure that their payoff
is above the outside option. The creditors expect that the renegotiated debt payment
is not below the liquidation value of assets, br ≥ `θ2kα2 , and the equity holders want
to make a non-negative payoff, θ2k
α
2 − br ≥ 0.
Consequently, the Nash solution to the renegotiation game is br(θ2,k2) = λθ2k
α
2 ,
where λ = q + `(1− q), λ ∈ (0,1] under the initial parameter assumptions. Next, we
derive the threshold θP such that equity holders are indifferent between repayment
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and renegotiation, that is b = br(θ2, k2), which gives
11






where the shareholders optimally decide to repay the debt in full if θ2 ≥ θP (k2, b) and
to renegotiate if θ2 < θP (k2, b). The decision to default strategically is affected by the
level of capital and debt, i.e. the firm leverage at the moment of making the decision.
Proposition 3.2. The higher the leverage, the higher the threshold θP , which makes
strategic default more likely.
Proof. Straightforward, by taking partial derivative of θP (k2, b) with respect to k2
and b.
Given the optimal default decision, the equity holders’ payoff at t = 2 is
E(θ2,k2, b) = 1{θ2<θP } (θ2k
α
2 − br(θ2,k2)) + 1{θ2≥θP } (θ2kα2 − b) ,
where 1{θ2<θP } is the strategic default indicator. The debt holders then receive b when
θ2 ≥ θP and br when θ2 < θP :
D(θ2,k2, b) = 1{θ2<θP }br(θ2,k2) + 1{θ2≥θP }b.
The total firm value is the sum of the value of debt and equity
F (θ2, k2) = E(θ2,k2, b) +D(θ2,k2, b) = θ2k
α
2 .
At t = 1, given the realized productivity shock θ1 and the current capital k1,
the equity holders decide the optimal k2:




1 − k2 + E1[E(θ2, k2, b)], (3.5)
where given the optimal default policy derived in (3.4), according to which the rene-
11The decision to file for bankruptcy is never optimal for the equity holder and can be ruled out
from the analysis. The renegotiation decision always dominates the liquidation given the constraint
θ2k
α
2 − br(θ2, k2) ≥ 0 (i.e. θ2kα2 · (1 − λ) ≥ 0) and the negative value of the liquidation threshold,
θ2 < θL < 0.
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gotiation is optimal for 0 < θ2 < θP (k2) and repayment is optimal for θ2 ≥ θP (k2),











Given the optimal default and investment policy, kE2 , derived later based on
equation (3.5), the debt value at t = 1 is
D(θ1, k1, b) = E1[D(θ2, kE2 , b)] =




2 )ψ(θ2)dθ2 + b(1−Ψ(θP )).
The total firm value at t = 1 is then
F (θ1, k1) = E(θ1,k1, b) +D(θ1,k1, b) = θ1k
α
1 − kE2 + E1[F (θ2, kE2 )].
At t = 0, given an initial endowment, the equity holders maximize their value
by making an optimal investment decision:




0 − k1 + E0[E(θ1, k1, b)]. (3.6)
In consequence of optimal investment policy, kE1 , derived later based on equa-
tion (3.6), the debt value at t = 0 is
D(θ0, k0, b) = E0[D(θ1, kE1 , b)]
=




2 )ψ(θ2)dθ2 + b(1−Ψ(θP ))
]
ψ(θ1)dθ1.
The total firm value is then
F (θ0, k0) = E(θ0,k0, b) +D(θ0,k0, b) = θ0k
α
0 − kE1 + E0[F (θ1, kE1 )].
The following proposition summarizes the optimal investment policy at t = 0, 1
based on equations (3.5) and (3.6).
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal investment policy without commitment). For an
equity value maximizing firm with outstanding debt b and costless external equity, at
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The equity maximizing and the firm maximizing policies may differ form each other
because debt financing under limited liability and contract incompleteness might cre-
ate an incentive for the equity holders to act in their own interest and transfer wealth
from the creditors to themselves. This conflict of interest leads in some states the
shareholders to take suboptimal corporate decisions.
First, the comparison of two programs shows that the lack of commitment
of equity holders leads to a possibility of strategic default in the equity maximizing
policy, whereby even in a solvent state, θ2 < θP , the shareholders decide to default
strategically and renegotiate to appropriate creditors’ wealth.
Next, we measure the investment agency distortions by comparing the optimal
policies kEt and k
F
t for t = 0, 1 given by Propositions 3.1 and 3.3. The comparison
indicates that these two programs differ in the expected marginal benefits of capital
at t = 1. Under firm value maximization, the firm has an expected claim on the
assets in all states at the end of the period, whereas under equity maximization if
the state θ2 is below the renegotiation threshold θP , there is a reduced value of the
claim on the assets in renegotiation. Consequently, the equity holders may prefer to
underinvest at t = 1 anticipating that some benefits from investing in capital might
be transferred to the creditors under renegotiation. This produces underinvestment
due to debt overhang associated with outstanding renegotiable debt.12 The above
findings are formalized in the following proposition.
12Note, the optimal investment policy at t = 0 is not affected by introducing any commitment tool
given the model design, costless equity financing and independence of current investment decisions
on following ones.
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Proposition 3.4 (Agency conflicts). For a firm with outstanding debt b and cost-
less external equity:
1. The lack of equity holders’ commitment increases the likelihood of strategic de-
fault at t = 2, when 0 < θ2 < θP .





Taken together, the possibility of strategic debt service and the deviation from
the efficient investment reduce the firm value and allow the shareholders to take
advantage of unprotected lenders. In the following sections, we use the results of
Proposition 3.4 as the baseline condition to assess how effective debt covenants and
CDSs considered individually and together can be as countervailing forces against
no-commitment. That allows us to understand whether the instruments can be used
as substitutes or complements to each other.
3.4. Constrained Equity Maximization
In this section, we analyse the rationality of debt covenants and CDSs as commit-
ment mechanisms considered individually to address underinvestment and strategic
debt service given constraints instruments create to the equity value maximization
program.
We examine the potential interaction between these tools by investigating the
ability of either tool to solve the problem that is naturally addressed by the other
instrument. In other words, in addition to the ability of covenants to reduce under-
investment, we also check if they can reduce the incentive to default strategically.
Similarly, for CDSs, which are aimed at reducing strategic default, we also analyse
their ability to address underinvestment. The above analysis allows us to understand
whether one instrument is enough for creditors to reduce the agency issues, or there
need to be both.
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3.4.1. Debt covenants
In this section, we examine the effect of introducing a covenant to the debt contract,
which places a constraint on the shareholders’ optimal policy. Among a variety of debt
covenants commonly used in practice, we focus our attention on financial (accounting-
based) covenants as a well-defined and measurable aspect of financial contracting.
Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) and Bradley and Roberts (2015) document that the
inclusion of covenants based on accounting metrics in loan agreements is common for
both private and public loans. We follow Gamba and Triantis (2014) and concentrate
on a “Maximum Debt to EBITDA” covenant, which is one of the most prevalent
covenants in the sample of private loans according to the empirical literature (e.g.,
see Chava and Roberts, 2008).
The covenant on a maximum Debt/EBITDA ratio, the calculation of which
requires variables from both the balance sheet and the income statement, is related
to the ability of a firm to service the debt. Furthermore, it combines the features
of several covenants intended for different purposes such as imposing limitations on
further indebtedness (like leverage and interest coverage restrictions), restricting asset
stripping and asset substitution.13 Gamba and Triantis (2014) provide evidence that
owing to the compounding effects of distortions of different firm policies, the covenants
that directly target distortions on the debt policy also indirectly affect and reduce
distortions of investment policy, and vice versa.
We modify the baseline model by assuming that a “Maximum Debt to EBITDA”
covenant, with a determined exogenously threshold value c∗, is added to the debt in-
denture at the loan inception. The covenant requires the current level of Debt/EBITDA





and the covenant is violated when it is above the threshold c∗.
While most of the recent empirical studies (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini,
Smith, and Sufi, 2009) concentrates mainly on the ex post effects of debt covenants,
i.e. on the policy changes as a result of transfer of control rights from equity hold-
13There is a big variety of financial covenants indented to protect debt holders against known
and unknown risks. Some of them are focused solely on balance sheet measures (e.g., maximum
leverage, minimum net worth, minimum current ratio) or income statement measures (e.g., minimum
EBITDA, minimum interest coverage).
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ers to debt holders when covenants are violated, our model incorporates the ex ante
effects of covenants. That is in line with the findings of Gamba and Triantis (2014)
and Xiang (2019), who demonstrate that much of the effect of covenant restrictions
on corporate policies occurs away from the violation point since shareholders make
decisions that reduce the likelihood of triggering a violation. In other words, to avoid
technical default and high potential renegotiation costs, shareholders may make in-
vestment and/or financing decisions ensuring the covenant compliance. Consequently,
we assume that if the firm does well, it will be effectively unconstrained in making
decisions. If the firm starts doing poorly, it becomes more constrained the closer the
Debt/EBITDA ratio to the specified threshold c∗.
In the interest of realism, we assume that in order to avoid violation of the
covenant shareholders can adjust both debt and investment policy, which are two
components of the Debt/EBITDA ratio. Specifically, shareholders can reduce the
debt b by the amount f ∈ [0,b], chosen by the borrower freely.14 Given the debt
after repayment b− f and the expected productivity θ̄t+1 for next period, the equity
holders make investment decision kt+1, which cannot be below the minimum level








Proposition 3.5 indicates that the covenant imposes a greater constraint on
optimal investment policy, i.e. it results in a higher minimum level of investment
kt+1, the greater the debt b−f , the lower the expected productivity θ̄ and the tighter
(stricter) the covenant threshold c∗.15
Proposition 3.5 (Covenant constraint on investment policy). The constraint
on shareholders’ optimal investment policy is an increasing function of b, and a de-
creasing function of f , θ̄t+1 and c
∗.
Proof. Straightforward, by taking partial derivative of kt+1 with respect to b, f , θ̄t+1
and c∗.
14The anticipation payment f is represented by an arbitrary value to keep the original logic of the
baseline model, which focuses on the endogenous investment decisions only.
15An accounting-based covenant represented by a maximum (minimum) financial ratio is tighter
when the covenant threshold is lower (greater). For instance, in our case for the “Maximum Debt
to EBITDA” covenant, the lower c∗, the stricter the covenant and the higher the probability of
violation.
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As a result, the equity holders’ maximization problem is changed to reflect
the constraint on investment policy (see Figure 3.1 with the covenant restriction).
To differentiate from the unconstrained equity maximization in Section 3.3.3, we use
an upper bar to denote the updated value of variables in the presence of the debt
covenant. At t = 1, the equity value is then

















2 − (b− f)) ψ(θ2)dθ2.
The renegotiated debt level, br(θ2,k2), in the above equation is the same as in Section
3.3.3. That can be explained by the fact that it is independent on the face value
of debt and determined by the outside options of claim holders in the renegotiation
game. On the contrary, the renegotiation threshold, θ̄P (k2,b,f), is changed according
to the after-repayment debt, b− f ,






We summarize the optimal investment policy at t = 1 in the following propo-
sition, which demonstrates the debt covenant’s ability to alleviate investment distor-
tions at t = 1 by moving the investment policy closer to the one that maximizes
firm value, and allowing to reduce the expropriation of creditors’ wealth due to debt
overhang.
Proposition 3.6 (Optimal investment policy with covenant). For a firm with
outstanding debt and costless external equity, the investment policy maximizing the eq-
uity value at t = 1 under the constraint aimed to maintain the expected Debt/EBITDA
ratio at the required level c∗ is kC2 , which solves:
















where µ ≥ 0, a Lagrange multiplier of the inequality constraints in (3.11), and
θ̄P (k2,b,f) ≤ θP (k2,b) imply
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kE2 ≤ kC2 ≤ kF2 , for f = 0,
kE2 < k
C
2 ≤ kF2 , for f > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
At t = 0, the optimal investment decision is not affected by introducing the
covenant given that the covenant threshold c∗ is determined at the loan inception,
when creditors are aware of the shareholders’ investment decision on k1 and the
expected productivity θ̄1. As a result, the capital level k1 is effectively unbounded.
Interestingly, we find that in addition to the debt covenant’s ability to allevi-
ate underinvestment, it is also effective in reducing the likelihood of strategic debt
service. By imposing a constraint on firm policies and moving investment closer to
the one maximizing the firm value, the covenant allows to increase the firm continua-
tion value, which is associated with a lower renegotiation threshold compared to the
unconstrained level, θ̄P ≤ θP .
Proposition 3.7 (Covenant and strategic default). The constraints on the firm’s
policies imposed by the presence of debt covenant allow to reduce the shareholders’
incentive to default strategically.
Proof. Under the constraints on shareholders’ investment policy and/or forcing lever-
age reduction, the renegotiation threshold becomes lower than the unconstrained one,
θP (k
C
2 ,b,f) ≤ θP (kE2 ,b), given kC2 ≥ kE2 and b − f ≤ b. The higher k2 (or the lower
b), the lower the threshold θP and the lower the probability of strategic default (see
Proposition 3.2).
3.4.2. Credit default swaps
Instead of having a covenant added to the loan indenture, we assume that at t = 0
the creditors purchase CDSs from a dealer to get protection against the borrower’s
default on the debt at t = 2. A CDS contract covers the debt exposure by a fraction
h, chosen by the debt holder, where h ∈ (0,1].16 We assume that both the protection
16We do not model the creditors’ optimal hedging policy for simplicity and tractability of the
model. However, endogenizing h should not affect the main model’s predictions, summarized in
Proposition 3.10. Even in the absence of creditors’ over-insurance (i.e., even for the moderate level
of credit protection h), a state when CDS-protected lenders might turn into empty creditors would
still exist for the lower realization of a parameter H(θ2, k2, b, `). The weaker firms’ fundamentals,
the more attractive bankruptcy option to lenders even in the absence of creditors’ over-insurance in
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seller (dealer) and the protection buyer (creditor) are risk neutral, and that CDS
contracts are priced fairly because both parties have full information.
In the spirit of Bolton and Oehmke (2011), we consider the most common
clause whereby bankruptcy is the credit event triggering an insurance payment by
the protection seller to the creditors. Therefore, out-of-court debt restructuring is
not a credit event and does not trigger a CDS payment. Similarly to Danis and
Gamba (2018), the lenders’ payoff Π(θ2,k2,b,h) in case of a credit event is
Π(θ2,k2,b,h) = hb+ (1− h)`θ2kα2 , (3.14)
where hb is the payment from the CDS seller and (1− h)`θ2kα2 is net of the payment
to the CDS seller with ` being the liquidation price. The debt holders’ payoff, the
price of credit protection in the CDS market, and the resulted debt value are derived
in Appendix.
To differentiate from the unconstrained equity maximization in Section 3.3.3,
we use a hat to denote the updated value of variables in the presence of CDS trading.
At t = 2, the equity holders optimally choose whether to repay the debt b in full or to
default strategically and renegotiate the debt by paying b̂r, where b̂r is the solution of
the renegotiation game between the shareholders and the debt holders given a feasible
region A(θ2,k2,h). Similarly to the unconstrained optimization problem, A(θ2,k2,h)
is defined in a way that both parties of the renegotiation game are seeking to extract
some surplus from the renegotiation to make sure that their payoff is above the outside
option. The difference arises from the expectation of CDS-protected creditors to get a
renegotiated debt payment not lower than the compensation made by the protection
seller, b̂r ≥ Π(θ2,k2,b,h). In other words, the debt holder will engage in renegotiation
just when he expects a higher payoff from renegotiation than he can get from the
CDS dealer.
Consequently, the Nash solution to the renegotiation game is





1−q · [p− Π(θ2,k2,b,h)]q
= Π(θ2,k2,b,h) + q [θ2k
α
2 − Π(θ2,k2,b,h)]
= hb (1− q) + θ2kα2 · λ(h), (3.15)
the CDS market. Furthermore, the findings of Wong and Yu (2018) of the amplified debt overhang
post-CDS introduction based on a continuous-time model with endogenous CDS positions do not
contradict our results.
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where λ(h) = q + (1− h)`(1− q).
The renegotiation payoff, b̂r, is increasing in k2 and h. The higher the hedge
ratio h, the higher the renegotiation payoff required to convince the creditor to rene-
gotiate the debt.
From equation (3.15), renegotiation is possible when the feasible region of the
bargaining problem is not empty. Otherwise, if Π(θ2,k2,b,h) > θ2k
α
2 , or equivalently,
if
h > H(θ2, k2, b, `) =
θ2k
α
2 · (1− `)
b− `θ2kα2
, (3.16)
renegotiation is never initiated. The economic intuition of the threshold H is that
debt holders are not interested in debt renegotiation when their credit protection from
CDSs is above the ratio of the loss in firm value over liquidation to the value of debt
not covered by the firm’s liquidation value of assets. The greater the part of debt,
that is uncovered, the higher the likelihood of the firm being forced into bankruptcy.
The likelihood of CDS-protected creditors to turn into empty creditors, who
prefer to force the firm into bankruptcy, depends on two parameters: the hedge ratio
h and the threshold H(θ2, k2,b, `) based on firm characteristics (see Proposition 3.8).
The empty creditor threat is higher, the greater h and the lower H. Through the
impact on the threshold H, the shareholders’ investment decision at t = 1 makes
renegotiation more or less likely. Firms with higher leverage, lower productivity and
higher liquidation costs are more likely to be pushed into bankruptcy by creditors
holding CDSs. That explains the empirical findings by Subrahmanyam, Tang, and
Wang (2014), who show that distressed firms are more likely to file for bankruptcy if
they are linked to CDS trading.
Proposition 3.8 (Likelihood of renegotiation/liquidation). (1) The higher h,
the greater the empty creditor threat. (2) The lower k2 (or the lower θ2 and `, or the
higher b), the lower H, which makes the firm more vulnerable to the empty creditor
threat.
Proof. Straightforward from (3.16), by taking partial derivatives with respect to k2,
θ2, ` and b.
The increase in renegotiation frictions following the introduction of CDS trad-
ing on a borrower’s debt results in a change of the equity optimization problem, which
is also summarized in Figure 3.1 for h > 0. Consequently, when the shareholders de-
cide whether to repay the debt or to default strategically, the payoff in a default state
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depends on the hedge ratio h and the value of H. If the hedge ratio is below or equal
to H, the payoff to equity equals the renegotiation surplus, θ2k
α
2 − b̂r. If the hedge
ratio is above H, the creditors force the firm into bankruptcy and the owners’ payoff
is zero. To summarize, the payoff to equity at t = 2 is
Ê(θ2, k2,b,h) =
max{θ2kα2 − b, θ2kα2 − b̂r}, if h ≤ Hmax{θ2kα2 − b, 0}, if h > H. (3.17)
From equation (3.17), in states in which renegotiation is feasible, h ≤ H,
we update the renegotiation threshold θ̂P1 such that equity holders are indifferent







according to which the shareholders optimally decide to repay the debt in full when
θ2 ≥ θ̂P1 and renegotiate when θ2 < θ̂P1.
Additionally, the presence of CDS trading produces a default threshold θ̂P2 in
states when renegotiation is never achievable, h > H. According to this threshold,
the firm always repays the debt in a solvent state, θ2k
α
2 ≥ b, and it is forced into
bankruptcy when the firm’s cash flow is insufficient to cover the contractual payment





according to which the debt is repaid in full when θ2 ≥ θ̂P2 and the firm is liquidated
when θ2 < θ̂P2.
The comparison of the derived above thresholds with the unconstrained level,
θ̂P1 ≤ θP and θ̂P2 ≤ θP , confirms the findings of previous studies emphasizing the abil-
ity of CDSs to reduce the incidence of strategic debt service at the costs of increasing
the likelihood of ex post inefficient liquidation.
Proposition 3.9 (CDS and strategic default). CDS reduces the occurrence of
strategic default at t = 2 by decreasing the renegotiation threshold compared to the
unconstrained case, θ̂P1 ≤ θP and θ̂P2 ≤ θP .
1. For h ≤ H, when renegotiation is feasible, the default threshold θ̂P1 is decreasing
in k2 and h. The higher k2 (or the higher hedge ratio h), the lower the probability
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of strategic default.
2. For h > H, when renegotiation is ruled out, CDS reduces the incidence of
strategic default at the costs of the increased likelihood of inefficient liquidation
ex post.
Proof. See Appendix.
At t = 1, the equity holders make only a decision on the capital level for next
period, k2. Then, the equity value is




1 − k2 + E1[Ê(θ2, k2, b, h)]. (3.20)
In the following proposition, we summarize the optimal investment policy in
the presence of CDS trading at t = 1 based on equation (3.20) and compare it to the
results of the unconstrained equity maximization.
Proposition 3.10 (Optimal investment policy with CDS). For a firm with
outstanding debt and costless external equity, the investment policy maximizing the


































From (3.21), the effect of CDS on investment policy is determined by the ex-
ogenous level of credit protection h relative to H, which is determined by firm char-
acteristics.
If the probability that creditors force a liquidation is low (h ≤ H(θ2,kS2 )):
kE2 < k
S





2 , for q = 1.












2 , for q = 1.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Surprisingly, we find that the CDS contract is not as effective in mitigating
investment-related agency distortions as it is in reducing strategic default. On the
contrary, the effect of CDS trading on underinvestment distortions is ambiguous, and
it is not clear a priori whether the positive or the negative effect dominates. The
ambiguity of its effect is driven by two economic forces conditional on the likelihood
of the renegotiation (liquidation) event (see Proposition 3.8).
When the probability that creditors force a liquidation is low and debt renego-
tiation is feasible, h ≤ H(θ2,k2), CDSs reduce underinvestment. By reducing share-
holders’ strategic default incentive, CDSs increase creditors’ incentive to renegotiate
debt owing to improved firm financial stability. Recall from Proposition 3.8, the
greater capital stock, the higher the threshold H(θ2,k2), and the lower the empty
creditor threat. Consequently, when renegotiation of the debt is feasible, the equity
holders can adjust their optimal investment policy by increasing the capital to make
renegotiation more attractive to the creditors.
In contrast, when the probability that creditors force a liquidation is high
and debt renegotiation is impossible, h > H(θ2,k2), CDSs enhance distortions of
the optimal investment. In other words, shareholders, fearing forceful liquidation
caused by empty creditors and sharing the return of equity-financed investment with
debt holders in default, will pass up valuable investment opportunities. This result
is also consistent with the recent theoretical study of Wong and Yu (2018), who in
a Leland’s (1994) type of model with dynamic investment opportunities show that
the CDS market drives debt overhang through the empty creditor channel. They
demonstrate that debt holders excessively hedge against credit risk compared to the
socially optimal credit insurance, which also increases the debt overhang problem.
In addition, our model predicts that the more bargaining power the equity
holders have, the bigger the investment distortion CDSs create. This observation is
in line with empirical findings of Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2019), who docu-
ment a reduction in investment in CDS firms with strong shareholders. They argue
that this result can be explained by creditors’ tendency to over-insure in the presence
of powerful shareholders to strengthen their bargaining position in debt renegotia-
tions. Consistent with a view that equity holders have more bargaining power than
bondholders, CDSs may lead to a significant increase in financial agency costs.17 As
17For instance, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) document that the risk that equity holders take
advantage of a stronger bargaining position is substantial enough to affect bond spreads. Similarly,
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a result, borrowers that are most affected by the empty creditor problem are more
likely to face adverse effects of CDS trading on their default risk, investment activity
and firm value.
Overall, the two forces, positive and negative effects, described above are par-
tially offsetting each other, creating an interesting and not obvious trade-off between
them. As a result, the effect of CDSs on investment-related agency costs is ambiguous.
3.4.3. Summary
The analysis on the potential interaction between debt covenants and CDSs indicates
that the use of credit protection by creditors cannot replace the role of covenants in
a loan agreement. A potential interaction between the two tools exists just for the
part of their ability to reduce the incidence of strategic debt service. However, as of
reducing investment-related agency costs, the tools are not equally effective. While
covenants restore the shareholders’ investment incentive reduced by debt overhang,
the effect of CDS trading on underinvestment is ambiguous. In other words, CDSs
can both alleviate or exacerbate the debt overhang problem.
Taken together, our model does not support the inference of empirical studies
suggesting that a contractual protection can be replaced by CDS trading. Rather, our
findings demonstrate that debt covenants are a more universal tool for debt protection
and so the reason of a negative correlation observed empirically between covenants
and CDSs might be found elsewhere.
3.5. Equity Maximization With Covenants and CDS
In this section, in light of the results of the previous section, we examine the rationality
of using both instruments at the same time and if the presence of one instrument
changes the incentives to use the other. Based on the analysis introduced in Section
3.4, we consider case of equity maximization in the presence of both a debt covenant
and a CDS contract (see Figure 3.1 with the covenant restriction and h > 0). To
differentiate from the unconstrained equity maximization in Section 3.3.3, we use a
tilde to denote the updated value of variables.
Garlappi and Yan (2011) show the effect of higher shareholder bargaining power relative to debt
holders on equity beta and return volatility.
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The payoff to equity at t = 2 is identical to the CDS constrained equity maxi-
mization in (3.17), but adjusted by an after-repayment debt, b − f , similarly to the
covenant constrained equity maximization in Section 3.4.1:18
Ẽ(θ2, k2,b− f,h) =
max{θ2kα2 − (b− f), θ2kα2 − b̃r}, if h ≤ H̃max{θ2kα2 − (b− f), 0}, if h > H̃.
At t = 1, under the constraint on shareholders’ investment policy, k2 ≥ k2,
aimed to maintain the expected Debt/EBITDA ratio at the required level c∗, the
equity value is




1 − k2 − f + E1[Ẽ(θ2, k2,b− f,h)]. (3.22)
The optimal investment policy at t = 1 based on equation (3.22) is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11 (Optimal investment policy with Covenant & CDS). For
a firm with outstanding debt and costless external equity, the investment policy max-
































If the probability that creditors force a liquidation is low (h ≤ H̃(θ2,k̃2)), the
combination of the debt covenant with CDS trading is more effective in mitigating
underinvestment than what each instrument does individually, given that kS2 ≤ k̃2 ≤
kF2 and k
C
2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kF2 .
If the probability that creditors force a liquidation is high (h > H̃(θ2,k̃2)), for
creditor bargaining power q < 1, the covenant proves ineffective in mitigting underin-
18By adjusting the payoff to equity at t = 2, we also update the value of renegotiated debt
b̂r(θ2,k2,b,h), the credit protection threshold H(θ2,k2,b), the renegotiation threshold θ̂P1(k2,b,h) and
the default threshold θ̂P2(k2,b) determined in Section 3.4.2.
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vestment, given that kS2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kE2 ≤ kC2 ≤ kF2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
When the probability that creditors force a liquidation is low, the combination
of instruments provides the greater protection of debt from investment-related agency
conflicts due to increased renegotiation frictions in the presence of CDS trading than
each instrument does individually, kE2 ≤ kS2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kF2 and kE2 ≤ kC2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kF2 .
That is in line with findings by Gamba and Mao (2019), who demonstrate that the
presence of frictions limiting ex post renegotiation of the debt contract is essential to
make covenants an useful commitment device. On the contrary, when renegotiation
is ruled out and there is a chance of inefficient liquidation, the presence of covenant in
the loan agreement makes the underinvestment problem less severe. However, it does
not solve the problem completely. When shareholders have at least some bargaining
power, q < 1, the covenant proves ineffective in the presence of CDS trading given
that underinvestment is still the equilibrium outcome, kS2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kE2 . Expecting a
forceful liquidation in next period with no chance to renegotiate the debt, the equity
holders underinvest despite the presence of the covenant in the credit agreement.
Such loss of covenant effectiveness provides an explanation to the empirical findings
of Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015), who document no creditors’ intervention
in investment policies in CDS traded firms, including those with agency problems,
following covenant violations. In other words, the loss of covenant effectiveness can
be much broader, and be also related to its ex post discipling effects on corporate
policies following the covenant violations.
Next, we examine the rationality for creditors to have two commitment mecha-
nisms at the same time to address the incidence of strategic debt service. We find that
the combination of the two instruments together is even more effective in reducing the
likelihood of strategic default than instruments can achieve individually. The model
with the equity maximization in the presence of both covenants and CDSs generates
the lowest renegotiation/default thresholds than in the unconstrained case and in the
presence of a single instrument. Furthermore, we find that covenants allow to reduce
the likelihood of inefficient liquidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors. The
default threshold in the presence of both covenants and CDSs is lower than the one
in the presence of just credit insurance. The following findings are summarized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 3.12 (Covenant & CDS and strategic default).
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1. Debt covenant and CDS are more efficient in reducing the likelihood of strategic
default together rather than individually, given that
θ̃P ≤ θ̄P < θP ,
θ̃P < θ̂P ≤ θP ,
where θ̄P is the renegotiation threshold with the covenant, θ̂P (either θ̂P1 or θ̂P2)
is the renegotiation/default threshold with CDS, and θ̃P (either θ̃P1 or θ̃P2) is
the renegotiation/default threshold with both the covenant and CDS.
2. The presence of the covenant allows to reduce the probability of inefficient liq-
uidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors, i.e. for h > H̃(θ2,k̃2), given
that
θ̃P2 ≤ θ̂P2 ≤ θP .
Proof. See Appendix.
Taken together, our findings indicate that the CDS market indeed can af-
fect creditors’ incentives to use traditional tools of financial contracting such as debt
covenants. That provides a consistent explanation for the empirical findings of Shan,
Tang, and Winton (2019), who document less strict covenants in new loans of CDS-
traded firms. But the reason of the reduced incentive of creditors to impose covenants
in loan agreements lies not in the substitutive effect of CDS trading, rather in its
detrimental effect on covenant effectiveness. The effectiveness of covenants as a tool
alleviating distortions of the optimal investment policy is mainly determined by the
probability that creditors turn into empty creditors and force a liquidation. When
there is a high risk for borrowers to be affected by empty creditors, covenants prove
ineffective given that underinvestment is still the equilibrium outcome. Notwith-
standing the potential loss of covenant effectiveness, the joint use of covenants and
CDSs allows to achieve the greatest reduction in the wealth transfer from debt to
equity caused by future strategic debt service, and the reduction in the likelihood of
inefficient liquidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors.
3.6. Conclusion
In this study, we analyse whether creditors’ incentive to use traditional tools of finan-
cial contracting, such as debt covenants, change following the introduction of CDS
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trading on a borrower debt. In a two-period model, we consider an equity-maximizing
firm with outstanding debt, that optimally makes investment and default decisions un-
der limited commitment. The model generates a couple of known debt-equity agency
conflicts, such as underinvestment and strategic default. In this debt overhang setup,
we explore whether CDS contracts are equally effective with debt covenants used by
creditors to reduce debt-equity agency frictions, and whether the presence of CDS
trading changes covenants’ effectiveness.
We find that the access of debt holders to credit insurance can indeed reduce
their incentive to impose covenants on loan agreements. But the reason of this reduced
incentive lies not in the substitutive effect of the CDS market discussed broadly in
empirical literature, rather in its detrimental effect on covenant effectiveness. Our
model demonstrates debt covenants as a more universal tool for debt protection,
the effectiveness of which can be affected by the introduction of CDSs. Specifically,
the effectiveness of covenants as a tool alleviating investment-related agency costs is
mainly determined by the probability that creditors turn into empty creditors and
force a liquidation. When there is a high risk for borrowers being affected by empty
creditors, shareholders, expecting forceful liquidation in next period with no chance
to renegotiate debt, underinvest despite the presence of debt covenants in a credit
agreement.
These findings can be useful for regulators in policy discussion with respect
to the welfare effects of the CDS market. Notwithstanding the potential loss of
covenant effectiveness following the introduction of CDS trading, debt holders should
be particularly careful in loosening strictness of covenants in credit contracts given
its complementary value in reducing the incidence of strategic debt service and the
likelihood of inefficient liquidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors.
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3.7. Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of propositions
Proposition 3.1





1 − k2 + E1[F (θ2,k2)],











that is equation (3.3).





0 − k1 + E0[F (θ1,k1)],




1 − kF2 + E1[F (θ2, kF2 )]
)








that is equation (3.3).
Proposition 3.3
At t = 1, the equity holders make a decision on the capital level for next period, k2,






















































































which is equation (3.7).





0 − k1 + E0[E(θ1, k1)],




1 − kE2 + E1[E(θ2, kE2 )]
)








that is equation (3.8).
Proposition 3.4
1. The possibility of strategic debt service is summarized in Proposition 3.2 based
on equation (3.4).
2. To prove an incentive to underinvest, kE2 < k
F
2 , we denote as ΦF (k2) the
marginal benefits of capital for the firm maximizing policy and as ΦE(k2) the
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marginal benefits of capital for the equity-maximizing policy based on the re-
sults of Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 (see equations (3.3) and (3.7), respectively):



















where the renegotiation threshold θP (k2) is a function of capital level k2 and 0 ≤
1− λ < 1 under the initial parameter assumptions.19
The comparison of marginal benefits of capital of two different programs for
the same capital level, k2, implies that







· (−λ)ψ(θ2)dθ2 < 0.
Consequently, ΦE(k2) < ΦF (k2), which is graphically represented in Figure
3.2. The marginal costs of capital in the two scenarios are identical and equal to 1,
given the absence of dividend constraints and equity issuance costs. That allows us
to compare two optimal polices by expecting that a firm invests in capital until the




Figure 3.2: Optimal investment policy: equity maximization vs. firm value maxi-
mization
19Where λ = q + `(1− q), 0 < λ ≤ 1 given q ∈ [0,1] and ` ∈ (0,1).
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Proposition 3.6
Under the constraint on shareholders’ investment policy, k2 ≥ k2, aimed to maintain
the expected Debt/EBITDA ratio at the required level c∗, the optimal capital level
k2 is the maximand of
max θ1k
α
1 − k2 − f + E1[Ē(θ2, k2,b− f)],
which is also subject to






The Lagrangian is defined by








where µ is a Lagrange multiplier of the inequality constraint.
Then, first order condition is























































where the constraint is binding, k2 = k2 , when µ > 0.
To prove that kE2 ≤ kC2 ≤ kF2 , first, we denote the marginal benefits of capital
for the covenant constrained equity maximization as ΦC(k2) and compare it with the
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Given θ̄P ≤ θP (see proof of Proposition 3.7), 0 < λ ≤ 1 and µ ≥ 0, it implies








· λψ(θ2)dθ2 + µ > 0,
and for θ̄P = θP (i.e., when f = 0), ΦC(k2)− ΦE(k2) = µ ≥ 0.
Consequently, for shareholders reducing the debt by amount f > 0 to ensure




2 (see Figure 3.3), whereas for
f = 0, ΦC(k2) ≥ ΦE(k2) and kC2 ≥ kE2 .
Figure 3.3: Optimal investment policy: unconstrained equity maximization vs.
covenant constrained equity maximization
With respect to ΦC(k2) compared to the marginal benefits of capital of the
firm maximization, ΦF (k2) (3.24), we have:







· (−λ)ψ(θ2)dθ2 + µ ≤ 0.
Consequently, ΦC(k2) ≤ ΦF (k2) and kC2 ≤ kF2 .
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Proposition 3.9
CDS reduces the occurrence of strategic default at t = 2. The renegotiation/default
thresholds in the presence of CDS are below or equal to the threshold in the uncon-
strained case, θ̂P1 ≤ θP and θ̂P2 ≤ θP , given that b ≥ b(1−h(1−q)) and 0 ≤ λ(h) ≤ 1

















λ(h) = q + (1− h)`(1− q).
1. For h ≤ H, when renegotiation is feasible, the higher k2 (or the higher hedge ratio
h), the lower the probability of strategic default.
1.1. The renegotiation threshold θ̂P1(k2,b,h) is decreasing in k2:
∂θ̂P1
∂k2





1.2. To prove that the renegotiation threshold θ̂P1(k2,b,h) is decreasing in h, we





−vb(1− q)− (−u`kα2 (1− q))
v2
=
(1− q) · [u`kα2 − vb]
v2
,
20In the baseline equity maximization case with no CDS, 0 < λ(h) ≤ 1 given that h = 0.
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b(1− h(1− q))`kα2 ≤ bkα2 [q + (1− h)`(1− q)],
` ≤ q + `(1− q).
2. For h > H, renegotiation is ruled out. As a result, when θ2 < θ̂P2, CDS
can give rise to inefficient liquidation ex post by forcing the firm into bankruptcy even
though renegotiation would be efficient.
Proposition 3.10
At t = 1, the equity holders make a decision on the capital level for next period, k2,
in order to maximize the value of equity at that date,




1 − k2 + E1[Ê(θ2, k2, b, h)],
where




























































2 · (1− `)
b− `θ2kα2
,
b̂r(k2,h) = hb (1− q) + θ2kα2 · λ(h).






· b(1− h(1− q))
λ(h)






































































which is equation (3.21).
The effect of CDS on investment policy is determined by the exogenous level of
credit protection h relative to H, which is determined based on firm characteristics,
we consider scenarios h ≤ H(k2) and h > H(k2) separately.
• When renegotiation is feasible at t = 2 (h ≤ H(k2)):
First, we denote as ΦS(k2) the marginal benefits of capital in the equity max-
imization in the presence of CDS trading based on equation (3.21) and compare it
with the marginal benefits of capital of the baseline equity maximization with no
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When the creditor bargaining power is q = 1, θ̂P1 = θP and λ(h = 0) = λ(h),
which make marginal benefits of the two programs identical: ΦS(k2) − ΦE(k2) = 0.
Consequently, kS2 = k
E
2 .
For the creditor bargaining power q < 1, θ̂P1 < θP , that implies that for the








· λ(h = 0)ψ(θ2)dθ2 > 0,
where λ(h = 0) > 0. Consequently, kS2 > k
E
2 .
With respect to ΦS(k2) compared to the marginal benefits of capital of the
firm maximization based on equation (3.24), we have:







· (−λ(h))ψ(θ2)dθ2 ≤ 0,
where 0 ≤ λ(h) ≤ 1. Consequently, ΦS(k2) ≤ ΦF (k2). Given that a firm invests in
capital until the marginal costs of capital are equal to the marginal benefits of capital,
kS2 ≤ kF2 .
Overall, kE2 ≤ kS2 ≤ kF2 . The optimal capital choice in the presence of CDSs
is above the one for the unconstrained equity maximization, when the creditor bar-
gaining power is q < 1:
kS2 = k
E
2 , for q = 1, 0 < h ≤ 1
kS2 > k
E
2 , for 0 ≤ q < 1, 0 < h ≤ 1
kS2 = k
F
2 , for q = 0, h = 1
• When renegotiation is ruled out at t = 2 (h > H(k2)):










Figure 3.4: Optimal investment policy: unconstrained equity maximization vs. equity
maximization with CDS
When the creditor bargaining power is q = 1, θ̂P2 = θP given that λ(h = 0) = 1,
that makes marginal benefits of the equity maximization with CDS identical to those





When the creditor bargaining power is q < 1, the fact that with CDS, on
θ2 < θ̂P2, the firm is liquidated and θ̂P2(k2,b) < θP (k2,b), 0 < λ(h = 0) < 1 implies





The comparison of marginal benefits of capital of firm value maximization and
equity maximization with CDS for the same capital level k2 implies that ΦS(k2) <
ΦF (k2) given zero value in liquidation case (no renegotiation), on θ2 < θ̂P2. Conse-





At t = 1, the equity holders make a decision on the capital level for next period, k2,
in order to maximize the value of equity at that date,
Ẽ(θ1, k1,b, h) = max θ1k
α
1 − k2 − f + E1[Ẽ(θ2, k2, b− f, h)],
under the constraint aimed to maintain the expected Debt/EBITDA ratio at the
required level c∗:






The Lagrangian is defined by








where µ is a Lagrange multiplier of the inequality constraint, and



























































2 · (1− `)
(b− f)− `θ2kα2
,
b̃r(k2,h) = h(b− f) (1− q) + θ2kα2 · λ(h).
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Then, first order condition is





· (b− f)(1− h(1− q))
λ(h)

















































































where the constraint is binding, k2 = k2 , when µ > 0.
Similar to the equity maximization with CDS, investment policy is ambiguous
and determined by the exogenous level of credit protection h relative to H, which
is determined based on firm characteristics, we consider scenarios h ≤ H̃(k2) and
h > H̃(k2) separately.
• When renegotiation is feasible at t = 2 (h ≤ H̃(k2)):
We denote as Φ̃(k2) the marginal benefits of capital in the equity maximization
in the presence of the two instruments together and compare it with the marginal
benefits of capital when the debt covenant and CDS are used separately, ΦC(k2) (3.26)
97














When the creditor bargaining power is q = 1, θ̃P1 = θ̄P and λ(h) = λ(h = 0),
which make Φ̃(k2) identical to the marginal benefits of the equity maximization with
the debt covenant: Φ̃(k2)− ΦC(k2) = 0. Consequently, k̃2 = kC2 .
For the creditor bargaining power q < 1, θ̃P1 < θ̄P , that implies that for the








· λ(h = 0)ψ(θ2)dθ2 > 0,
where λ(h = 0) > 0. Consequently, k̃2 > k
C
2 .









· λ(h)ψ(θ2)dθ2 + µ ≥ 0,
where 0 ≤ λ(h) ≤ 1, µ ≥ 0 and the renegotiation thresholds of the two programs can
be identical for f = 0. Consequently, Φ̃(k2) ≥ ΦS(k2) and k̃2 ≥ kS2 .
Overall, the combination of the debt covenant and CDS together reduces under-
investment more than using instruments separately, kS2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kF2 and kC2 ≤ k̃2 ≤ kF2 .
• When renegotiation is ruled out at t = 2 (h > H̃(k2)):
The marginal benefits of capital in the equity maximization with the debt









1. The over-insurance in CDS makes the debt covenant less efficient in miti-
gating financial agency costs, given k̃2 ≤ kC2 :
When the creditor bargaining power is q = 1, θ̃P2 = θ̄P given that λ(h =
0) = 1, that makes marginal benefits of the equity maximization in the presence of
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the two instruments identical to those of with the debt covenant, Φ̃(k2) = ΦC(k2).
Consequently, k̃2 = k
C
2 .
When the creditor bargaining power is q < 1, the fact that with CDS, on
















·(1−λ(h = 0))ψ(θ2)dθ2 < 0.
Consequently, k̃2 < k
C
2 .
2. The presence of the debt covenant in the loan agreement makes the under-
investment problem caused by the overinsurance in CDS less severe, given k̃2 ≥ kS2 :
The comparison of Φ̃(k2) with the marginal benefits of the equity maximization
with CDS for the same capital level k2 implies that Φ̃(k2) ≥ ΦS(k2), given θ̃P2 ≤ θ̂P2








ψ(θ2)dθ2 + µ ≥ 0,
Consequently, k̃2 ≥ kS2 .
3. In a state of creditors’ over-insurance, shareholders underinvest despite the
presence of the debt covenant, given k̃2 ≤ kE2 :
Finally, we compare Φ̃(k2) with ΦE(k2) (with no debt covenants and CDS).
The fact that in a state of creditors’ over-insurance renegotiation is ruled out and, on
θ2 < θ̃P2, the firm is liquidated implies that Φ̃(k2) ≤ ΦE(k2). Consequently, k̃2 ≤ kE2 .
Proposition 3.12
1. The combination of the debt covenant and CDS together is more efficient in re-
ducing the likelihood of strategic default rather than using instruments separately.
Given that the reduction in the likelihood of strategic default manifests itself in
the reduction of the renegotiation threshold, we compare the renegotiation threshold
θ̃P1 in the presence of the two instruments together with the renegotiation thresh-
olds when the instruments are used separately (θ̄P and θ̂P1 for the models with the
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covenant and CDS, respectively):















· (1− h(1− q))
λ(h)
,
where 0 ≤ λ(h) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ b − f ≤ b and 0 ≤ 1 − h(1 − q) ≤ 1 under the initial
parameter assumptions.21
The comparison of renegotiation thresholds for the same capital level k2 implies
that θ̃P1 ≤ θ̄P and θ̃P1 ≤ θ̂P1:






θ̃P1 − θ̂P1 =
−f
kα2
· 1− h(1− q)
λ(h)
≤ 0.
Note, the sign between thresholds θ̂P (either θ̂P1 or θ̂P2) of the equity maxi-
mization with CDS and θ̄P of the covenant constrained equity maximization depends
on the size of anticipation payment f ensuring the covenant compliance, the creditor
bargaining power q and the level of credit protection h:
θ̄P − θ̂P1 =
−f + h(1− q)
kα2 λ(h)
,
θ̄P − θ̂P2 =
b(1− λ(h = 0))− f
kα2 λ(h = 0)
.
2. The presence of the debt covenant allows to reduce the probability of ineffi-
cient liquidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors, i.e. for h > H̃(θ2,k̃2).
We compare the default threshold θ̃P2 in the presence of the debt covenant and
CDS together against the default threshold θ̂P2 with just CDS for the same capital
level k2:















Taken together, we summarize the comparison of optimal renegotiation deci-
sions of the unconstrained versus the constrained equity maximization (with the debt
covenant and CDS used as separate tools and together) in Figure 3.5.




θ̂P1 θ̄P θ̂P1 θp





Figure 3.5: Optimal renegotiation/repayment decision: unconstrained vs.
constrained equity maximization. The figure presents the optimal equity hold-
ers’ renegotiation/repayment decision as a function of θ2 for two scenarios of creditors’
hedge ratio h. In Panel A, the shareholders optimally decide to repay the debt in full
when θ2 is above a renegotiation threshold and to renegotiate when it is below. In
Panel B, renegotiation is ruled out, and the debt is repaid when θ2 is above a default
threshold and the firm is liquidated when it is below. Unconstrained equity maximiza-
tion (with no debt covenant and CDS) is represented by the renegotiation threshold
θP , Covenant constrained equity maximization is represented by θ̄P , equity maximiza-
tion with CDS is represented by θ̂P1 and θ̂P2, and Covenant-CDS constrained equity
maximization is represented by θ̃P1 and θ̃P2.
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Appendix B. Additional properties of the model
with CDS trading
B.1. The debt holders’ payoff and the price of credit protec-
tion
Given the creditors’ hedge ratio h and the optimal default decision of the shareholders










where 1{h>H} is the “empty creditor” indicator, i.e. when renegotiation is never
achievable.
The debt value at t = 0 is then calculated as the difference between the ex-
pected creditors’ payoff φ(θ0,k0,b,h) and the insurance premium γ(θ0,k0,b,h) paid at






























`θ2k2 ψ(θ2)dθ2 + b(1− ψ(θ̂P2))
]
ψ(θ1)dθ1,
where the price of credit protection γ(θ0,k0,b,h) is calculated as the expectation of









22While h is maintained constant and the CDS contract issued at t = 0 is not renegotiated over
the life of the contract, we assume the the price paid ex post is consistent with the actual firm’s risk
given the protection buyer’s opportunity to sell/buy new contracts over time.
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Chapter 4




It has long been argued, back to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and
Hart and Moore (1989, 1994), that the use of debt financing might introduce mis-
alignment of the incentives of debt and equity. Specifically, the corporate finance
literature indicates that the lack of commitment of equity holders to repay a debt
and/or implement value maximizing corporate policies results in lenders’ wealth ex-
propriation. The magnitude of these agency costs reveals the increasing importance
to derive optimal mechanisms allowing to alleviate the costs of no-commitment.1
Debt covenants, along with other specific provisions in a debt contract (e.g.,
maturity, seniority structure), are generally viewed as a traditional value enhanc-
ing tool of financial contracting, that allows to reduce the costs of no-commitment
through disciplining and determining the set of policies that shareholders are commit-
ting to. The literature indicates both ex post and ex ante effects of debt covenants on
borrower corporate policies. The ex post effects arise from debt covenants’ ability to
1How large the effect of agency costs has been studied in various settings by Hennessy (2004),
Moyen (2007), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), DeMarzo (2019) and Gamba and Saretto (2019). For
instance, on the example of the cost of debt, Gamba and Saretto (2019) demonstrate that agency
costs (such as debt claim dilution, underinvestment, and asset stripping) represent approximately
39% of the average credit spread.
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allocate control rights between contracting parties on a state-contingent manner, i.e.
that allows debt holders to get control rights and influence firm policies at covenant
violations (e.g., see Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009). In con-
trast, the ex ante effects arise from the increased shareholders’ motivation to adjust
their policies ex ante to reduce the likelihood of triggering a covenant violation and
ensure the covenant compliance (e.g., see Gamba and Triantis, 2014; Xiang, 2019).
Notably, Gamba and Triantis (2014) emphasize that much of the effect of covenant
restrictions on corporate policies occurs ex ante, away from its violation points. All
together, these views underline the role of debt covenants as an important tool of
financial contacting intended to increase shareholders’ commitment ex post.
The rise of the CDS market, one of the major financial innovations of recent
decades, has created a new commitment device for borrowers to repay their obliga-
tions. Redistribution of bargaining power in favour of creditors following the intro-
duction of CDS trading reduces an incidence of strategic default by making debt rene-
gotiation more difficult. CDS-protected creditors have an incentive to impose harsher
loan terms during debt renegotiation or, in a case of creditors’ over-insurance, to
push borrowers into bankruptcy (as an “empty creditor”) following the non-payment
of debt (e.g., see Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Danis and Gamba, 2018; Kim, 2016).
Based on the findings of weakened financial covenant strictness and collateral require-
ments in newly issued private loans of CDS-traded firms, the recent empirical study
of Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) suggests that CDSs improve contracting efficiency
by substituting loan contractual protection.
Has the emergence of the CDS market affected creditors’ incentive to use tra-
ditional tools of financial contracting, such as debt covenants, for protection of their
interests? In other words, does the availability of a new commitment mechanism,
significantly strengthening bargaining power of creditors, reduce creditors’ incentive
to use covenants? Differently from the study of Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019), to
address these questions, we propose a direct test on the ability of CDS contracts to be
used as an adequate substitute for financial covenants.2 In addition, we examine any
complementary (or detrimental) value that the presence of CDS trading can bring to
debt covenant effectiveness.
2While Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) explain the possible substitutive effect of CDSs by po-
tential reduction in creditors’ incentive to monitor, we directly test whether CDSs are able to solve
problems that are typically addressed by covenants. Note that, in terms of covenants, monitoring is
just an instrument helping to identify the need of value improving renegotiation based on technical
default and facilitate ex post effect of covenants on corporate policies. However, the rationale for
covenants in loan agreements is much broader.
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Our main hypotheses are based on the model’s predictions developed in Chap-
ter 3, that represents a first theoretical study analysing the effect of CDSs on financial
contracting via its impact on debt covenants. By considering in details the rationality
for creditors to use CDSs and debt covenants as individual commitment mechanisms
and in combination, the model helps to understand if the presence of one instrument
changes the rationality and incentives for creditors to use the other. In particular,
the theory indicates that CDSs and covenants share the ability to increase debt pro-
tection by reducing the likelihood of strategic debt service. However, it is not clear
a priori whether these two instruments are equally effective in reducing costs arising
from no-commitment to implement value maximizing corporate policies.
We build an extensive dataset covering financial information of U.S. public
firms over the period 1994 to 2016, their CDS trades, including information on CDS
trade initiation and net notional amount of CDS outstanding, and private loans issued
by bank and non-bank lenders. Based on this data, we construct a comprehensive
measure of loan-level financial covenant strictness following a non-parametric simula-
tion approach of Demerjian and Owens (2016), who proposed an alternative and more
flexible method to the parametric simulation approach developed by Murfin (2012).
To test whether CDSs can substitute covenants in loan contracts, we concen-
trate on potential distinctive characteristics of these two commitment mechanisms,
and examine whether CDSs are equally effective in alleviating distortions of the op-
timal investment policy as financial covenants. We rely on the existing literature of
empirical investment models considering debt overhang problem, one of the central
focus of the financial agency literature, posited by Myers (1977). Specifically, we fol-
low Hennessy (2004), Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) and construct an empirical
proxy of a debt overhang wedge correction which is intended to capture investment
return accruing to debt holders as opposed to equity holders. The above measure is
built on theoretical predictions indicating the more severe overhang and, as a result,
underinvestment for firms with high leverage, high default probabilities, and high
lenders’ recovery ratios in default. The interaction of the debt overhang empirical
measure with the commitment mechanisms of the interest allows us to test individual
and joint effects of CDSs and financial covenants on the investment distortions caused
by debt overhang.
Our baseline results provide strong empirical support for the comparative stat-
ics predictions developed in Chapter 3. We find that the investment-distortion effect
of CDSs dominates. In other words, the negative investment effect of debt over-
hang is amplified after the introduction of CDS trading on firm debt. Furthermore,
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the investment-distortion effect of CDSs is more prominent for firms with the higher
probability that creditors turn into empty creditors and force a liquidation, such as
for the higher amount of CDS insurance written on firms and/or the weaker firms’
fundamentals. In contrast, stricter financial covenants restore investment incentive
reduced by debt overhang. However, in the post - CDS inception, covenants lose their
effectiveness as a mechanism intended to reduce investment agency distortions. The
CDS market undermines shareholders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment
despite the presence of strict financial covenants in a loan contract.
In our empirical analysis, we address potential endogeneity concerns with re-
spect to both the timing of CDS introduction and the financial covenant strictness,
which is heavily dependent on borrowers’ financial characteristics. First, we follow
Danis (2016) and Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2019), and conduct a quasi-natural
experiment in a narrow window period around the implementation of the CDS Big
Bang Protocol on April 4, 2009. There are several reasons to believe that this regu-
latory reform might affect the severity of the empty creditor problem. Particularly,
it facilitated an improvement of liquidity and availability of CDSs, that in turn in-
creased attractiveness of credit risk hedging. Furthermore, it excluded debt restruc-
turing from eligible credit events, thereby reducing lenders’ incentive to restructure
debt out of court and making lenders tougher in debt renegotiation. Consistent
with our theoretical predictions (i.e., the stronger CDS-induced debt overhang for
the greater empty creditor threat), we find that firms with outstanding CDSs forgo
value-increasing investment during the first six calendar quarters after the Big Bang
Protocol introduction, despite the presence of strict covenants in debt contracts.
Next, we show that our measure of covenant strictness is endogenous because
at the loan inception it is determined based on borrowers’ financial characteristics
together with contracting choices. As a result, the estimation coefficients are biased
in the presence of simultaneity.3 We address this endogeneity issue using a two-
stage instrumental variable (IV) approach with the number of loan defaults suffered
by the lead lender prior contracting a new loan as an instrument. The instrument
choice is based on the findings of Murfin (2012), who shows that banks’ exposure
to idiosyncratic risk, such as payment defaults to their own loan portfolios, induces
lenders to tighten provisions in their new loan contracts. Thus, the current instrument
choice allows us to concentrate on unrelated to borrowers’ characteristics determinants
of covenant strictness, that take into account supply (lender) - side effects.
3Similarly, in the analysis of the effect of covenants on firm operating performance, Spyridopou-
los (2019) provides evidence that the estimated coefficient of covenants strictness based on OLS
regressions is negatively biased and requires endogeneity addressing.
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In addition, we perform various checks and confirm that our findings are robust
to alternative measures of the likelihood of the empty creditor threat. Specifically, we
provide an additional analysis on cross-sectional heterogeneity in our baseline results
based on the likelihood of firms to face empty creditors. We find that CDS trading
enhances debt overhang problem and makes debt covenants less effective in the sub-
samples of firms with higher risk, characterized by high firm leverage, high cash flow
volatility, and a long-term debt rating below investment grade. These results support
our arguments that weaker fundamentals make firms more vulnerable to the empty
creditor threat. Furthermore, we explore heterogeneity in our results through identi-
fication of types of firms for which creditors have higher tendency to over-insure. We
find that CDSs lead to underinvestment and covenant effectiveness loss in subsamples
characterized by high shareholders’ bargaining power, low renegotiation frictions, and
high liquidations costs. The current literature on CDSs indicates that these charac-
teristics are associated with the tendency of lenders, who are more vulnerable to the
strategic default threat, to choose a higher hedge ratio in the CDS market in order
to enhance commitment benefits (e.g., see Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi, 2019; Danis
and Gamba, 2018; Wong and Yu, 2018).
Further, our results are not sensitive to potential measurement errors associ-
ated with the inclusion of proxies for unobservable variables, such as marginal q and
debt overhang. The results remain qualitatively unchanged to using the higher-order
cumulant estimators of Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014). In addition, our findings
are robust to an alternative measure of underinvestment. As a robustness check, we
follow the extant literature in accounting and construct a measure of investment in-
efficiency by modelling the expected optimal level of firm-specific capital investment
based on a neoclassical parsimonious model of firm growth opportunities (e.g., see
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011). Specifically, we
use residuals of the investment model to determine deviations from the expected op-
timal level. Where a negative residual (i.e., a negative deviation from the expected
investment) indicates underinvestment, a form of investment inefficiency when a firm
makes investment at a lower rate than the expected level.
Our empirical study contributes to several streams of the literature. First,
our study adds to the literature analysing the improvement of contracting efficiency
through commitment. We extend this literature by showing that CDSs, though bring-
ing ex ante commitment benefits through reducing the incidence of strategic default,
cannot completely replace a traditional tool of financial contracting, such as debt
covenants. In addition, despite that covenants have long been considered by theorists
107
as a countervailing force against known agency conflicts, our work provides the first
direct empirical test on their ability to mitigate debt overhang problem. Finally, we
show that combining two commitment mechanisms together can negatively affect the
effectiveness of one of the instruments.
Second, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits
of CDS trading. On the one hand, previous studies have shown that the introduction
of CDS trading allows financially constrained firms to receive ex-ante financing for
a larger set of positive NPV projects (e.g., Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Danis and
Gamba, 2018). On the other hand, we demonstrate the value-reducing effect of CDSs
through the amplification of the negative investment effect of debt overhang in firms
that are more likely to be affected by the empty creditor problem. This empirical
finding is in support of theoretical predictions of Wong and Yu (2018).
Third, our study shows a new effect of CDS trading on covenants, which has
been overlooked in the literature. We show that following the onset of CDS trading,
an exogenous increase in covenant tightness no longer helps to alleviate the debt
overhang problem. These findings are not inconsistent with Shan, Tang, and Winton
(2019) or with other empirical papers on covenants and CDSs, but they provide a new
explanation for why covenants have become looser following CDS trading. Covenants
are costly because they constrain a firm’s behavior. If they are not useful in addressing
the debt overhang problem after the introduction of CDSs, then it makes sense for
the firm and the lender to negotiate looser covenants at loan inception.
Finally, we contribute to the literature indicating ex ante covenant effects on
borrower corporate policies, i.e. upon violations of covenant restrictions. The vast
empirical literature concentrates mainly on the states around covenant violation by
demonstrating creditor interventions in borrower policies as a result of renegotiation
caused by a technical default (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi,
2009). Exceptions are Demiroglu and James (2010) and Spyridopoulos (2019), who
demonstrate that stricter loan covenants affect corporate policies, and are associated
with an increase in profitability even when firms do not breach their covenants.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes
testable hypotheses based on the theoretical predictions in Chapter 3. Section 4.3
describes the empirical framework we use to test the key predictions and address
potential endogeneity concerns. Section 4.4 describes the data, and the construction
of samples and variables. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide baseline empirical results and
additional robustness check, respectively. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
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4.2. Empirical Predictions
The theoretical model in Chapter 3 allows to compare the effectiveness of debt
covenants and CDSs as commitment mechanisms (i.e., through investigating the abil-
ity of either tool to alleviate the costs of no-commitment that are naturally addressed
by the other instrument), and determine whether the presence of one instrument
affects the effectiveness of another in the joint use.
In particular, the model focuses on two types of costs arising from sharehold-
ers’ lack of commitment: investment-related agency costs and strategic default. As
investment-related agency costs, we consider investment distortions caused by debt
overhang, which is one of the foci of the financial agency literature. As it is known
from Myers (1977), the fact that shareholders invest to maximize equity value leads to
a situation when the presence of outstanding (risky) debt reduces shareholders’ incen-
tive to undertake value-increasing investment because the benefit of such investment
would accrue to the existing debt holders. The underinvestment problem caused by
debt overhang has been also confirmed by more recent theoretical and empirical stud-
ies (e.g., see Alanis, Chava, and Kumar, 2018; Hennessy, 2004; Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited, 2007). Hennessy (2004) also demonstrates that debt overhang distorts not
just the level of investment, but also its composition, while the economic significance
of the overhang channel is more significant for firms in distress. Recently, DeMarzo
and He (2017), and Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2018) identify a new
type of agency conflict “leverage ratchet effect”, which represents the impact of debt
overhang on firm leverage policy. Gamba and Saretto (2019) show that the “leverage
ratchet effect” is quantitatively at least as important in transferring wealth from debt
to equity as underinvestment due to debt overhang.
Our theoretical model predicts that while both commitment mechanisms are ef-
fective in reducing shareholders’ incentive to default strategically, they are not equally
effective in alleviating underinvestment. Specifically, we provide an additional theo-
retical confirmation on the ability of covenants to restore investment incentive reduced
by debt overhang. The stricter the covenants, the lower the negative effect of debt
overhang on investment policy. In contrast, we find that the effect of CDS trad-
ing on underinvestment is ambiguous, and it can both alleviate or exacerbate the
debt overhang problem (see, Proposition 3.10). The model identifies two mechanisms
through which CDSs influence investment distortions caused by debt overhang, with
the outcomes depending on the likelihood of borrowers to be affected by the empty
creditor problem. Whereas the probability of lenders to turn into inefficient empty
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creditors in default state, i.e. into creditors who always prefer to force a borrower
into bankruptcy, increases with the borrower risk and the amount of CDS insurance
written on firms.
When the probability that creditors turn into empty creditors and force a liq-
uidation is low, CDSs reduce the negative effect of debt overhang on firm investment
policy due to increasing renegotiation frictions and the subsequent reduction of the
occurrence of strategic default. That is in line with the theoretical study of Pawlina
(2010), who provides evidence that the possibility of debt renegotiation upon financial
distress (and, as a result, the possibility of strategic default) exacerbates the under-
investment problem. He also suggests that the debt overhang might be reduced by
higher renegotiation frictions such as in public debt, for which disperse debt holding
increases coordination costs and makes renegotiation prohibitively expensive (Rajan,
1992), and/or in legal systems with strong enforcement of creditors’ rights (Favara,
Schroth, and Valta, 2012). On the contrary, when there is a high risk for borrowers to
be affected by the empty creditor problem, shareholders, fearing forceful liquidation
caused by empty creditors and sharing the return of equity-financed investment with
debt holders in default, will pass up valuable investment opportunities. The debt
overhang exacerbation is also consistent with the recent theoretical study of Wong
and Yu (2018), who by introducing a Leland’s (1994) type model with dynamic invest-
ment opportunities show that CDSs drive debt overhang through the empty creditor
channel.
In addition to the ambiguous effect of CDSs on underinvestment, our theoret-
ical model predicts that the presence of CDS trading might affect the effectiveness
of debt covenants as a commitment mechanism (see, Proposition 3.11). Particularly,
CDSs make covenants more effective when value-enhancing effect of CDSs dominates
(i.e., when the alleviation of debt overhang problem is feasible owing to increased
renegotiation frictions). That is in line with findings of the theoretical study of
Gamba and Mao (2019), who demonstrate that the presence of frictions limiting ex
post debt renegotiation is essential to make covenants an useful commitment device.
In contrast, when value-reducing effect of CDSs dominates (i.e., when CDSs worsen
debt overhang due to high empty creditor threat), the higher likelihood of liquidation
with no chance to renegotiate debt make covenants ineffective in mitigating underin-
vestment.4 As a result, the firm underinvests despite the presence of covenants in a
loan agreement.
4Notably, even though the presence of covenants in a credit agreement allows to reduce the
likelihood of inefficient liquidation caused by CDS-protected empty creditors, debt covenants prove
ineffective in reducing investment distortions caused by debt overhang.
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In the subsequent sections, we focus on potential distinctive characteristics of
the two commitment mechanisms, and conduct the empirical analysis on their ability
to affect investment distortions caused by debt overhang. The testable hypotheses
are formulated based on our theoretical predictions discussed above, under the as-
sumption of an exogenous lender’s hedge ratio in the CDS market.
Hypothesis 1 (Covenants and debt overhang). The negative effect of debt overhang
on borrower investment policy decreases with the strictness of debt covenants.
Hypothesis 2 (CDS and debt overhang). When the threat of empty creditor problem
is low (high), the CDS market reduces (exacerbates) the debt overhang issue.
Hypothesis 3 (Joint effect of covenants and CDS on debt overhang). When the
threat of empty creditor problem is low (high), the CDS market makes debt covenants
more (less) effective as a commitment mechanism.
4.3. Research Design
This section describes the empirical framework we use to test the key predictions of
the model. To test whether CDS trading can be used as an adequate substitute for
covenants in loan contracts, we start from individual tests on the ability of CDSs and
financial covenants to reduce underinvestment caused by debt overhang (Hypotheses
1 and 2). These tests serve as a starting point for the empirical design and logic of the
test on changes in covenant effectiveness following the introduction of CDS trading
(Hypothesis 3).
4.3.1. Empirical specification
To derive a baseline empirical specification, we rely on the existing empirical litera-
ture on investments that consider debt overhang problem posited by Myers (1977).
Specifically, we follow Hennessy (2004), Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) and in-
clude an empirical proxy of debt overhang (Overhang) which is intended to catch up
investment returns accruing to debt holders as opposed to equity holders:
Investmenti,t = β0 +β1Overhangi,t−1 +β2CashF lowi,t+β3 TobinQi,t−1 +εi,t, (4.1)
where the subscripts i and t indicate a firm and a fiscal quarter, respectively. The
dependent variable of interest is Investmenti,t, defined as the rate of investment
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expenditures normalized by the start-of-period capital stock (i.e., at t − 1). As is
standard in the literature, we control for the principal determinants in empirical in-
vestment models such as the cash flow generated during the fiscal quarter t and scaled
by the start-of-period capital stock, and the start-of period Tobin’s Q.5 The model is
estimated using firm and time (calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Consistent to Myers’s theory and the supportive empirical evidence, the ex-
pected coefficient sign for Overhang is negative. In particular, equity-maximizing
shareholders underinvest relative to first-best whenever future investment returns give
a positive spillover to lenders who could recover the assets of the firm in bankruptcy.
The higher debt overhang correction, the more severe underinvestment problem, re-
sulting in the negative impact on investment.
Next, to test our key empirical predictions, we enhance the model design in
(4.1) by including a commitment mechanism of the interest (either CDS contracts,
or financial covenants). Specifically, we test the effect of a commitment mechanism
on underinvestment caused by debt overhang through an interaction of a commit-
ment mechanism, CommitMechanism, with the debt overhang, Overhang. Alanis,
Chava, and Kumar (2018) use the similar specification in their analysis of the impact
of shareholder bargaining power on the investment effects of debt overhang.
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1Overhangi,t−1 × CommitMechanismi,t−1
+ β2Overhangi,t−1 + β3CommitMechanismi,t−1
+ β4CashF lowi,t + β5 TobinQi,t−1 + εi,t, (4.2)
where CommitMechanism defines either as an indicator of CDS trading activity
(CDS Active), or an aggregated measure of strictness of financial covenants (FinCov)
included in a loan at the loan inception. The positive (negative) sign of the inter-
action Overhang × CommitMechanism indicates the mitigation (exacerbation) of
underinvestment caused by debt overhang. Consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions, we expect the lower impact of debt overhang on investment for tighter debt
covenants, that should result in the positive interaction term, β1 > 0. With respect
to CDSs, the model predicts an ambiguous effect on underinvestment, conditional on
the likelihood of the empty creditor threat.
To test the potential heterogeneity in the CDS effect on investment distortions
5For instance, see Alanis, Chava, and Kumar (2018); Hennessy (2004); Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited (2007).
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caused by debt overhang, we first replace the binary variable CDS Active with the
continuous variable Hedge Ratio, which represents an aggregate hedge ratio of lenders
for a particular borrower in the CDS market and corresponds to the parameter h in
our model.6 The higher the amount of CDS insurance written on firms, the greater
the empty creditor threat. Next, we measure borrowers’ propensity to be affected
by the empty creditor problem based on firm financial stability, Firm Stability, that
closely corresponds to the model’s parameter H. The weaker firms’ fundamentals,
the more attractive bankruptcy option to lenders even in the absence of creditors’
over-insurance (i.e, even for the moderate level of credit protection h). According to
this statement, we split the sample into firms with low and high firm stability. We
discuss the construction of all key variables in detail in Section 4.4.
Finally, we test the joint effect of covenants and CDSs on the investment effect
of debt overhang. To do it, we modify equation (4.2) to consider two commitment
mechanisms at the same time. Similarly to the test on the individual effect of CDSs
on debt overhang problem, we take into account the potential heterogeneity in our
results, conditional on the likelihood of the empty creditor threat. Specifically, we
estimate the following regression:
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1Overhangi,t−1 × FinCovi,t−1 × CDS Activei,t−1
+ β2Overhangi,t−1 × CommitMechanism∗i,t−1
+ β3Overhangi,t−1




+ β6CashF lowi,t + β7 TobinQi,t−1 + εi,t, (4.3)
where CommitMechanism∗ defines either an indicator of CDS trading activity (CDS
Active), or an aggregated measure of strictness of financial covenants (FinCov) in-
cluded in a loan at the loan inception.7 The interaction term Overhang×FinCov×
CDS Active is a variable of interest, which examines any changes in covenant effec-
tiveness to mitigate underinvestment caused by debt overhang post CDS inception.
The positive (negative) sign of the interaction indicates the enhanced (reduced) ability
6The model indicates that the probability of lenders to turn into inefficient empty creditors in
default state depends on the two model’s parameters: lenders’ hedge ratio h and the parameter H
representing firm financial stability. In particular, the probability increases with the amount of CDS
insurance written on firms and the borrower risk.
7A simultaneous examination of two instruments produces two interaction terms for Overhang×
CommitMechanism∗, such as Overhang×CDS Active and Overhang×FinCov, and two variables
for CommitMechanism∗, such as CDS Active and FinCov.
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of covenants as a mechanism against no-commitment post CDS inception.
4.3.2. Potential endogeneity concerns
In the following section, we suggest econometric methodologies to address poten-
tial endogeneity concerns with respect to both the timing of CDS introduction and
the financial covenant strictness, which is heavily dependent on borrowers’ financial
characteristics.
Endogeneity of debt covenant strictness
Using the empirical specification described above, we should be particularly careful
in estimating the effect of debt covenant strictness on firm investment policy. Our
measure of covenant strictness is potentially endogenous because at the loan inception
it is determined based on borrowers’ financial characteristics together with contracting
choices. As a result, the estimation coefficients in equations (4.2) - (4.3) might be
biased in the presence of simultaneity.
To address potential endogeneity, we apply a two-stage instrumental variable
(IV) approach. In identification of a valid instrument for the endogenous regressor,
FinCov, we follow Roberts and Whited (2012) and look for a variable that satisfies
two conditions, relevance condition (i.e., the instrument has partial correlation with
the debt covenant strictness) and exclusion condition (i.e., the instrument affects bor-
rower’s investment policy just through its effect on the covenant strictness). Unlike
the relevance condition, the exclusion condition is more challenging because of the
requirement to define determinants of covenant strictness, which are unrelated to
borrowers’ characteristics. Consequently, to satisfy the exclusion condition, we con-
centrate on determinants of covenants strictness based on the supply (lender) - side
characteristics. Murfin (2012) was the first who provide evidence of the importance
of lender-specific shocks for the strictness of loan contracts.8 Specifically, he shows
that banks’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk, such as payment defaults to their own loan
portfolios, induces lenders to tighten covenant provisions in their new loan contracts.
8The relation between lenders’ loan portfolio performance (e.g., recent default experience) and
lender behaviour has been indicated in a number of studies. For instance, Chava and Purnanandam
(2011) show that banks affected by the 1998 Russian sovereign default subsequently decreased the
quantity of their lending and increased loan interest rates. Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011)
provide evidence that large-scale bankruptcies among borrowers affect subsequent activity of lead
arrangers in the syndicated loan market.
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Motivated by the findings of Murfin (2012), we construct the instrumental
variable based on the number of loan defaults suffered by the lead lender during the
360 day period prior contracting a new loan. Specifically, for each new loan contract,
we count number of defaults for outstanding loans in portfolios of the lead arrangers
prior its issuance. As a default, we consider the moment when a borrower’s S&P long-
term debt rating changes to default (D) or selective default (SD). This classification
allows to capture economically significant defaults that represent payment defaults
on at least one obligation.
In the spirit of Murfin (2012), we define a contracting date for a new loan as
90 days prior to the loan start date (i.e., the legal effective date). The adjustment is
motivated in the interest of realism to account for the time lag between contracting
(negotiation of loan terms) and closing. In the real world, an average syndicated
transaction takes around two months for the documentation process, between the
date of receiving a mandate from the borrower and the legal effective date of the loan.
Whereas the pre-mandate phase, including negotiation of loan terms and approving a
term sheet, takes at least a month (e.g., see Campbell, Rhodes, Weaver, Bailey, and
Andrews, 2013).
The constructed instrument is then used in the first stage of the two-stage-
least-squares (2SLS) regression, which estimates the aggregated strictness of financial
covenants included in the loan:
FinCovi,t = β0 + β1DefaultN daysi,t + β2Xi,t + εi,t, (4.4)
where the subscripts i and t indicate a borrower and a fiscal quarter (time of loan
issuance), respectively. Default N days is the number of outstanding loan packages
in the loan portfolio of the lead lender that defaulted N days prior contracting of
a new loan, where N days ranges 0 - 360 days before contracting. We break down
defaults for different time periods to define for which one banks are more sensitive in
their contracting decisions. X represents an array of borrowing firms’ characteristics
capturing observable proxies for credit risk (such as, a dummy variable for S&P long-
term credit rating, and Altman Z-score), and loan characteristics (such as the loan
package maturity, the loan package amount, the number of bank participants, the
number of lead arrangers). As previously, the model is estimated using firm and time
(calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. In addition, we include the lender fixed effects
to remove possible effects of lenders’ size, that might influence the number of defaults
in lenders’ portfolios and their specific contracting propensities.
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The fitted value of the covenant strictness, FinCov, is used next for the second-
stage estimation based on the empirical design of equations (4.2) - (4.3).
Endogeneity of CDS trading
To address potential endogeneity issues associated with timing of the introduction
of CDS trading, we follow Danis (2016) and Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2019),
and examine the implementation of the CDS Big Bang Protocol on April 4, 2009
as a quasi-natural experiment affecting the severity of the empty creditor problem.
Theoretically, we expect that the higher empty creditor threat post CDS inception
reduces equity holders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment by exacerbating
debt overhang problem. Consequently, we expect a negative exogenous shock gen-
erated by the CDS Big Bang to the borrower’s investment policy and the covenant
effectiveness in the presence of CDS trading.
There are several reasons to believe that the CDS Big Bang might affect the
likelihood of the empty creditor problem. First, a harmonization of contract terms
within the CDS Big Bang facilitates the improvement of liquidity and availability of
CDSs, that in turn increase attractiveness of credit risk hedging (for more details on
changes in contract terms of CDS contracts, see Markit, 2009). Colonnello, Efing,
and Zucchi (2019) find confirmation of a statistically significant increase in CDS
liquidity following the implementation of the CDS Big Bang Protocol. Furthermore,
the CDS Big Bang Protocol redefined the definitions of eligible credit events of North
American CDS contracts. Specifically, it excluded the most common type of clauses
in CDS contracts, out-of-court debt restructuring (named as “Modified Restructuring
(MR)”), from credit events. As a result, the CDS Big Bang leads to exacerbation of
renegotiation frictions for CDS traded firms through reducing lenders’ incentive to
restructure debt out of court.
To conduct a quasi-natural experiment for the baseline empirical specification,
we apply a difference-in-difference approach by restricting the sample to the six calen-
dar quarters before and the six calendar quarters after the CDS Big Bang Protocol.
We define PostBigBang as an indicator variable of the post-event period (i.e., af-
ter April 4, 2009). Whereas treated firms are defined as those with CDS trading
on their debt (denoted as CDS Firm) at any time during the total sample period
for the empirical specification in (2), and as CDS-traded firms with strict financial
covenants, CDS Firm×FinCov, for the empirical specification in (3). Given that the
main purpose of the analysis is to examine individual and join effects of commitment
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mechanisms on underinvestment caused by debt overhang, Overhang×CDS Firm×
PostBigBang and Overhang×FinCov×CDS Firm×PostBigBang are the main
variables of interests for the empirical specifications in (4.2) and (4.3), respectively.
4.4. Data Sources and Variable Construction
This section describes the data and construction of key variables used in the analysis.
4.4.1. Empirical measures
Debt overhang
Our empirical measure of debt overhang is constructed in the spirit of the extant lit-
erature (e.g., Hennessy, 2004, Hennessy, Levy, and Whited, 2007, and Alanis, Chava,
and Kumar, 2018) by substituting quarterly data for annual data. The measure
is robust to measurement error and built on theoretical predictions indicating the
more severe overhang for firm with high leverage, high default probabilities, and high
lenders’ recovery ratios in default. Intuitively, it is intended to capture investment
return accruing to debt holders as opposed to equity holders. That undermines a
shareholders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment. The higher debt overhang
measure, the more severe underinvestment problem.
The debt overhang measure, Overhang, is then calculated as the present value








ρt+s[1− 0.05(s− 1)](1 + r)−s
]
(4.5)
where the subscripts i, t and s indicate a firm, a fiscal quarter and a number of years
after the debt inception, respectively. D/K × Recovery Rate represents the capital-
normalized value of collections in the event of default, where D is the firm’s total
debt, K is the firm’s capital stock, Recovery Rate is an industry specific weighted
recovery ratio of defaulted senior unsecured bonds by three-digit SIC code based on
Altman and Kishore (1996). The expression in the brackets represents the value of
hitting claim under the assumption of the long-term debt with the initial maturity
of 20 years, which matures under a straight-line at a rate of 5% per year. The firms’
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default probability in period t + s is denoted by ρt+s. r is a risk-free rate based on
long-term Treasuries.
We calculate the firms’ default probability as the expected default frequency
(EDF) following the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008), which hangs upon
the functional form of Merton’s (1974) distance to default (DD) model with no re-
quirement of a numerical solution of the model:
ρt+s = EDF = N(−DD) = N
(








where DD is the distance to default, V denotes the asset value of the firm, µ is the
expected continuously compounded return on asset, σV is the asset value volatility,
F is the face value of debt, t + s is the forecasting period, N(.) is the cumulative
standard normal distribution.
Notably, our way of estimating the firm’s default probability for the calculation
of debt overhang differs from the existing literature. Specifically, Hennessy (2004),
Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) use Moody’s reports of historical default hazard
rates by bond rating to proxy for the probability of default. This approach signifi-
cantly restricts the analysis of the debt overhang by reducing the sample of firms to
the firms with credit rating, and assuming the same default probability for all firms
in the same credit rating class. In contrast, we calculate the probability of default
individually for each firm on the monthly basis, and use the value of expected default
frequency as of the end of fiscal quarter.9 Furthermore, Bharath and Shumway (2008)
demonstrate that their approach of calculating EDF performs well against Moody’s
KMV model.
CDS trading activity
We measure CDS trading activity in the spirit of prior studies (e.g., Ashcraft and
Santos, 2009, Saretto and Tookes, 2013) as an indicator variable equal to one in and
after the first quarter of CDS trading on a reference firm and zero prior it (hereafter
referred to as CDS Active). It allows us to capture the timing of CDS trade initiation
and the change in the dependent variable following this moment.
9Alanis, Chava, and Kumar (2018) address the similar concern by using the predicted default
probability from a discrete-time hazard model based on Shumway (2001), and Chava and Jarrow
(2004).
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Likelihood of empty creditor problem
We measure the likelihood of the empty creditor problem following the model’s pre-
dictions developed in Chapter 3. The model indicates that the probability of lenders
to turn into inefficient empty creditors in default state depends on the two model’s
parameters: the lenders’ hedge ratio h and the parameter H representing borrower
financial stability. In particular, the probability is higher for greater hedge ratio, and
(or) weaker firm’s fundamentals.
First, we construct an empirical proxy, HedgeRatio, for the aggregate hedge
ratio of lenders in the CDS market, denoted in the model as h. Specifically, it is
defined as the net notional amount of CDS outstanding for a reference firm scaled by
the amount of firms’ total debt in a given quarter. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016)
emphasize that the net notional amount of CDS outstanding represents the more
reliable measure of the amount of credit risk transferred in the CDS market due to
the adjustment of the gross notional amount for offsetting positions. Consequently,
it can be interpreted as the maximum amount of payments that need to be made
between a CDS seller and a CDS buyer in the case of a credit event on a reference
entity.
Next, we construct an empirical measure of firm financial stability, Firm Sta-
bility, which closely corresponds to the model’s parameter H. H is a function of bor-
rower characteristics (a decreasing function of firm’s leverage and liquidation costs,
and an increasing function of firm’s productivity). The low (high) value of H is as-
sociated with low (high) firm financial stability. To incorporate the dependence of
H on firm-specific characteristics and reduce measurement errors in its determinants,
we calculate Firm Stability as a composite score measure of H.
Specifically, for each fiscal year of a given year, we sort firms into deciles based
on each of the three partition variables of H, where leverage and liquidation costs
have their sign changed before sorting so that H is increasing in all variables. We use
Tobin’s Q as the proxy for the firm’s productivity, that corresponds to the parameter
θ in our model. A higher value of Tobin’s Q is associated with a high productivity
shock experienced by the firm. With respect to liquidation costs, we follow Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007) suggesting a fraction of non-fixed assets in a firm as a good
proxy for liquidation costs, which corresponds to the parameter (1− `) in our model.
We calculate leverage as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets. Finally,
we calculate the average of sorted variables to get a composite score measure, Firm
Stability.
119
A high (low) score, i.e. above (below) the median value, is indicative for high
(low) firm financial stability, that is associated with the lower (greater) empty creditor
threat. Note that the goal of calculating this measure was to determine borrowers’
vulnerability to the empty creditor threat based on firms’ characteristics rather than
to precisely determine the parameter H, which can be directly substituted into the
model in Chapter 3.
Financial covenant strictness
For debt covenant strictness, that corresponds to the parameter c∗ in our model,
we construct an empirical measure capturing the ex-ante aggregate probability of
covenant violation in a debt contract. The stricter the covenant, the lower a bor-
rower’s distance to technical default that leads to a forced renegotiation between a
lender and a borrower, and the higher shareholders’ incentive to adjust corporate
policy decisions to ensure the covenant compliance.
Motivated by prior measures of covenant strictness in the literature, Murfin
(2012) emphasises that a comprehensive strictness measure should incorporate both
the number of covenants in a debt contract and the initial slack of covenants (i.e.,
how tightly covenants are set to the associated financial ratios of a borrower at the
time the contract is written), and adjust for the variance-covariance of the underlying
accounting ratios. He is the first who demonstrates that the complex debt covenant
strictness is a superior measure to alternative measures used previously in the liter-
ature. The inability of former measures to capture strictness accurately comes from
their reliance on just individual components of the strictness, such as just for the
number of covenants in a contract (covenant intensity index), or just for the slack of
each individual covenant (e.g., Bradley and Roberts, 2015; Demerjian, 2011; Dichev
and Skinner, 2002). Furthermore, all prior measures fail to capture the third im-
portant dimension of strictness: the covariance of the underlying accounting ratios.
Where the lower correlation results in a greater probability of technical default.
In the spirit of Murfin (2012), in our analysis, we use the complex measure
of debt covenant strictness for private loans (hereafter referred to as FinCov), which
represents the aggregate probability that at least one financial covenant attached to a
debt contract will be violated during the quarter after the loan inception. We concen-
trate on private loans due to the current data limitations of public loans, that makes
calculation of the complex measure of covenant strictness impossible.10 Specifically,
10The prior empirical studies examining the effect of CDSs on financial contracting also concentrate
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Fixed Income Security Database (FISD), one of the main sources for public loans,
identifies just bond covenant provisions without providing any additional information
on their initial thresholds, needed for the calculation of covenant slackness.
FinCov is calculated following the non-parametric simulation approach by De-
merjian and Owens (2016), who propose an alternative and more flexible method to
the parametric simulation approach by Murfin (2012).11 Furthermore, the method
proposed by Demerjian and Owens (2016) relies on covenant-specific definitions that
allows to minimise presumed measurement error concerns from using the Dealscan
database, one of the main data sources for the empirical analysis of covenants in pri-
vate loans. While Dealscan contains the detailed information on many aspects of the
loan terms (e.g., amount, maturity, promised yields, loan type, loan purpose, lenders
identity, covenant type, financial covenant threshold at the loan inception), it does
not provide definitional details on how financial covenants are actually constructed
in loan agreements. As a result, many empirical studies restrict attention to a small
number of covenants by making assumption that accounting measures used for these
covenants are standardized and unambiguous. In contrast, in our calculation, we use
all 15 categories of financial covenants documented in Dealscan based on “standard”
covenant definitions provided by Demerjian and Owens (2016). Specifically, Demer-
jian and Owens (2016) determine definitions for each Dealscan covenant category, that
are most frequently used in actual contract terms (based on the Tearsheets database
with information on 2,683 loan packages).
More details on the simulation approach and the covenants included in its
computation are in Appendix.
4.4.2. Data and sample construction
We use a sample of U.S. public firms from the CRSP-Compustat merged database,
providing information on firms’ daily stock returns and quarterly accounting data,
over the period from 1994 to 2016. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999),
regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and public service firms (SIC above 9000). In our
sample selection, we also follow the previous literature in debt overhang and discard
firm-quarters with book leverage outside of the unit interval, and missing data or
on covenant provisions of just private loans (e.g., see Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri, 2015; Shan,
Tang, and Winton, 2019).
11The parametric simulation approach requires that quarterly changes in financial metrics under-
lying the covenants follow a multivariate lognormal distribution.
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with negative (or zero) values for total assets, the capital stock, or sales.
Then for each firm - fiscal quarter (year) observation in the CRSP-Compustat,
we find the matching company name and date (e.g., CDS trading inception dates, or
the closest weekly net notional in time) from our CDS data sources. To determine
starting dates of CDS trading on borrowers’ debt, for greater accuracy we combine
three data sources following Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014): CreditTrade,
the GFI Group and Markit. We have information on 546 North American corporates
that have CDS trading initiated on their debt at some time during 1997-2013.12
We extract CDS volume data from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation
(DTCC), that captures almost the entire market for standard single-name CDS (95%
by estimation of the DTCC). The DTCC reports on a weekly basis both the aggregate
gross notional and the aggregate net notional amounts outstanding on a particular
reference entity. Overall, we have data for 396 US corporate reference entities over
the period between October 2008 (the starting point of the DTCC database) and
October 2015.
Next, the resulting sample is matched with the loan data from Loan Pricing
Corporation (LPC) Dealscan based on the Dealscan-Compustat link file as of April
2018 provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). Particularly, we match a Dealscan
borrower company ID with a Compustat firm ID, and assign each firm’s loan package
to the fiscal quarter (year) when the loan package was issued. The Dealscan has
detailed information on the majority of all commercial loans issued by bank and non-
bank lenders in the US. We conduct our analysis at the loan package level owing to a
fact that debt covenants generally pertain to all loans (also referred to as facilities or
tranches) in a package. We concentrate on the sample of loans issued after 1994 due
to the fact that the information on covenants is fairly limited in Dealscan prior this
date. In addition, it gives us an opportunity to examine loan data three years before
the first data on inception of CDS trading occurred in 1997. In the same logic, we
choose 2016 as the end date of the sample, that is three years after the last available
observation on the introduction of CDS trading (or a year after the available data on
the net notional amount).
Finally, to define defaulting borrowers for the construction of the instrumen-
tal variable for the debt covenant strictness, we use monthly Compustat’s rating
database. We match the identified defaulting borrowers with the Dealscan. We keep
12The starting point of our CDS sample is the earliest available date, 1997, which is generally
recognized as the origin year of the broad CDS market (Tett, 2009). See Subrahmanyam, Tang, and
Wang (2014) for details of the CDS sample construction.
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just information on defaults for loans which were outstanding at the time of default
based on their start and maturity dates. As previously, we conduct our analysis at
the loan package level.
4.4.3. Summary statistics
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of U.S. firms with active CDS trading by year
and across industries (excluding financial, regulated utilities and public service firms)
in the period between 1997 and 2013. Our final CRSP-Compustat merged sample
includes 546 firms that have CDS traded on their debt. The largest number of active
CDS contracts was during 2004-2008 period, and in manufacturing industry (52% of
CDS firms). The CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan merged sample includes 396 distinct
firms with active CDS trading.
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of firm and loan characteristics be-
tween 1994 and 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th
percentiles. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the whole sample, whereas
Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for CDS firms versus non-CDS firms. With
respect to the firm characteristics, on average, CDS traded firms are bigger, have lower
investment, higher cash flow and firm leverage compared to non-CDS firms. In ad-
dition, we find that CDS traded firms are characterized by higher Altman’s Z-score
and lower debt overhang correction than non-CDS firms. With respect to the loan
characteristics, on average, CDS traded firms have much larger size of loan facilities
and packages issued at lower spreads through involving a larger number of participant
and lead banks in loan syndicates compared to non-CDS firms. Loans of CDS firms
have twice lower usage for refinancing purposes than non-CDS firms. CDS-referenced
loans include lower number of financial covenants than non-CDS firms. The strictness
of debt covenants in CDS-referenced loans is also lower (22% vs. 40%, respectively).
Panel C of Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of lender characteristics
in terms of recent borrower defaults in loan portfolios of lead arrangers. On average,
lenders experience 1.2 defaults in the 90 days leading up to a contracting date of a
new loan. In total, in the CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan merged sample, for the period
between 1994 and 2016, lead arrangers experienced 562 borrowers’ defaults.
Table 4.3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between key variables used in
the analysis. The correlation coefficient between investment and overhang is negative
and statistically significant, consistent with theory. The relationships between invest-
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ment and other explanatory variable are consistent with prior studies. The covenant
strictness is positively associated with the overhang measure, and negatively associ-
ated with the measure of firm financial stability. The choice of explanatory variables
does not suffer from multicollinearity, the absolute values of correlation coefficients
do not exceed 0.8 (Studenmund, 2016, p.272).
Table 4.1: Distribution of CDS firms. This table reports the distribution of
U.S. firms with CDS trading initiated on their debt between 1997 and 2013. Panel
A reports the distribution of firms with active CDS trading per year based on the
CRSP-Compustat and CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan merged samples. Panel B reports
the distribution of CDS firms across industries based on the SIC code in the CRSP-
Compustat merged sample.
Panel A: Distribution of firms with active CDS trading by year
CRSP-Compustat CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan
sample sample
Year Total # firms Active CDS firms Total # firms Active CDS firms
1994 3602 - 100 -
1995 3793 - 196 -
1996 3989 - 444 -
1997 4185 22 551 2
1998 4100 58 399 5
1999 3795 94 372 11
2000 3642 155 391 34
2001 3411 244 455 73
2002 3069 349 502 118
2003 2786 383 475 123
2004 2615 412 545 171
2005 2519 434 525 175
2006 2455 428 421 136
2007 2384 411 387 110
2008 2339 402 259 63
2009 2225 392 203 65
2010 2097 389 272 89
2011 2051 380 353 124
2012 1976 371 299 91
2013 1941 359 300 89
2014 2007 355 257 94
2015 2044 341 251 98
2016 1991 334 182 67
Total 546 396
Panel B: Distribution of CDS firms by industry






Wholesale Trade 15 2.7
Retail Trade 47 8.6
Services 73 13.4
Total 546 100.0 %
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics. This table reports summary statistics of firm and
loan characteristics with non-missing observations between 1994 and 2016. Firm
characteristics are reported based on the CRSP-Compustat merged sample. Loan
characteristics are reported based on the CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan merged sample
used for the calculation of strictness of financial covenants. Panel A presents the
descriptive statistics of the variables over the entire sample. Panel B presents the
descriptive statistics of the variables for CDS firms versus non-CDS firms. Panel C
presents the descriptive statistics of lender characteristics in terms of recent borrower
defaults in loan portfolios of lead arrangers. All continuous variables are winsorized at
the 1th and 99th percentiles. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix
4.A1.
Panel A: Whole sample
N mean sd p25 med. p75
CDS trading
Hedge ratio 6,724 0.294 0.463 0.065 0.151 0.347
CDS Active (binary) 229,716 0.115 0.319 0.000 0.000 0.000
CDS Firm (binary) 229,716 0.172 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm characteristics
Investment 229,716 0.068 0.078 0.025 0.047 0.083
Cash Flow 229,716 0.018 0.569 0.016 0.070 0.167
Tobin Q 229,716 1.872 1.567 1.103 1.445 2.083
Leverage 229,716 0.267 0.198 0.110 0.241 0.384
Nonfixed assets 229,716 0.707 0.229 0.583 0.775 0.888
Size 229,716 6.032 1.961 4.502 5.930 7.412
Altman 229,716 0.308 1.737 0.103 0.712 1.199
Rated 229,716 0.314 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm Stability 229,716 5.485 1.656 4.333 5.500 6.667
Overhang 229,716 0.016 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.005
Underinvestment 97,754 0.034 0.053 0.008 0.019 0.038
Loan characteristics
Facility amount (mln) 8,843 426.000 819.000 75.000 200.000 485.000
Package amount (bln) 8,843 8.570 18.000 0.309 1.800 7.500
Package maturity (months) 8,843 47.885 19.327 36.000 55.712 60.000
# participants 8,843 9.676 9.574 3.000 7.000 13.000
# lead lenders 8,843 1.719 1.349 1.000 1.000 2.000
Loan spread (%) 8,843 1.834 1.258 1.000 1.578 2.500
# covenants 8,843 2.264 1.023 2.000 2.000 3.000
% performance covenants 8,843 0.719 0.339 0.500 1.000 1.000
% capital covenants 8,843 0.281 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.500
FinCov 8,843 0.346 0.408 0.009 0.095 0.858
Secured (binary) 8,843 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000
Corporate purpose (binary) 8,843 0.589 0.492 0.000 1.000 1.000
Refinancing purpose (binary) 8,843 0.193 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000
Acquisition purpose (binary) 8,843 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4.2 - Continued
Panel B: CDS firms vs. non-CDS firms
CDS firms Non-CDS firms
N mean med. N mean med.
Firm characteristics
Investment 37,146 0.052 0.043 192,570 0.071 0.048
Cash Flow 37,146 0.116 0.080 192,570 -0.003 0.067
Tobin Q 37,146 1.825 1.542 192,570 1.882 1.420
Leverage 37,146 0.311 0.284 192,570 0.258 0.227
Nonfixed assets 37,146 0.661 0.713 192,570 0.717 0.788
Size 37,146 8.705 8.660 192,570 5.478 5.461
Altman 37,146 0.774 0.820 192,570 0.215 0.681
Rated 37,146 0.896 1.000 192,570 0.194 0.000
Firm Stability 37,146 5.509 5.667 192,570 5.482 5.500
Overhang 37,146 0.008 0.000 192,570 0.018 0.000
Underinvestment 10,531 0.023 0.016 87,223 0.035 0.019
Loan characteristics
Facility amount (mln) 2,625 930.477 550.000 6,218 212.259 125.000
Package amount (bln) 2,625 20.230 10.000 6,218 3.627 0.850
Package maturity (months) 2,625 45.955 57.509 6,218 48.710 55.000
# participants 2,625 15.263 13.000 6,218 7.304 5.000
# lead lenders 2,625 2.239 2.000 6,218 1.498 1.000
Loan spread (%) 2,625 1.309 1.025 6,218 2.056 1.823
# covenants 2,625 1.796 2.000 6,218 2.463 2.000
% performance covenants 2,625 0.671 1.000 6,218 0.739 0.750
% capital covenants 2,625 0.329 0.000 6,218 0.261 0.250
FinCov 2,625 0.224 0.015 6,218 0.399 0.162
Secured (binary) 2,625 0.297 0.000 6,218 0.695 1.000
Corporate purpose (binary) 2,625 0.616 1.000 6,218 0.578 1.000
Refinancing purpose (binary) 2,625 0.117 0.000 6,218 0.225 0.000
Acquisition purpose (binary) 2,625 0.139 0.000 6,218 0.167 0.000
Panel C: Lender characteristics
N mean sd p10 med. p90
Default 90 days 9,796 1.220 3.203 0 0 4
Default 90 days (different industry and state) 9,796 0.954 2.776 0 0 3
S&P Rating and Dealscan defaults by year year # year #
1994 1 2006 7
1995 8 2007 6
1996 2 2008 26
1997 2 2009 55
1998 2 2010 11
1999 42 2011 15
2000 50 2012 11
2001 70 2013 7
2002 78 2014 6
2003 45 2015 24







































































































































































































































































































































This section presents our main empirical findings based on the research design de-
veloped in Section 4.3, and aimed at exploring and comparing the ability of com-
mitment mechanisms to affect investment distortions caused by debt overhang. To
ensure robustness of our findings, we then investigate cross-sectional heterogeneity in
the baseline results based on the likelihood of the empty creditor threat and conduct
an additional empirical analysis with an alternative measure of underinvestment.
4.5.1. CDS and debt overhang
To study the effect of CDSs on investment distortions created by debt overhang, we
estimate equation (4.2) using an indicator of CDS trading activity, CDS Active, as
a commitment mechanism variable, Commit Mechanism. We address potential het-
erogeneity in the CDS effect based on the likelihood of the empty creditor problem
through replacing the binary variable CDS Active by Hedge Ratio, an empirical proxy
for the aggregate hedge ratio of lenders for a particular borrower in the CDS market,
and performing the analysis for subsamples split according to the value of the em-
pirical proxy for firm financial stability, Firm Stability. Where the low (high) Firm
Stability, i.e. below (above) the median value, indicates the weaker (stronger) firms’
fundamentals, that are associated with greater (lower) firm vulnerability to the empty
creditor threat.
Table 4.4 Panel A reports the results for the interaction of Overhang with
CDS Active, representing the treatment effect over the entire post-CDS introduction
period. Column 1 shows that the underinvestment effect of debt overhang is robust
for the sample of our analysis. Column 2 indicates that the severity of the debt
overhang problem is amplified after CDS contracts start trading on the debt of the
average firm. The interaction coefficient Overhang × CDS Active is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level for the overall sample. This suggests that the
investment-distortion effect of CDSs dominates for the average firm by undermining
shareholders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment. Economically, it implies
that the initiation of CDS trading contributes to the negative effect of debt over-
hang on investment policy ceteris paribus by an additional 4.4%. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, the investment-distortion effect of CDSs is more prominent for bor-
rowers with greater risk (i.e., low Firm Stability), which are more vulnerable to the
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empty creditor threat. Among firms with the lower risk, the coefficient estimate of
Overhang × CDS Active is positive consistent with our theoretical predictions, but
statistically insignificant.
Table 4.4 Panel B reports the results for the interaction of Overhang with Hedge
Ratio. Column 1 shows that the underinvestment effect of debt overhang is robust
for the smaller sample with available information on CDS net notional amounts after
the fourth quarter of 2008 in DTCC. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we
observe that the negative effect of debt overhang on borrower investment policy is
more prominent for the higher amount of CDS insurance written on firms (see, column
2). The interaction terms Overhang × HedgeRatio are negative and statistically
significant at the 5% and 10% levels, in the entire sample and the subsample of
firms with higher financial risk, respectively. In terms of economic significance, a one
standard deviation increase in the aggregate hedge ratio of lenders in the CDS market
(0.463) ceteris paribus lowers investment by an additional 3.7%.
Finally, we address potential endogeneity issues associated with CDS trad-
ing by using the Big Bang Protocol of April 4, 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment,
described in detail in Section 4.3.2. Table 4.5 reports the results for a difference-in-
difference estimation of the joint effect of CDS trading and debt overhang on borrower
investment policy over 12 calendar quarters around the CDS Big Bang Protocol. Con-
sistent with our expectations, we find that the keys variables of interest, Overhang×
CDS Firm×PostBigBang and Overhang×HedgeRatio×PostBigBang, are neg-
ative and statistically significant, suggesting that the CDS Big Bang exacerbated
the empty creditor problem, thus forcing borrowers to forgo some value-increasing
investment.
Overall, our findings indicate that the investment-distortion effect of CDSs
dominates for the average firm and increases with the likelihood of the empty creditor
threat. As a result, CDS contracts fail as a mechanism intended to reduce investment
distortions caused by lack of commitment, instead they exacerbate debt overhang
problem.
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Table 4.4: CDS and debt overhang. This table presents the coefficients and
robust standard errors clustered by firm, that are obtained from the panel regression
analysing the joint impact of debt overhang and CDS trading on investment. Column
1 reports estimates of the individual effect of debt overhang on investment based on
equation (4.1). In columns 2-4, according to equation (4.2), the dependent variable
Investment is regressed on the measure of CDS trading activity, which is defined
as either CDS Active (i.e., an indicator variable equal to one in the period after
introduction of CDS trading) or HedgeRatio (i.e., CDS net notional amount scaled
by total firm debt), Overhang and the interaction term Overhang × CDS Active
(or, Overhang × HedgeRatio). In columns 3-4, the sample is split according to
the borrower vulnerability to the empty creditor threat, based on the measure of
firm financial stability. Low (high) Firm Stability, i.e. below (above) the median
value, indicates high (low) vulnerability. The definitions of variables are presented
in Appendix 4.A1. All specifications include firm and time (calendar quarter - year)
fixed effects. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
All All Low High
Firm Stability Firm Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: CDS Variable = CDS Active
Overhang × CDS Active -0.044** -0.064*** 0.020
(0.019) (0.018) (0.007)
Overhang -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.019** -0.023***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
CDS Active 0.008*** 0.002 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Flow 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
TobinQ 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 229,716 229,716 115,487 111,981
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.35
Panel B: CDS Variable = Hedge Ratio
Overhang × Hedge Ratio -0.079** -0.055* -0.014
(0.035) (0.032) (0.092)
Overhang -0.054** -0.021 -0.024 -0.025
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.079)
Hedge Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Cash Flow 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
TobinQ 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,724 6,724 3,618 3,106
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.59
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Table 4.5: CDS and debt overhang: a quasi-natural experiment. This table re-
ports estimates from the panel regression analysing the joint impact of debt overhang
and CDS trading on investment over 12 calendar quarters around the introduction of
the Big Bang Protocol on April 4, 2009. Column 1 reports estimates of the individual
effect of debt overhang on investment based on equation (4.1). Columns 2-4 report
estimates of the joint impact of debt overhang and CDS trading on investment based
on modified equation (4.2) in Section 4.3.2. CDS Firm is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm has CDSs traded over the total sample period. PostBigBang is
an indicator of the post-event period. In columns 3-4, the sample is split according
to the borrower vulnerability to the empty creditor threat, based on the measure of
firm financial stability. Low (high) Firm Stability, i.e. below (above) the median
value, indicates high (low) vulnerability. The definitions of variables are presented
in Appendix 4.A1. All specifications include firm and time (calendar quarter - year)
fixed effects. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: CDS Variable = CDSFirm
Overhang × CDSFirm × PostBigBang -0.028** -0.030** 0.013
(0.024) (0.021) (0.010)
Overhang × CDSFirm -0.033** -0.020** 0.089
(0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
Overhang × PostBigBang 0.018 0.006 -0.096
(0.018) (0.021) (0.035)
CDSFirm × PostBigBang 0.003** 0.001 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Overhang -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.037*** -0.031**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 23,152 23,152 11,824 11,328
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.55
Panel B: CDS Variable = Hedge Ratio
Overhang × HedgeRatio × PostBigBang -0.026* -0.048** -0.013*
(0.051) (0.060) (0.070)
Overhang × HedgeRatio -0.036** -0.065** -0.016
(0.056) (0.065) (0.070)
Overhang × PostBigBang 0.010 0.007 0.004
(0.020) (0.031) (0.033)
HedgeRatio × PostBigBang -0.005 -0.007 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Overhang -0.047*** -0.044** -0.047* -0.016**
(0.018) (0.025) (0.034) (0.038)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,263 2,263 1,187 1,076
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.63
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4.5.2. Covenants and debt overhang
Next, we empirically examine the effectiveness of debt covenants as a commitment
mechanism to reduce investment distortions created by debt overhang. Theoretically,
we expect a lower negative effect of debt overhang for the stricter financial covenants,
i.e. for the higher value of FinCov. Since our measure of covenant strictness is poten-
tially endogenous in the presence of simultaneity (the strictness of debt covenants at
the loan inception is determined jointly with the firm corporate policies), we employ
the instrumental variable approach by conducting a 2SLS regression, described in
detail in Section 4.3.2.
In the first stage, we estimate an aggregated strictness of financial covenants
included in a loan based on equation (4.4). We use the number of recent defaults in the
loan portfolio of the lead loan arranger prior contracting a new loan as an instrument.
We report the results of the first stage based on the number of defaults for different
time periods ranging between 0 and 360 days in Table 4.6 Panel A (columns 1 - 4).
The number of recent defaults positively and significantly at the 1% level predicts
the covenant strictness of new loans for the same lead arrangers, suggesting that the
instrument satisfies the relevance condition. In addition, we can reject the hypothesis
of a weak instrument given that p-value is less than 0.01 and Sargan F-test statistic
is above 10.
The results in Table 4.6 Panel A demonstrate that lenders are more sensitive
to the most recent defaults, such as those experienced in the past 90 days prior
contracting. The economic magnitude of the estimated coefficient for Default 90 days
implies that covenant strictness of new loans (ranging from 0 to 100) increases by 0.60
in response to each incremental default in lead lenders’ loan portfolios. Hereinafter,
to carry out 2SLS regressions, we focus on the number of defaults over the 90-day
period.
In Table 4.6 Panel B, we conduct the test on the sensitivity of our instru-
ment for geographic and/or industry-specific risks. Specifically, in the estimation of
covenant strictness for new loans, we exclude defaults with the same 1-digit SIC code,
or in the same state as the contracting borrower, or both. This allows us to consider
the effect of defaults of unrelated borrowers in lenders’ portfolios on the strictness of
new contracting loans. The estimated coefficients for Default 90 days remain positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level, reinforcing that the chosen instrument
represents a distinct lender (supply-side) effect.
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Table 4.6: Endogeneity of debt covenant strictness: first stage of IV/2SLS.
This table reports estimates from the first stage of the IV approach, according to
equation (4.4), with debt covenant strictness instrumented by number of defaults on
lead lenders’ loan portfolios in N days prior to contracting. Debt covenant strictness
ranges 0 - 100, and represents the probability that the borrower will violate at least
one covenant in next quarter after the loan inception. Default N days is calculated as
the number of outstanding loan packages in the loan portfolio of the lead lender that
defaulted (i.e., for which the borrower’s rating was changed to Default or Selective
Default based on S&P rating database) N days prior contracting of a new loan. Panel
A presents estimates of the fixed-effect regression of debt covenant strictness on recent
defaults, where N days ranges 90 - 360 days before contracting. Panel B repeats the
analysis for the instrument Default 90 days and tests its sensitivity to borrowers’
location and industry (i.e., through excluding defaults with the same 1-digit SIC
code as the contracting borrower, or in the same state, or both). The definitions
of variables are presented in Appendix 4.A1. All specifications include firm, time
(calendar quarter - year), lender fixed effects, and borrowers’ rating dummies. The
symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Financial covenant strictness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default 90 days 0.601***
(0.126)
Default 180 days 0.365***
(0.077)
Default 270 days 0.236***
(0.058)
Default 360 days 0.203***
(0.048)
Altman -5.265*** -5.297*** -5.298*** -5.303***
(0.803) (0.803) (0.803) (0.803)
Loan maturity -0.091 -0.088 -0.072 -0.044
(0.815) (0.815) (0.817) (0.817)
Loan amount -3.335*** -3.321*** -3.294*** -3.265***
(0.640) (0.640) (0.641) (0.641)
Number participants 5.870*** 5.858*** 5.805*** 5.755***
(1.072) (1.072) (1.073) (1.073)
Number lead lenders -3.723*** -3.824*** -3.730*** -3.794***
(1.050) (1.054) (1.057) (1.058)
Rating dummies YES YES YES YES
Lender FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,796 9,796 9,796 9,796
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
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Table 4.6 - Continued
Panel B: IV’s dependence on borrowers’ location and industry
All Different Industry Different State Different Industry
& State
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default 90 days 0.601*** 0.569*** 0.635*** 0.614***
(0.126) (0.139) (0.136) (0.149)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Rating dummies YES YES YES YES
Lender FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,796 9,796 9,796 9,796
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
We then use the fitted value of the covenant strictness, FinCov, for the second-
stage estimation based on the empirical design of equation (4.2). In comparison with
measures of CDS trading activity, our measure of debt covenant strictness, being
related to the initial covenant threshold, is available just at the particular point of
time, at the loan inception. That reduces the sample for our analysis.13 To address
this issue in our empirical design, we follow the extant literature analysing the ex
ante effect of debt covenants on borrower corporate policies and focus on a short time
period after the loan inception (e.g., see Demiroglu and James, 2010; Li, Vasvari, and
Wittenberg-Moerman, 2016). Particularly, we study the joint effect of debt covenants
and overhang on firm investment policy from a quarter to four quarters after the loan
inception.14
We report the results of our estimation based on both OLS and the second
stage of IV/2SLS regressions in Table 4.7.
13Demerjian and Owens (2016) emphasize that even though the strictness measure of debt
covenants can be technically updated subsequent to the loan inception, it may introduce additional
measurement error due to covenant threshold adjustments over the life of the loan, information
on which is not available. Dealscan reports just initial covenant thresholds without updating the
database on its adjustments. Whereas the existing literature documents that debt covenants are a
subject of frequent renegotiation over the life of the loan (e.g., see Denis and Wang, 2014; Roberts,
2015). For instance, Denis and Wang (2014) document that 53% of all debt contracts and 76% of all
debt renegotiations, the majority of which occur in the absence of any covenant violation, modify
at least one of the restrictive or financial covenants. They also show that, on average, the absolute
values of changes to debt covenants range from over 30% to over 80%.
14We do not consider time period longer than four quarters after the loan inception for the same
reason we do not update the measure of debt covenant strictness over time. The assumption is based
on the frequency of covenant renegotiation, that the typical bank loan is renegotiated every nine
months (Roberts, 2015).
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Table 4.7: Covenants and debt overhang: OLS and IV/2SLS. This table
presents the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by firm, that are ob-
tained from OLS and the second stage of IV/2SLS regressions analysing the joint
impact of debt overhang and financial covenants on investment. Panel A presents
the estimation results from OLS investment regressions. Investment is defined both
as a quarter after and four quarters after the loan inception, in columns 1-2 and 3-4,
respectively. Columns 1 and 3 report estimates of the individual effect of debt over-
hang on investment based on equation (4.1). In columns 2 and 4, based on equation
(4.2), the dependent variable Investment is regressed on FinCov (i.e., an aggregated
measure of strictness of financial debt covenants included in a loan package as of
loan inception), Overhang and the interaction term Overhang × FinCov. Panel
B presents the estimation results from IV/2SLS with financial covenant strictness
FinCov instrumented by number of defaults on lead lenders’ loan portfolios in 90
days prior to contracting of a new loan. The definitions of variables are presented
in Appendix 4.A1. All specifications include firm and time (calendar quarter - year)
fixed effects. The symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Investmentt+1 Investmentt+4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Overhang × FinCov -0.020 -0.001
(0.057) (0.011)
Overhang -0.061** -0.043** -0.014*** -0.013**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.005) (0.006)
FinCov -0.010*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.004)
Cash Flow 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
TobinQ 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 8,843 8,843 8,418 8,418
R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.63
Panel B: Instrumented covenant strictness







Firm FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Observations 6,929 6,552
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The estimated coefficients of the interaction term Overhang × FinCov based
on the OLS regressions are negative and statistically insignificant. However, the effect
of covenants on debt overhang problem might be potentially masked due to endogene-
ity of loan contract design to firm characteristics. Once we introduce the instrumental
variable approach, we observe that debt covenants allow to restore shareholders’ in-
vestment incentives by reducing the negative effect of debt overhang on investment
policy. Similarly, in the analysis of the effect of covenants on firm operating per-
formance, Spyridopoulos (2019) provides evidence that the estimated coefficient of
covenants strictness based on OLS regressions is negatively biased and requires en-
dogeneity addressing.
The observed value-enhancing effect of covenants through mitigation of debt
overhang is more pronounced in four quarters rather than in the one quarter after
the loan origination (the coefficients of the interaction term Overhang×FinCov are
positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively). Econom-
ically, a one standard deviation increase in debt covenant strictness (0.408) ceteris
paribus raises investment by 2.23%, allowing to reduce the negative effect of debt
overhang.
Together with the findings in the previous section, we demonstrate that CDSs
and covenants are not equally effective mechanisms reducing costs of no-commitment.
Covenants represent a more universal tool for debt protection and cannot be substi-
tuted by CDS trading. Thereby, the reason of a negative correlation between covenant
strictness and CDSs observed empirically by Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) might
be found elsewhere.
4.5.3. Joint effect of CDS and covenants on debt overhang
Finally, to test whether the reduced incentive of CDS-protected lenders to use debt
covenants is driven by a reason other than the substitution effect, we examine any
changes in covenant effectiveness post CDS inception.
To do it, we test the joint effect of covenants and CDSs on the investment
effect of debt overhang by estimating equation (4.3). Similarly to the analysis on the
individual effect of covenants on debt overhang, we concentrate on the time period of
four quarters after the loan inception. The interaction term Overhang × FinCov ×
CDS Active is the variable of interest, which reflects any changes in effectiveness
of financial covenants in mitigating underinvestment caused by debt overhang post
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CDS inception. The positive (negative) sign of the interaction indicates the enhanced
(reduced) covenant effectiveness. As previously, we address potential endogeneity
concerns with respect to covenant strictness and CDS trading by using the instru-
mental variable approach and the quasi-natural experiment, respectively.
Table 4.8 Panel A reports the results of estimations based on the second stage
of IV/2SLS regressions for the entire CRSP-Compustat-Dealscan sample. Consis-
tent with our theoretical predictions, we find a negative sign of the triple interaction
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active for the overall sample and for the subsample
of firms with greater risk, which are more vulnerable to the empty creditor threat
(statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively).15 This suggests that
CDS trading on a borrower debt makes financial covenants less effective as a mecha-
nism against no-commitment. On the contrary, among firms with the lower risk, the
coefficient estimate of Overhang×FinCov×CDS Active is positive consistent with
our theoretical predictions, but statistically insignificant.
Table 4.8 Panel B reports the results of estimations based on the second stage of
IV/2SLS regressions for the sample over 12-28 calendar quarters around the introduc-
tion of Big Bang Protocol on April 4, 2009. In comparison with Panel A, the number
of observations drops significantly from 6,552 to 295 (12 quarters around the event),
963 (20 quarters around the event) and 1,743 (28 quarters around the event). The
coefficients of the interaction term Overhang×FinCov×CDS Firm×PostBigBang
are negative in all columns, and significant in two out of three specifications for the
longer sample periods. Consistent with our predictions, this suggests that the im-
plementation of the Big Bang Protocol increases the empty creditor threat, which in
turn exacerbates debt overhang problem and reduces covenant effectiveness.
Overall, the above results indicate that the introduction of CDS trading can
reduce the rationales for covenants in a loan agreement through its detrimental effect
on covenant effectiveness.
15The coefficient estimates for two-way interaction terms are generally consistent with the fore-
going analysis. One exception, however, is the coefficient estimate for Overhang × CDS Active,
which has an opposite sign than in Table 4.4, and is not statistically significantly different from
zero. That can be explained by using a much smaller sample than in the analysis of the joint impact
of debt overhang and CDS trading on investment, and concentrating particularly on the sample of
firms with private loans associated with debt covenants (i.e., on firms, for which it was possible to
calculate an aggregate probability of covenant violation).
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Table 4.8: CDS, covenants and debt overhang. This table presents the coeffi-
cients and robust standard errors clustered by firm, that are obtained from the panel
regressions analysing the joint effect of financial covenants and CDS trading on the
investment effects of debt overhang. Based on equation (4.3), the dependent variable
Investmentt+4 is regressed on FinCov, CDS Active, Overhang, and interactions be-
tween these three variables. The interaction term Overhang×FinCov×CDS Active
is a variable of interest, that examines any changes in effectiveness of financial debt
covenants in mitigating underinvestment agency distortions caused by debt overhang
post CDS inception. Panel A reports estimation results of the second stage of 2SLS
instrumental variable regressions with instrumented financial covenant strictness. In
columns 2-3, the sample is split according to the borrower vulnerability to the empty
creditor threat, based on the measure of firm financial stability. Low (high) Firm Sta-
bility, i.e. below (above) the median value, indicates high (low) vulnerability. Panel
B reports estimation results with instrumented financial covenant strictness over 12-
28 calendar quarters around the introduction of the Big Bang Protocol on April 4,
2009. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 4.A1. All specifications
include firm and time (calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. The symbols ***,**, and
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
All Low High
Firm Stability Firm Stability
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Instrumented covenant strictness
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.078*** -0.057** 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.019)
Overhang × FinCov 0.054*** 0.037** 0.039**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
Overhang -0.036** -0.023* -0.031*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.064)
Overhang × CDS Active 0.033 0.015 0.066
(0.018) (0.018) (0.075)
FinCov × CDS Active 0.023** 0.033*** 0.033**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
FinCov -0.033*** -0.047*** -0.034**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
CDS Active -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Controls YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 6,552 3,572 2,980
Panel B: Instrumented covenant strictness: around the Big Bang Protocol
12 quarters 20 quarters 28 quarters
(1) (2) (3)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Firm × PostBigBang -0.002 -0.011* -0.020**
(0.205) (0.045) (0.024)
Interaction terms YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 295 963 1743
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4.6. Robustness Check
4.6.1. Alternative measures of the likelihood of empty creditor
threat
In Section 4.2, we emphasize that our main theoretical predictions on the CDS effects
on debt overhang and covenant effectiveness are conditional on the likelihood of the
empty creditor threat (Hypotheses 2-3). The baseline results discussed above provide
support to our predictions demonstrating more pronounced underinvestment post
CDS inception for the higher amount of CDS insurance written on firms and the
borrowers with weaker fundamentals. Similarly, we find analogous heterogeneity in
the results for the negative effect of CDS trading on covenant effectiveness. In this
section, we provide an additional analysis on cross-sectional heterogeneity in our
baseline results based on the likelihood of firms to face empty creditors.
The first element contributing to the severity of the empty creditor problem is
firm financial stability. So far, to measure firm financial stability, we have used the
empirical proxy which closely corresponds to the model parameter H. As a robustness
check, we use alternative measures of firm risk, such as firm leverage, investment grade
and cash flow volatility. The second element contributing to the severity of the empty
creditor problem is how much CDS insurance is written on firms. Based on the current
literature, we identify types of firms for which creditors have a higher tendency to
over-insure in the CDS market and explore the heterogeneity in our baseline results.
We first sort firms according to shareholders’ bargaining power. Colonnello,
Efing, and Zucchi (2019) show theoretically and empirically that creditors buy more
CDS insurance in the presence of powerful shareholders, who can extract a larger
surplus share in distressed debt renegotiation. That, in turn, enhances the empty
creditor problem and increases the bankruptcy risk in those firms.16 To test it, we
divide the sample into two groups according to the percentage of equity held by insti-
tutional investors, used frequently in the previous literature as an empirical proxy for
shareholder bargaining power (e.g., see Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2007). The higher
institutional ownership is associated with better coordinated and more sophisticated
investors, that allows a firm to bargain more effectively with existing debtholders on
16This prediction on shareholder bargaining power is also consistent with our model’s predictions in




Second, we examine whether the CDS - debt overhang relation is moderated
by the level of renegotiation frictions (i.e., how difficult it is to renegotiate the debt).
The recent theoretical study of Wong and Yu (2018) demonstrates that, to enhance
commitment benefits of CDS contracts, debt holders acquire more credit protection
as renegotiation costs decrease. While the increased use of CDS hedging enhances
debt overhang.17 To determine empirical proxies for renegotiation frictions, we follow
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and use the normalized number of institutional
shareholders and the proportion of short-term debt in the capital structure. The
first empirical proxy measures the dispersion of equityholders. The higher dispersion,
the greater coordination problems, and as a result the greater renegotiation frictions.
The second empirical proxy is based on findings indicating that firms with a higher
proportion of short-term debt (as opposed to long-term-debt) have lower incentives to
renegotiate debt given rare debt forgiveness of short-term creditors and more frequent
concessions made by subordinated long-term creditors (Berglöf and Von Thadden,
1994; Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991).
Third, we split the sample according to the costs of liquidation. Danis and
Gamba (2018) and Wong and Yu (2018) demonstrate that CDS-protected lenders
choose a higher hedge ratio for firms with high bankruptcy costs given greater vul-
nerability of creditors to the strategic default threat.18 We determine two empirical
proxies for liquidation costs following the extant literature. The first empirical proxy,
Nonfixed assets, is based on Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and calculated as one
minus the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. The second
empirical proxy, Intangibles, is based on Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) and calcu-
lated as one minus the ratio of the weighted average of different tangible assets (such
as, receivables, inventories, net property, plant, and equipment, and cash) to total
assets.
We then reestimate equations (4.2) and (4.3) with instrumented covenant
strictness separately for subsamples, representing low/high firm risk and low/high
creditors’ tendency to over-insure in CDSs. We provide the definitions of variables
in Appendix 4.A1. The results are tabulated in Table 4.9. For brevity, we only
17The current literature also indicates the relation between debt overhang and renegotiation fric-
tions. Specifically, Pawlina (2010) shows theoretically that debt overhang can be reduced by higher
renegotiation frictions.
18Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4.4, our model parameter H is a decreasing function of
firm liquidation costs. The lower H, the greater empty creditor threat, and, as a result, the greater
investment-distortion effect of CDS trading.
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report the coefficients of key variables of interest, Overhang × CDS Active and
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active. The cross-sectional analysis supports our ar-
gument that CDS-induced debt overhang and covenant effectiveness loss increase
with the likelihood of firms to face empty creditors. Specifically, we find the more
pronounced detrimental effect of CDS trading in the subsamples of firms with higher
risk (i.e., firms with high firm leverage, high cash flow volatility, and a long-term debt
rating below investment grade), and firms for which creditors have a higher tendency
to over-insure (i.e., firms with high shareholders’ bargaining power, low renegotiations
costs, and high liquidation costs).
Table 4.9: Cross-sectional heterogeneity in results. This table presents the
coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by firm, that are obtained from esti-
mation of equations (4.2) and (4.3) with instrumented covenant strictness. In Panel
A, the sample is split according to the level of firm risk. Firms with higher risk
are presented by the high firm leverage (above the median), high cash flow volatility
(above the median) and no investment grade. In Panel B, we split the sample into
two groups based on the median percentage of institutional ownership, that repre-
sents shareholders’ bargaining power. In Panel C, we partition the sample into two
subsamples based on the level of renegotiation frictions. Firms with the high pro-
portion of short-term debt and number of institutional shareholders (i.e., above the
median) face greater renegotiation frictions. In Panel D, the sample is split based
on the median level of liquidation costs, measured by two empirical proxies follow-
ing Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012). For
CDS-traded firms, the partition variables are measured 4 quarters prior to CDS trade
initiation. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 4.A1. All specifica-
tions include firm and time (calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. The symbols ***,**,
and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Proxy Key independent variable Model 1 Model 2
Low/yes High/no Low/yes High/no
Panel A: Firm risk (1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage
Overhang × CDS Active -0.036 -0.066***
(0.044) (0.020)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.070 -0.066***
(0.012) (0.025)
Observations 116,064 111,404 1,966 4,022
Investment grade
Overhang × CDS Active -0.040 -0.048**
(0.031) (0.020)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active 0.020 -0.069**
(0.059) (0.031)
Observations 25,180 202,288 1,367 5,048
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Table 4.9 - Continued
Proxy Key independent variable Model 1 Model 2
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow Overhang × CDS Active -0.027 -0.048**
volatility (0.028) (0.023)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.034 -0.079***
(0.095) (0.022)
Observations 101,739 114,022 1,339 4,879
Low High Low High
Panel B: Shareholder bargaining power (1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional ownership
Overhang × CDS Active -0.022 -0.045**
(0.015) (0.020)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.022 -0.068***
(0.017) (0.025)
Observations 51,537 83,765 1380 3,311
Low High Low High
Panel C: Renegotiation frictions (1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term debt
Overhang × CDS Active -0.052** 0.002
(0.022) (0.022)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.047* 0.050
(0.025) (0.060)
Observations 129,848 97,620 4,888 1,151
Norm. no. of Overhang × CDS Active -0.012*** -0.023
shareholders (0.046) (0.034)
Overhang × FinCov× CDS Active -0.064*** -0.032
(0.087) (0.060)
Observations 58,830 78,035 2,275 1,331
Low High Low High
Panel D: Liquidation costs (1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonfixed assets
Overhang × CDS Active 0.015*** -0.062***
(0.025) (0.022)
Overhang × FinCov× CDS Active 0.077 -0.060**
(0.064) (0.031)
Observations 117,275 110,181 3,432 2,815
Intangibles
Overhang × CDS Active 0.017 -0.071***
(0.024) (0.024)
Overhang × FinCov × CDS Active -0.045 -0.081***
(0.047) (0.026)
Observations 107,401 120,056 2,328 3,832
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4.6.2. Measurement errors
Our baseline empirical specification (4.1-4.2) can suffer from measurement errors. The
inclusion of proxies for unobservable variables, such as marginal q and debt overhang,
can bias regression coefficients. One of the common methods to address this issue
is to find additional observable variables that can serve as instruments. However,
in many situations it is very difficult to do because such variables might be simply
unavailable. Instead, we address this problem by using linear-cumulant equations
to approximate the minimum distance consistent estimator suggested by Erickson,
Jiang, and Whited (2014).
Table 4.10 reports the results of fifth-order cumulant estimators with two mis-
measured regressors: Overhang and TobinQ. In Column 1, we estimate our baseline
investment regression (4.1) and the coefficient for our proxy of debt overhang remains
negative and statistically significant. In Column 2, we estimate our regression (4.2)
with the interaction of Overhang and an indicator of the start of CDS trading. The
result is consistent with our previous findings that CDSs do not alleviate, but exac-
erbate debt overhang problem. The absolute values of coefficients for both Overhang
and TobinQ increase in comparison with corresponding estimates from OLS in Table
4.4.
In foregoing analysis, we address endogeneity of the measure of covenant strict-
ness through a two-stage instrumental variable approach, that makes it impossible to
combine with the fifth-order cumulant estimators. In next section, as a robustness
check, we propose an alternative measure of underinvestment, which can be tested on
both commitment mechanisms.
4.6.3. Alternative measure of investment inefficiency
To test how the commitment mechanisms of interest affect investment-related agency
costs, so far we have focused on the empirical proxy for the debt overhang capturing
the likelihood that a firm is operating in settings prone to underinvestment (high
leverage, high probability of default, high lender recoveries in default). As a ro-
bustness check, we follow the extant literature in accounting and use an alternative
measure of investment inefficiency by modelling the expected optimal level of firm-
specific capital investment and the deviations from it (e.g., see Biddle, Hilary, and
Verdi, 2009; Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011).
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Table 4.10: Measurement errors. This table tests the robustness of our results
to measurement errors in our proxies for marginal q and debt overhang by using
linear-cumulant equations to approximate the minimum distance consistent estimator
according to Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014). We present the minimum distance
estimates from the fifth-order cumulant estimator. Column 1 reports estimates of the
individual effect of debt overhang on investment based on equation (4.1). Column 2
reports estimates of the joint impact of debt overhang and CDS trading on investment
based on equation (4.2). The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 4.A1.
All specifications include firm and time (calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. The
symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2)










Firm FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Observations 229,716 229,716
In the neoclassical theory of investment, the marginal Q ratio represents the
sole driver and the sufficient statistic for the optimal rate of investment when there are
convex costs of adjusting the capital stock (e.g., see Abel and Eberly, 1994; Hayashi,
1982). Firms invest in capital until the marginal cost of capital is equal to the marginal
benefit. However, under the agency framework, the literature also recognizes that,
in some states of nature, firms may deviate from the expected level and follow a
suboptimal investment policy (e.g., see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).
We first estimate the expected optimal investment cross-sectionally for each
industry-quarter by using a parsimonious model of firm’s growth opportunities (with
at least 30 observations in each industry-quarter)19:
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1TobinQi,t−1 + εi,t, (4.7)
where the error term from the regression model reflects deviations from the predicted
19In untabulated results, given the potential measurement errors in average Q (e.g., see Erickson
and Whited, 2000), in the estimation of the expected level of investment, we include the sales growth
additionally to Tobin’s Q. We find that the results do not change after the extension of the model.
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investment level. We use the residual as a firm-specific proxy for investment ineffi-
ciency. A positive residual (i.e., a positive deviation from the expected investment)
indicates overinvestment, a form of investment inefficiency when a firm makes invest-
ment at a higher rate than the expected level. In contrast, a negative residual (i.e., a
negative deviation from the expected investment) indicates underinvestment, a form
of investment inefficiency when a firm makes investment at a lower rate than the
expected level.
We then construct the variable indicating underinvestment. Underinvestment
is measured by the absolute value of the negative residuals of the above model. The
higher value of which suggests the greater deviation from the predicted investment
level, and, as a result, the more severe underinvestment. We use Underinvestment
as a dependent variable in the further analysis examining individual and joint effects
of the commitment mechanisms on investment inefficiency:
Underinvestmenti,t = β0+β1CommitMechanismi,t−1+β2Controlsi,t−1+εi,t, (4.8)
where CommitMechanism defines either as an indicator of CDS trading activity
(CDS Active), or an aggregated measure of strictness of financial covenants included
in a loan at the loan inception (FinCov). The positive (negative) sign of β1 indicates
the exacerbation (mitigation) of investment inefficiency. To test the joint effect of
covenants and CDSs on investment inefficiency, we interact FinCov with CDS Active.
Motivated by prior research that use residuals as a deviation from the expected
optimal investment level (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011), we control for firm size,
asset tangibility and financial slack. The definitions of these variables are presented
in Appendix 4.A1. The model is estimated using firm and time (calendar quarter -
year) fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the firm level.
The results are reported in Table 4.11. We find that, unlike covenants, CDSs
do not improve, but worsen investment efficiency for the average firm through en-
hancing underinvestment. The coefficient estimate for CDS Active is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The covenant mitigation effect persists after
addressing potential endogeneity by the instrumental variable approach. The test
on the joint effect of the two commitment mechanisms on investment inefficiency
indicates that financial covenants loose their ability to mitigate underinvestment fol-
lowing the introduction of CDS trading. The coefficients of the interaction term
FinCov × CDS Active are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in
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both the OLS and the second stage of IV/2SLS. 20 Overall, the results of robustness
check on the alternative measure of investment inefficiency remain broadly consistent
with our foregoing analysis.
Table 4.11: Commitment mechanisms and investment inefficiency. This ta-
ble presents the coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by firm, that are
obtained from the panel regressions analysing individual and joint effects of commit-
ment mechanisms on investment inefficiency based on equation (4.8). The dependent
variable, Underinvestment, represents a deviation from the optimal investment level
estimated based on firm’s growth opportunities cross-sectionally for each industry-
quarter in (4.7), and measured by absolute value of its negative residuals. The positive
(negative) sign of CDS Active/FinCov indicates the exacerbation (mitigation) of in-
vestment inefficiency. The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 4.A1.
All specifications include firm and time (calendar quarter - year) fixed effects. The
symbols ***,**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: OLS
FinCov × CDS Active 0.011**
(0.005)




Size -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Tangibility 0.005*** 0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
Financial slack 0.031*** 0.022 0.021
(0.001) (0.014) (0.014)
Firm FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 97,754 2,215 2,215
R-squared 0.493 0.731 0.733
Panel B: Instrumented covenant strictness





Firm FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Observations 1,187 1,187
20In untabulated results, as a robustness check, we drop firms in the bottom decile of the Un-
derinvestment variable, i.e. firms with the lowest deviation from the expected optimal level, which
are more likely to be affected by measurement error in the investment model and be a subject of
misclassification. The results remain unchanged.
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4.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, to understand the CDS effect on financial contracting, we take a step
further and test empirically the theoretical predictions developed in Chapter 3.
Based on the sample of U.S. private loans, we find strong empirical support
for the comparative statics predictions in Chapter 3. Unlike covenants, CDSs do
not alleviate, but enhance investment distortions created by debt overhang. The
investment-distortion effect of CDSs is more prominent for firms with the higher
probability to be forced by empty creditors into a liquidation, such as for the higher
amount of CDS insurance written on firms and/or the weaker firms’ fundamentals.
Further analysis reveals that, in the post - CDS inception, covenants lose their ef-
fectiveness as a mechanism against no-commitment. The CDS market undermines
shareholders’ incentive to undertake valuable investment despite the presence of strict
financial covenants in a loan contract. These results are robust to alternative variable
measures, and address potential endogeneity issues.
Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 shed new light on the effect of CDSs on
financial contracting, and can be useful for regulators in policy discussion with respect
to the welfare effects of the CDS market. Our findings indicate that the access of debt
holders to credit insurance can reduce their incentive to impose covenants on loan
agreements. However, the reason of this reduced incentive lies not in the substitutive
effect of the CDS market, as suggested in Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019), rather
in its detrimental effect on covenant effectiveness. Our findings are not inconsistent
with Shan, Tang, and Winton (2019) or with other empirical papers on covenants





Table 4.A1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
CDS variables
CDS Active Binary variable that equals one in and after the quarter of inception of CDS
trading on a reference firm’s debt. Source: CreditTrade, GFI, Markit
CDS Firm Binary variable that equals one if a firm has CDS trading on its debt at any
time during the sample period. Source: CreditTrade, GFI, Markit
PostBigBang Indicator variable that equals one after the introduction of the Big Bang Pro-
tocol (April 4, 2009). Source: Internation Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA)
Likelihood of empty creditor threat
Hedge Ratio Proxy for the aggregated hedge ratio of lenders in the CDS market, h. Ratio
of CDS net notional amount at the quarter-end scaled by the total debt.
Source: DTCC, Compustat
Firm Stability An empirical measure of firm financial stability, which closely corresponds to
the model’s parameter H. Calculated as a composite score measure based on
the average of decile-sorted key partitions variables of H: leverage, firm pro-
ductivity (Tobin’s Q) and liquidation costs (nonfixed assets). Where leverage
and liquidation costs are corrected through multiplication by minus one be-
fore sorting so that H is increasing in all variables. Source: Compustat
Financial covenant
FinCov Proxy for the covenant strictness, c∗. Overall measure of debt covenant
strictness calculated as the aggregate probability of covenant violation at the
loan inception date across all financial covenants included on a given loan
package from the total set of fifteen covenant categories in Dealscan. The
calculation is based on a non-parametric simulation approach by Demerjian
and Owens (2016). Source: Compustat, DealScan
# covenants Number of financial covenants included on a loan package at the loan incep-
tion from the total set of fifteen covenant categories in Dealscan. Source:
DealScan
Covenant definitions For each 15 financial covenant documented in Dealscan, we use “standard”
definitions (including Compustat implementations) determined by Demerjian
and Owens (2016):
(1) Min. Cash Interest Coverage = EBITDA/Interest Paid (oibdpq/intpny),
(2) Min. Debt Service Coverage = EBITDA/(Interest Expense + Principal)
(oibdpq/(xintq + lag(dlcq))),
(3) Min. EBITDA = EBITDA (oibdpq),
(4) Min. Fixed Charge Coverage = EBITDA/(Interest Expense + Principal
+ Rent Expense) (oibdpq/(xintq + lag(dlcq) + xrent)),
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Table 4.A1 - Continued
Variable Description
(5) Min. Interest Coverage = EBITDA/Interest Expense
(oibdpq/xintq),
(6) Max. Debt-to-EBITDA = Debt/EBITDA ((dlttq + dlcq)/oibdpq),
(7) Max. Senior Debt-to-EBITDA = Senior Debt/EBITDA ((dlttq +
dlcq − ds)/oibdpq),
(8) Min. Quick Ratio = (Account Receivable + Cash and Equiva-
lents)/Current Liabilities ((rectq + cheq)/lctq),
(9) Min. Current Ratio = Current Assets/Current Liabilities
(actq/lctq),
(10) Max. Debt-to-Equity = Debt/NW ((dlttq + dlcq)/(atq − ltq)),
(11) Max. Debt-to-Tangible Net Worth = Debt/TNW ((dlttq +
dlcq)/(atq − intanq − ltq)),
(12) Max. Leverage = Debt/Assets ((dlttq + dlcq)/atq),
(13) Max. Senior Leverage = Senior Debt/Assets ((dlttq + dlcq −
ds)/atq),
(14) Min. Net Worth = NW (atq − ltq),
(15) Min. Tangible Net Worth = TNW (atq − intanq − ltq).
% performance covenants Percentage of performance covenants included on a loan package at
the loan inception. Based on covenant definitions: # (1) - (7). Source:
DealScan
% capital covenants Percentage of capital covenants included on a loan package at the
loan inception. Based on covenant definitions: # (8) - (15). Source:
DealScan
FinCov Financial covenant strictness instrumented by the number of defaults
on lead lenders’ loan portfolios in 90 days prior to contracting of a new
loan. Source: DealScan, Compustat
Default 90 days Number of outstanding loan packages in loan portfolios of lead lenders
that defaulted (i.e., for which the borrower’s rating was changed to
Default or Selective Default based on S&P rating database) 90 days
prior contracting date. Source: DealScan, Compustat
Contracting date 90 days prior to the loan start date (legal effective date). Source:
DealScan
Agency costs measures









ρt+s[1− 0.05(s− 1)](1 + r)−s
]
where D is the firm’s total debt, K is the firm’s capital stock,
Recovery Rate is an industry specific weighted recovery ratio of de-
faulted senior unsecured bonds by three-digit SIC code, ρ is the firms’
default probability calculated as the expected default frequency (EDF)
following the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008), r is a risk-
free rate based on long-term Treasuries. Source: Compustat, CRSP,
Altman and Kishore (1996) for recovery ratios, Federal Reserve Bank
Reports
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Table 4.A1 - Continued
Variable Description
Underinvestment Measure of investment inefficiency determined based on the absolute value
of the negative residuals of the cross-sectional estimation of the parsimo-
nious expected investment model based on firms’ growth opportunities for
each industry-quarter (with at least 30 observations).
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1TobinQi,t−1 + εi,t,
The higher value, the more severe underinvestment (i.e., greater deviation
from the predicted investment level). Source: Compustat
Firm characteristics
Investment Capital expenditures normalized by the start-of-period Net PPE,
capxy/ppentq(t− 1), where capxy is adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation.
Source: Compustat
Cash Flow Internal cash flow normalized by the start-of-period Net PPE, (ibq +
dpq)/ppentq(t− 1). Source: Compustat
TobinQ Tobin’s q defined as market value of assets divided to book value of assets,
(prccq × cshoq + atq − ceqq)/atq. Source: Compustat
Altman Altman’s Z-score defined as 3.3× piq/atq + saleq/atq+ 1.4× req/atq+ 1.2×
(actq − lctq)/atq. Source: Compustat
Rating dummies Dummy variable for a firm’s S&P long-term debt rating. Source: Compustat
Investment grade Indicator variable equal to one if a firm has investment grade rating (i.e., BBB
or above). Source: Compustat
Leverage Total debt to book value of assets, (dlcq + dltq)/atq. Source: Compustat
Cash flow volatility Cash flow (ibq + dpq) standard deviation for the previous ten years. Source:
Compustat
Size Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, defined as atq. Source: Compustat
Tangibility Net PPE scaled by total assets, ppentq/atq. Source: Compustat
Financial slack Cash to total assets, cheq/atq. Source: Compustat
Loan characteristics
Loan amount Sum of loans (i.e., facilities, tranches) included in the loan package. Source:
DealScan
Loan maturity Weighted average of maturities of loans included in the loan package where
the weights are the amount of each loan. Source: DealScan
# participants Number of lenders in the loan syndicate. Source: DealScan
# lead lenders Number of lead lenders in the loan syndicate. Source: DealScan
Loan spread The weighted average of all-in-drawn loan spreads over LIBOR at the loan
inception where the amount of each loan is used as loan weights. Source:
DealScan
Secured Binary variable that equals one if there are secured loans in the package.
Source: DealScan
Purpose Binary variable that equals one if the loan is issued for corporate (or refinanc-
ing, or acquisition, or backup line) purposes. Source: DealScan
Renegotiation frictions proxy
Short-term debt dlcq/(dlttq + dlcq). Empirical proxy is determined following the extant liter-
ature (e.g., see Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2007). Source: Compustat
150
Table 4.A1 - Continued
Variable Description
Norm no. of shareholders Log(Number of institutional shareholders/Market equity). Empirical
proxy is determined following the extant literature (e.g., see Davydenko
and Strebulaev, 2007). Source: Thomson 13f, Compustat
Shareholder bargaining power proxy
Institutional ownership Percentage of total equity owned by institutional investors. Empirical
proxy is determined following the extant literature (e.g., see Davydenko
and Strebulaev, 2007). Source: Thomson 13f
Liquidation costs proxy
Nonfixed assets 1-Net PPE/Book total assets, 1 − ppentq/atq. Empirical proxy is de-
termined following the extant literature (e.g., see Davydenko and Stre-
bulaev, 2007). Source: Compustat
Intangibles 1 - (Cash + 0.715 x Receivables + 0.547 x Inventories + 0.535 x Net
PPE)/Total assets, 1 − (chq + 0.715 × rectq + 0.547 × invtq + 0.535 ×
ppentq)/atq. Empirical proxy is determined following the extant litera-
ture (e.g., see Favara, Schroth, and Valta, 2012). Source: Compustat
Appendix B: Simulation approach
To calculate the measure of debt covenant strictness FinCov, we follow the non-
parametric simulation approach by Demerjian and Owens (2016). The goal of this
simulation is to compute the aggregate probability that at least one financial covenant
attached to a debt contract will be violated during the quarter after the loan inception.
The computation is organized in the following steps:
1. Based on Compustat data, for all levered firms we calculate financial ratios
associated with all 15 financial covenants documented in Dealscan based on
“standard” debt covenant definitions provided by Demerjian and Owens (2016).
Note, that we focus on the firm’s most recent quarterly data preceding the loan
origination date. The list of these 15 covenants, their standard definitions and
Compustat implementations are detailed in Appendix 4.A1.
2. For each firm-quarter, we then calculate quarterly changes for each 15 financial
underlying ratios from Step 1. Changes are presented in the ratio form, i.e.
Changet = FinRatiot/F inRatiot−1, where t is a fiscal quarter. The financial
ratio increases if Change > 1, and decreases if Change ∈ (0,1). Observations
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with missing data on changes for any of the 15 financial ratios are deleted. The
rest change variables are truncated at the upper and lower percentiles.
3. Next, firms are sorted into 12 size-profitability bins. Specifically, we first sort
firm-quarter observations into size quartiles, and next into profitability terciles.
Size is measured by average total assets. Profitability is measured by ROA
(operating income before depreciation scaled by average total assets).
4. For each 15 financial underlying ratios, we then simulate the firm’s one-quarter-
ahead measures. To do it, we multiply the firm’s quarterly financial underlying
ratios by change variables (from Step 2) in the randomly drawn match firm
observation (i.e., from the sample of firms in the same size-profitability bin).
5. Then, we compare the forecasted (simulated) financial underlying ratios with
the initial covenant thresholds in Dealscan, and record whether there is a
covenant violation.
6. We repeat 1,000 times Step 4 and Step 5. In each iteration, we randomly
draw (with replacement) a new firm-quarter observation matching by the size-
profitability bin.
7. Finally, we calculate FinCov as the number of iterations with an indicated




The thesis contributes to the ongoing debates on the welfare effects of the CDS market
by revealing positive and negative effects which were previously undetected.
Chapter 2 provides the first comprehensive assessment of the effect of CDSs on
human capital representing one of the key non-financial stakeholders of firms. We find
that the inception of CDS trading on borrowers’ debt leads to an increase in employee
pay and an improvement of overall labor welfare, including broad-based cash profit
sharing and health and safety benefits. Our findings of the CDS effect on human
capital, an asset which brings essential economic value to the firm’s business and
the economy as a whole, add positively to the ongoing debates on the welfare effects
of the CDS market. Furthermore, the study helps to improve our understanding
of determinants of corporate labor relationship and emphasizes the role of credit
derivatives in shaping corporate human-resource policies.
Chapters 3 and 4 shed new light on the effect of CDSs on financial contracting,
and provide an explanation to current empirical research. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first who theoretically investigate whether the emergence of the CDS
market changes creditors’ incentive to use traditional tools of financial contracting,
such as debt covenants, for protection of their interests. Our analysis is built on un-
derstanding whether CDS contracts can be considered as an adequate substitute for
debt covenants, and whether the presence of CDS trading changes their effectiveness
as a countervailing force against no-commitment. Based on the sample of U.S. private
loans, Chapter 4 provides empirical support for the theoretical predictions developed
in Chapter 3.
Our findings indicate that the access of debt holders to credit insurance can
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reduce their incentive to impose covenants on loan agreements, that is consistent
with empirical findings of weakened covenant strictness post CDS inception by Shan,
Tang, and Winton (2019). However, the reason of this reduced incentive lies not in
the substitutive effect of the CDS market, as suggested in Shan, Tang, and Winton
(2019), rather in its detrimental effect on covenant effectiveness. That also provides
an explanation to empirical findings of Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015),
who document no creditors’ intervention in investment policies in CDS traded firms,
including those with agency problems, following covenant violations. Thus, the loss of
covenant effectiveness post CDS inception can be much broader, and be also related
to its ex post disciplining effect on corporate policies following technical default.
While the thesis was being prepared for final submission, a new paper-discussion
by Demerjian (2019) came to our attention. The paper provides a discussion of as-
pects, which are important for understanding and interpreting findings of Shan, Tang,
and Winton (2019). In particular, Demerjian (2019) raises a question of whether
weakened loan provisions in CDS firms could be associated with an improved con-
tracting efficiency and a substitution of loan contractual protection. He argues that
CDSs may or may not be a substitute for traditional tools of financial contracting,
and a negative correlation observed empirically between these instruments might be
not due to the substitution effect. Given the complexity of the problem, he highlights
the importance of understanding the full nature of risk that CDSs and covenants
address. This thesis answers the questions raised by Demerjian (2019).
Finally, our findings of the detrimental CDS effect on traditional tools of fi-
nancial contracting, used by creditors to reduce debt-equity agency conflicts, add
negatively to the ongoing debates on the welfare effects of the CDS market. Notwith-
standing the potential loss of covenant effectiveness post CDS inception, debt holders
should be particularly careful in loosening covenant strictness given its complemen-
tary value in reducing the likelihood of strategic debt service and inefficient liquidation
caused by CDS-protected empty creditors.
Findings in this thesis could inspire future research on various topics. First,
Chapter 2, recognizing the interaction between financial innovations and human cap-
ital of firms, opens a new and exciting path for future research in corporate human-
resource policies. Chapters 3 and 4 suggest further studies to take into account that
the joint use of several commitment mechanisms does not always lead to an improve-
ment of contracting efficiency, and instead may have an opposite effect. Finally, a
natural progression of Chapter 4 is to empirically examine changes in covenant effec-
tiveness post CDS inception in public bond market.
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